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Abstract 
 
With the wireless media and ad hoc nodes operating both as routers and 
communication end-terminals, the ad hoc routing protocols are more prone to attacks 
than the network layer of fixed networks. Authenticated routing messages are a primary 
concern in the provisioning of a reliable network service. 
The scope of this dissertation has been network layer security in ad hoc networks 
intended for the operational scenario of emergency and rescue operations. The main 
objectives have been to investigate the applicability of existing security schemes for ad 
hoc networks, and to contribute to the development of resource efficient, yet robust and 
appropriate protection schemes.  
The majority of secure ad hoc routing protocols proposed so far, tend to focus on the 
protection techniques, rather than the computational cost and bandwidth consumption. 
Our work highlights the importance of taking these factors into consideration in the 
design of secure routing protocols. In addition, attention must be paid to the nature of 
routing control traffic and its discrepancies from ordinary application data. 
The thesis is based on our research published in four articles. Our contributions 
include a comprehensive survey of key management methods proposed for ad hoc 
networks and an evaluation of the applicability for initialization and maintenance of a 
protected network service. The applicability of identity-based public key schemes for 
protection of ad hoc routing information is also analyzed. Scalability remains an issue 
even with ID-based schemes that remove the need for bandwidth consuming certificate 
exchanges. A hybrid protection scheme is therefore proposed for the Optimized Link-
State Routing protocol (OLSR). The protection scheme reduces both computational cost 
and bandwidth consumption by combining identity-based signatures with values from a 
hash chain.  And last, a simple and robust, yet scalable, method is introduced for the 
distribution of revocation information in ad hoc networks.  
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1 Introduction  
 
1.1 Background and motivation 
Wireless communication is the key to network availability anywhere and at 
anytime.  Today’s wireless communication systems usually depend on pre-established 
communication infrastructure. Mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) allow 
communication where no such infrastructure is available. They are self-organizing and 
self-configuring. The nodes operate both as communication end-points and routers. 
Multi-hop communication is enabled through co-operating nodes and ad hoc routing 
protocols.  
The application areas of MANETs range from conference hall networks to military 
tactical operations and disaster relief. This dissertation emphasizes the latter. The PhD 
project is part of the SIMULTAN (Secure IP-based multi-media access networks) 
program at Kongsberg Defence & Aerospace. Communication solutions for 
emergency and rescue operations are the focal point of the program. 
MANETs are expected to play an important role in future communication systems 
for disaster relief operations where one cannot rely on a fixed infrastructure. Ad hoc 
networks can also be used to extend the coverage area or reduce the load on base 
stations and access points in infrastructure based communication systems.  
The users can be expected to anticipate the same set of services as they are used to 
have in the wired network. However, to meet these objectives, wireless multi-hop 
communication faces additional challenges and constraints compared to wired 
networks. Problems, ranging from power consumption and frequency allocation to 
routing and security, are topics for research.  
 
1.2 Scope and Objectives 
Attacks can be launched towards any layer of the protocol stack. Our scope has 
been network layer security in mobile ad hoc networks. The aim is a reliable network 
service in emergency and rescue operations.   
Zhou and Haas [113] suggest redundancy (multiple routes) and cryptographic 
schemes for protection of ad hoc routing protocols. We have focused on cryptographic 
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methods. Key management is a basic problem for any scheme relying on 
cryptographic methods, and an initial objective was to provide an overview of 
proposed key management schemes and evaluate their applicability for the 
deployment of a protected network service.  
The wireless environment and battery powered nodes make bandwidth efficiency 
and energy saving important design criterions for ad hoc networks. Besides limited 
energy and spectrum resources, the ability to scale is an important factor.  
There may be a large number of recipients of ad hoc routing messages. A separate 
message authentication code for each possible recipient of a routing message 
represents a scalability problem. The receivers may not even be known in advance. 
Hence, pairwise symmetric keys is no viable solution. A symmetric group key scales 
better. The price is lower intrusion tolerance. That is, a single captured node means 
the system security is compromised. Furthermore, the exclusion of compromised 
nodes necessitates re-keying. Key changes have negative impacts on network 
availability during the transient period. The robustness is enhanced with asymmetric 
keys and exclusions through a public key revocation scheme. However, asymmetric 
cryptographic schemes are known to be computationally expensive and introduce 
more overhead than symmetric schemes.  
Identity-based schemes [95] make certificate exchanges obsolete. This implies 
lower bandwidth cost than traditional public key schemes. The scope therefore 
included an investigation of the limitations of asymmetric schemes, and identity-based 
schemes in particular, for the protection of ad hoc routing information. A natural 
extension has been to explore how hybrid protection schemes using multiple security 
mechanisms, can be combined with the exploitation of the nature of the routing 
protocols to provision a reliable network service.  
Assuming a protected network service with routes set up through trusted nodes 
only, the exclusion of compromised and malfunctioning nodes can be achieved with 
the aid of a revocation scheme. Revocation schemes designed for the fixed net 
typically assume guaranteed network connectivity and/or no bandwidth constraints. 
The last objective was development of a method for efficient and appropriate 
distribution of revocation information in ad hoc networks.  
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1.3 Structure of the thesis 
The thesis is divided into two parts. Part I (this part) gives the motivation for the 
problems investigated and an introduction to the research field. Knowledge of ad hoc 
routing protocols is required in order to be able to suggest appropriate protection 
mechanisms. A survey of some representative ad hoc routing protocols is therefore 
included. Part I in addition discusses basic protection mechanisms and their use in the 
securing of route control traffic. Our contributions and some remaining problems are 
also described in Part I. Part II contains the publications that constitute the major 
results of the research conducted: 
Paper I: Survey of Key Management in Ad Hoc Networks 
Paper II: Analysis of IBS for MANET Security in Emergency and Rescue 
Operations 
Paper III:  Hybrid Protection of OLSR 
Paper IV: On the Distribution of Revocation Information in Ad Hoc Networks  
 
The reference section of Part I, lists the publications cited in Part I only. 
Publications cited in the articles in Part II are found in the reference section of each 
paper. 
 
1.4 Methods 
The survey paper (paper I) is a result of on an extensive literature study. A number 
of evaluation criteria were defined and the surveyed schemes were evaluated in 
accordance with these criteria. For the remaining work, the problems were identified, 
requirements for beneficial solutions were defined, related work was studied and new 
solutions proposed. The suggested solutions were then evaluated and unsolved 
problems identified. The analytical proof-of-concepts in paper II and paper III are 
based on simulation results from [106], obtained with the ns-2 network simulator. 
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1.5 Setting the scene: mobile ad hoc networks for emergency and 
rescue operations 
1.5.1 Organizational structure of emergency and rescue operations 
Emergency and rescue operations are governed by international conventions and 
national laws and regulations. The organizational structure of the emergency and 
rescue services in Norway is specified in [53]. 
The emergency and rescue team on the site of the incident consists of professional 
units. Typically, health personnel, fire brigade and police take part. Military forces 
and humanitarian organizations may also be included. Figure 1 illustrates the generic 
organizational structure.  
The emergency and rescue team reports to the rescue management on the site of 
the accident. The operation is coordinated from one or more off-site rescue co-
ordination centres. In Norway, depending on the severity and size of the incident, the 
operation may be administered from a local rescue co-ordination centre or one of the 
two national rescue co-ordination centers. 
 
Fire Police
Health
Site of incident
Rescue co-ordination centre(s)
On site rescue 
management
 
Figure 1 Organizational structure of emergency and rescue operations 
 
Altogether, whereas the time and location of the next operation are not known in 
advance, the involved parties and roles are to a large extent predefined. The 
organizational structure enables pre-configuration and pre-distribution of credentials 
such as cryptographic keys. The rescue management and co-ordination centers 
represent common points of trust.  These can be exploited in the generation and 
distribution of keys. The key material can be distributed in the preparation phase prior 
to the actual operations.   
 
9 
1.5.2 Characteristics of MANETs for emergency and rescue operations 
MANETs for emergency and rescue operations will have a planned origin. The 
network size and range will depend on the type of operation. Small to medium size 
and range will expectedly dominate. Node mobility may vary. The on-site rescue 
management is normally vehicle mounted. Nodes with heterogeneous capabilities can 
be expected. Nodes carried by the ordinary rescue personnel will be battery powered. 
Vehicle mounted nodes may be less energy constrained and have better physical 
protection. The wireless media implies limited bandwidth.  
A communication system for emergency and rescue operations should function 
independently of the availability of fixed infrastructure. However, the communication 
system should be able to exploit fixed infrastructure if such is available. The 
communication patterns will include both group and peer-to-peer communications. 
Efficient and reliable communication is mission critical. The deployment time 
must be minimized. When the rescue team arrives on the scene of an incident, 
communication should be established and maintained with as little human interaction 
as possible.  
The risk of intervention by malicious actors differs depending on whether the 
rescue operation takes place in a hostile or a benign environment. However, the 
communication system must function in either situation. Therefore, adequate 
protection must be built-in. Regulations and laws also impose security requirements.  
The MANET may include nodes from a single security domain or multiple 
security domains. Operations cross national borders can be examples of the latter. 
 
1.5.3 Network architecture 
Different scenarios for how ad hoc technology will be used in future 
communication systems for emergency and rescue operations are discussed by 
Winjum in [105]. A probable application is as an extension to existing infrastructure-
based systems, e.g., as shown in Figure 2.  
The MANET may have a connection to fixed network through one or more 
gateways. The MANET internet connection may include a satellite link, a fixed or a 
mobile base station (possibly co-located with the on-site rescue management) or other. 
References [9] and [46] describe the connection of MANETs to the Internet with the 
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aid of Mobile IP assuming a reactive or a proactive ad hoc routing protocol, 
respectively.  
Ad hoc networks could be used as transit networks. Throughout this thesis 
MANETs are assumed to be stub networks.  
MANET 
MANET
Gateway
WAN
Gateway to rescue co-
ordination centre
Site of incident  
Figure 2 Network architecture 
 
Other sub groups of ad hoc networks may also have applicability for future 
disaster relief communication. Sensor nodes and sensor networks will likely come to 
play an important role. Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are a type of ad hoc 
networks with different requirements and features than MANETs. Data are routed 
towards a base station. The nodes are normally static and more resource constrained 
than traditional MANET nodes. WSNs can be formed through mass deployment of a 
huge number of sensor nodes. 
 Vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) may also be exploited in disaster relief 
communication, but the role is less evident. In VANETs the nodes move along roads. 
The nodes communicate vehicle-to-vehicle or via base stations and fixed 
infrastructures available along the road. The node mobility is expected to be higher 
than in traditional MANETs, and the size of the VANET may be very large 
(potentially including all vehicles in the world).  
Throughout this thesis ad hoc networks and ad hoc technology refer to mobile ad 
hoc networks unless other is specified. Other types of ad hoc networks are considered 
out of scope of this dissertation. 
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1.5.4 A note on MANETs and TETRA 
Norway is currently (2007) planning to implement a TETRA (Terrestrial Trunked 
Radio) -based emergency network over the next years. TETRA is an open standard for 
emergency communication defined by the European Telecommunications Standards 
Institute (ETSI). The TETRA system is infrastructure-based, and has limited capacity. 
The emergency network for Norway is specified to cover only approximately 80% of 
the land area, and, hence, 90% of the population. MANETs could be combined with 
TETRA in order to provide higher data capacity, extend the coverage area and reduce 
the load on base stations. 
TETRA uses Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) technology, and offers 4 
user channels (4 TDMA timeslots). The number of concurrent flows within one cell is 
hence low. The maximum data rate offered is 28.8 Kbps (7.2 Kbps per channel). This 
is in Trunked Mode operation (TMO) where the communication is set up with the aid 
of a TETRA base station. The TETRA terminals can also communicate directly or via 
another node in the Direct Mode operation (DMO). DMO can be used if the nodes are 
out of range of a TETRA base station or the base station for other reasons is not 
accessible. But TETRA DMO offers limited functionality regarding data rate, range 
(number of hops) and concurrent flows compared to what can be obtained with a 
mobile ad hoc network. The maximum data rate in DMO is 7.2 Kbps. TETRA 2 
extends the data rates to some hundred Kbps. However, TETRA 2 requires a 
significantly higher density of base stations than TETRA in order to cover the same 
area. (Figures from Belgium indicate a factor of approximately 100 [105]). TETRA 
combined with ad hoc technology may be a more viable solution.   
Our research has focused on mobile ad hoc networks and has sought to be neutral 
to specific implementations and possible co-existing technologies. The network 
architecture in Figure 2 has been assumed throughout the work. 
 
1.5.5 Summary 
Whereas some ad hoc networks may be truly ad hoc, mobile ad hoc networks for 
operational scenarios such as emergency and rescue operations will have a planned 
origin. Common points of trust will exist, and pre-configuration of security parameters 
will be possible.  
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Mobile ad hoc networks are expected to play an important role in future 
communication systems for emergency and rescue operations. However, exactly how 
the ad hoc technology will be used is yet to be concluded. The mobile ad hoc network 
should operate independently from fixed infrastructure, but be able to exploit such 
infrastructure if available.  
The wireless media and nodes operating both as routers and communication end- 
points make the ad hoc network layer routing information prone to attacks. Hence, a 
protected routing protocol is a prerequisite for a reliable network service.  
 
1.6 Threats to ad hoc networks 
1.6.1 Threats: MANETs versus infrastructure based wireless networks 
Basically, MANETs are exposed to the same types of threats as other wireless 
mobile communication systems. Attacks can be directed towards any layer of the 
protocol stack. Jamming, eavesdropping, replays, falsification, insertion and 
modification of messages are inherently easy. Battery-powered terminals imply 
vulnerability to energy-depleting attacks.  
However, MANET communication does not suffer from failures in fixed 
infrastructures such as access points and base stations, transmission network and core 
network in the same way as the infrastructure-based wireless and wired 
communication systems do. On the other hand, whereas the routers in infrastructure-
based networks are part of an established and (at least to some extent) controllable 
infrastructure, the same is not true in ad hoc networks. The nodes acting both as 
routers and communication end-points make the ad hoc routing protocols more prone 
to attacks.  
 
1.6.2 Threats to MANET routing protocols 
Attacks are often classified as either active or passive. A passive attack can be 
defined as an attack where an adversary attempts to defeat a cryptographic technique 
by simply recording data and thereafter analyzing it. An active attack involves an 
adversary who modifies or injects messages [63].  
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Passive attacks are mainly threats against communication privacy and anonymity, 
rather than against the network’s function or routing protocol [39]. Active attacks 
constitute the major threats. That is, passive eavesdropping on routing messages could 
be used as part of traffic analysis, which could be exploited to launch other attacks. 
But this is assumed not to represent any significant threat in the emergency and rescue 
operations scenarios.  
Attacks on ad hoc routing protocols generally fall into one of the two categories; 
routing-disruption attacks and resource-consumption attacks [39]. Routing-disruption 
attacks refer to attacks where the attacker attempts to cause legitimate data packets to 
be routed in dysfunctional ways. In resource-consumption attacks, the attacker injects 
packets into the network for the purpose of consuming bandwidth or exhausting the 
nodes by depleting their energy resources or using up memory. In general, from an 
application-layer perspective, attacks on the ad hoc routing protocol appear as various 
types of Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks. Nodes that perform active attacks with the 
aim of damaging other nodes by causing network outage are considered to be 
malicious.  
Surveys of attacks on ad hoc routing protocols are found in[22], [23], [39], [40] 
and [94]. Related information is also found in [6], which discuss generic threats to 
routing protocols for wired networks. Examples of attacks on routing protocols 
include:  
Bogus routing information: Successful insertion of bogus routing information 
may lead to corrupt routing tables.  
Black holes refer to nodes that attract traffic by maliciously advertising shortest 
path to other nodes. The black holes may choose to forward routing information 
correctly but discard other data. Grey holes selectively forward data.   
Wormholes [42] refer to adversary nodes colluding by tunneling packets from one 
part of the network to another, making geographically distant nodes falsely believe 
that they are neighbors. The wormhole nodes may then act as black holes or grey 
holes.  
Invisible node attacks [61] are basically wormhole attacks consisting of only one 
node that passively relays routing messages.  The invisible node can make 2-hop 
nodes falsely believe they are 1-hop neighbors. The attack can be set up with the aid 
of directional antennas. 
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Replays are retransmissions of earlier messages for the purpose of corrupting 
routing tables or exhausting the channel or other nodes.  
Rushing attacks [41] are targeted at reactive routing protocols where routes are 
established on demand and in which duplicate messages are discarded. The attacker 
distributes route requests quickly through the network, e.g., by extending the 
transmission range through increased antenna gain or augmenting the transmission 
power. Legitimate requests that arrive later are discarded. 
Byzantine behavior refers to nodes that do not behave according to the protocol. 
This includes insertion of false or modified routing messages, masquerade, selfish 
behavior, delayed response and other deviations from the protocol. Malicious nodes 
may also try to cause routing loops.  
Selfish nodes give priority to own traffic. They are reluctant to forward data for 
other nodes, and prefer to save their battery for own communications. (It could be 
argued that this represents a kind of passive attacks, but we regard it as an active 
attack where the node actively chooses not to cooperate in accordance with the 
protocol.)  
Impersonation (masquerade or spoofing) can be launched by replays or old 
routing messages or insertion of false routing information for the purpose of 
corrupting routing tables, exhausting nodes or gain unauthorized access to the 
network.  
A Sybil attack [25] refer to a single node capable of presenting multiple identities. 
This can be exploited in impersonation attacks. 
Blackmail: In ad hoc network routing protocols where the nodes attempt to keep 
track of perceived malicious nodes in a “blacklist” at each node, e.g., as in watchdog 
and pathrater [62], an attacker may blackmail a good node, causing other good nodes 
to add that node to their blacklists, thus avoiding that node in routes [40]. 
 
1.6.3 Threat model 
The classical Dolev-Yao threat model [24] assumes that the adversary may 
eavesdrop on any message, modify and replay messages, and forge source and 
destination addresses. But the adversary cannot produce a valid signature on other 
nodes’ behalf or decrypt a message that has been encrypted with a key she does not 
possess.  
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For ad hoc networks the threat model must cope with one or a few compromised 
nodes. The nodes are out in the field. The physical protection of the communication 
nodes can be limited. The probability of one or more compromised routers (nodes) 
will thus expectedly be greater than in traditional wired and wireless networks. That 
is, the threats may come from external attackers (outsiders) as well as internal 
attackers (insiders). However, the number of internal attackers will expectedly be low. 
Internal attackers here refer to nodes with access to secret key material. External 
attackers are adversaries without access to any special information other than what can 
be obtained by listening to the wireless transmissions. Attacks can be launched both 
by nodes that deliberately act maliciously, and nodes that unintentionally do not 
behave according to the protocol, e.g., due to a hardware or software error.  
A somewhat more complex attacker model for ad hoc networks is used in [39] and 
[40]. The model assumes an attacker consists of more nodes. Both external nodes and 
compromised nodes are included. The attacker owns all the cryptographic key 
information of compromised nodes and distributes it among all its nodes. The attacker 
can be passive or active, and is characterized by the number of nodes it owns in the 
network and the number of nodes it has compromised. An Active-n-m attacker is an 
active attacker consisting of m nodes that has compromised n good nodes.  
1.6.4 Summary  
Ad hoc routing protocols are more prone to attacks than their wired equivalents. 
Threats may originate from external attackers as well as insiders. An unprotected 
network service is vulnerable to active attacks. Active attackers may cause route-
disruption and node exhaustion. Passive eavesdropping is considered not to be 
harmful.  
Our work assumes that security schemes for ad hoc routing protocols should resist 
attacks from externals as well as a limited number of internal nodes.  
 
1.7 A summary of the thesis 
A reliable ad hoc network service requires protected routing control traffic. 
Authenticated routing messages, i.e., integrity protected and source authenticated 
messages, are demanded. A proper key management system is an essential 
prerequisite of any successful cryptographic protection scheme.  A natural starting 
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point was thus to survey existing key management schemes proposed for ad hoc 
networks (Paper I in Part II) [34]. The aim was to discover any dominating or more 
suitable schemes. The proposals were evaluated according to a set of evaluation 
criteria covering applicability under various network assumptions, security, 
robustness, scalability and simplicity.  
The assumed threat model means that survivability despite one or more 
compromised nodes is required. Asymmetric schemes enable unique identification and 
authentication of the sources of route management traffic, and can also be used for 
verification of message authenticity. These are desirable features. If identifiers that are 
by default sent as part of the routing messages can be used as public keys, intuitively, 
identity-based schemes may scale better than traditional certificate based schemes. 
This observation led to a closer analysis of the implications of identity-based signature 
schemes for the protection of ad hoc routing information (Paper II in Part II) [33].  
One of the conclusions was that signature sizes can be a more limiting factor for 
the applicability of asymmetric schemes than computational cost.  Bandwidth efficient 
protection schemes are sought.  That is, with resource constrained nodes, both little 
overhead and low computational cost is beneficial.  This makes hybrid solutions 
interesting. A typical assumption for protection schemes is that all ad hoc routing 
messages must be signed. However, all messages may not need equally strong 
protection in order to provide a reliable network service. Especially in proactive 
protocols, a large number of the periodic routing messages primarily serve as “heart-
beat” messages. They do not necessarily report any important changes.  This was the 
background for the development of a hybrid protection scheme for the Optimized Link 
State Routing protocol OLSR [18] (Paper III in Part II) [32]. The hybrid protection 
scheme uses identity-based signatures and hash chains.   
Practical communication systems will normally require a way to expel 
compromised and maliciously behaving nodes. This can be achieved through an 
appropriate revocation scheme. The revocation techniques proposed for fixed 
networks are generally not well suited for ad hoc networks. Some require guaranteed 
connectivity to a central trusted entity to check certificate status on-line. Others trade 
update cost for timeliness or vice versa. Schemes proposed for ad hoc networks 
typically rely on the ad hoc nodes’ exchanges of accusations or revocation lists 
obtained from trusted entities during periods with connection to the fixed net. 
Revocation due to false accusations may occur. The revocation lists typically cover all 
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revocations in the entire security domain, and not only the subset of revocations 
interesting for the nodes in a particular MANET.  
Assuming that most practical ad hoc networks will have one or more gateways 
connecting them to external networks, the gateways could be exploited in the filtering 
and distribution of relevant revocation information. With a proactive routing protocol, 
the gateway will know which nodes are in the ad hoc network. This led to the 
development of the MANET revocation list (MRL) scheme (Paper IV in PART II) 
[31]. The MRLs are set up with the aid of information learned from the routing 
protocol and one or more trusted gateways with connection to a trusted revocation 
entity. 
 
The work has concentrated on the network layer and the protection of routing 
information. A natural extension would be to investigate security on multiple layers 
and security as a cross-layer issue. As an example, black holes may be easier to detect 
by combining network layer routing information with connectivity experienced by the 
application layer. Common data-bases could be shared by multiple layers. Treating 
security as a multiple-layer and cross-layer issue, could lead to increased efficiency 
and possibly better, less fragmented solutions compared to what is obtained by adding 
security layer by layer. 
We have assumed that compromised nodes should not be included in the ad hoc 
network, i.e., a “Stop-at-the-network-layer” idea. However, some systems may require 
that the compromised nodes are included in the network in order to erase keys, e.g., 
keys used to protect application data. An example of a scheme that utilizes key-
zeroing messages is described by Jungels, Raya and Hubaux in [45]. It assumes that 
the keys are stored in tamper-proof devices. If the node has fallen into wrong hands, 
the key administrator deletes the key material through a deletion message 
acknowledged by the tamper proof device. This requires a network connection to the 
compromised node. On the other hand, such information could also be included in the 
transmissions in such a way the key material is deleted whenever the compromised 
node tries to eavesdrop on the communication.  
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2 Security in ad hoc networks  
2.1 Ad hoc routing protocols 
With the wireless media and mobile nodes acting as routers, ad hoc networks 
present different requirements than wired networks do. A large number of ad hoc 
routing protocols have been proposed. Some have received more attention than others, 
but there is no generally adopted standard. That is, there are ongoing standardization 
efforts. After classification of the routing protocols, the next sections summarize the 
standardization work, and outline some of the candidate standard ad hoc routing 
protocols.  
Surveys of ad hoc routing protocols are found in [37], [56], and [59]. 
   
2.1.1 Classification of ad hoc routing protocols 
A widely adopted classification of ad hoc routing protocols is according to their 
routing strategy, i.e., proactive (table-driven) or reactive (on-demand). In [37], Hong, 
Xu and Gerla extend this categorization to include the network structure underlying 
the routing protocols. Their categories include flat, hierarchical and geographic 
position assisted routing. Flat routing protocols are further divided into Reactive and 
Proactive.  
Reactive routing protocols establish routes on demand. Proactive protocols 
maintain the routing tables irrespective of the actual use of the routes. Reactive 
routing protocols generally impose less overhead, but longer delays to establish a 
route than proactive protocols do. A drawback with proactive protocols is the constant 
bandwidth and energy consumption due to periodic updates. However, with scattered 
traffic patterns and high mobility, proactive protocols produce higher routing 
efficiency than reactive protocols do. The routes are known in advance. This is a 
desirable property also for real-time applications. 
 Hybrid routing protocols make use of both reactive and proactive approaches. As 
an example, in the Zone Routing Protocol (ZRP) [28] the nodes use a proactive 
approach within a specific radius and a reactive approach to reach nodes outside this 
zone.  
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When the network size increases beyond some threshold, the link and processing 
overhead of flat routing schemes become intractable. This motivates a hierarchical 
approach. Each node participating in flat routing protocols plays an equal role. In 
contrast, the nodes in hierarchical routing schemes are organized in groups, and nodes 
are assigned different functionalities inside and outside the group. The group leader 
node communicates with other nodes on behalf of the group. An example of 
hierarchical routing is the Internet hierarchy. 
Flat routing protocols adopt a flat addressing scheme [37]. Some hierarchical 
protocols require a hierarchical addressing system. Hierarchical addressing schemes 
assume the nodes within an area to have related addresses, e.g., a common subnet 
address. In flat addressing schemes all bits in the addresses are used for each 
forwarding decision. The nodes need not have addresses from a specific range to be 
routable in the MANET.   
Geographical routing assumes the nodes to be equipped with location-finding 
equipment such as the Global Positioning System (GPS).  
Ad hoc routing protocols can also be classified according to other criteria such as 
routing metrics and whether the protocols use link-state or distance-vector routing 
algorithms. In distance-vector routing, the nodes maintain a view of the distance from 
themselves to all other destinations. This information is exchanged with neighbors. In 
link-state routing the nodes inform all other destinations in the network about their 
links to neighbors. A routing metric is any value used by routing algorithms to 
determine whether one route is superior to another [105].  
 
2.1.2 Standardization work 
The MANET working group (WG) of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) 
has been established to standardize IP routing protocol functionality for ad hoc 
networks.  
The Optimized link state routing protocol (OLSR) [18], the Ad hoc On-demand 
distance vector routing protocol (AODV) [86]  and the Topology dissemination based 
on reverse-path forwarding protocol (TBRPF)[78] have earned status as experimental 
RFCs.  Current Internet-drafts from the MANET WG by December 2006 comprised 
the Dynamic MANET On-demand (DYMO) routing protocol [13], OLSR version 2 
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[17], Dynamic Source Routing Protocol (DSR) [44] and simplified multicast 
forwarding for MANETs (SMF) [60].   
In addition, another IETF working group, the Open Shortest Path First (OSPF) 
WG, works with an adaptation of the OSPF routing protocol [19][69] for ad hoc 
networks, referred to as W-OSPF or OSPF-MANET.  Two techniques dominate; the 
OSPF overlapping relays (OSPF-OR) [14] and OSPF-MANET designated router 
(OSPF-MDR) [77]. The OSPF WG has not yet (Jan 2007) reached consensus on 
which one of these approaches is the superior.   
OLSR, OLSR version 2, TBRPF, and the OSPF-MANET protocols [14] [77] are 
all proactive link-state protocols. AODV, DSR and DYMO are reactive distance-
vector protocols. The MANET WG currently (Jan 2007) pursues one proactive (OLSR 
version 2) and one reactive (DYMO) routing protocol. The official charter maintained 
by the IETF secretariat indicates that the MANET WG may consider a converged 
reactive and proactive approach. 
2.1.3 Proactive ad hoc routing protocols 
2.1.3.1 OLSR and OLSRv2  
In the Optimized link state routing protocol (OLSR) [18] and OLSR version 2 
(OLSRv2) [17], distribution of topology information is optimized compared to 
classical flooding through the use of Multipoint Relay (MPR) nodes. Only nodes that 
are chosen as MPRs forward routing information. Each node selects MPRs from its 1-
hop neighbors in such a way that all 2-hop neighbors are covered by at least one MPR.  
OLSRv1 specifies four message types: HELLO, Topology Control (TC), Multiple 
Interface Declaration (MID) and Host and Network Association (HNA). The HELLO 
messages are used for link sensing, neighbor detection and MPR selection, and are not 
forwarded by the MPRs. The other message types are flooded through the MPR 
nodes.  TC messages convey topology information, and are only emitted by MPR 
nodes. MID messages are sent by nodes with more than one OLSR interfaces. HNA 
messages announce non-OLSR interfaces. The nodes are uniquely identified by their 
main address included as the originator address in every routing message. Routing 
tables are computed from the information exchanged through the HELLO and TC 
messages. 1-hop and 2-hop neighbors are detected from the HELLO messages. 
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Information concerning the 3-hop and more distant nodes are found from the TC 
messages.  
OLSRv2 only specifies HELLO and TC messages, and adopts the generalized 
MANET packet and message formats described in [16]. Information such as gateway 
announcements is included as Type-Length-Value fields (TLVs) in TC messages. 
Thus, the generation of TC messages in OLSRv2 is not limited to MPR nodes. 
Old or duplicate routing messages are detected with the aid of the message 
sequence numbers, and are discarded. Each node increments the message sequence 
number for every new message it generates.  
 
2.1.3.2 OSPF-MANET protocols 
OSPF-MANET provides reliable flooding. All routing messages are 
acknowledged. Backup nodes forward the routing control traffic if the expected 
forwarding node fails to do so.  
The proposed OSPF-MANET solutions; OSPF overlapping relays (OSPF-OR) 
[14] and OSPF-MANET designated router (OSPF-MDR) [77], differ in the way they 
optimize the flooding of routing information. OSPF-OR nodes choose overlapping 
relays (ORs) parallel to the MPRs in OLSR. Non-OR nodes act as backup ORs that 
retransmit the routing messages if the ordinary OR fails to do so. OSPF-MDR use 
MANET designated routers (MDRs) to flood routing information. The decision to 
become a MDR or a backup designated router (BMDR) is made by the nodes 
themselves.  
Topology information is disseminated through link-state update (LSU) packets 
containing link-state advertisements (LSAs). The other packet types; HELLO, 
database description (DD), link-state request, and link-state acknowledgement are not 
forwarded outside the 1-hop neighborhood. HELLO messages are used for neighbor 
detection and link sensing.  Link-state acknowledgements are used to locally 
acknowledge the reception of LSAs. DD and link-state requests are used to 
synchronize the link-state databases between adjacent nodes.  
The OSPF-OR and OSPF-MDR extensions to the OSPF packet format are carried 
in a link local signaling (LLS) data block attached to HELLO and DD packets. OSPF-
OR in addition specifies a new LSA type – link LSA that is used to distribute 
information about 2-hop neighbors. 
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OSPF-OR and OSPF-MDR packets are encapsulated in IP. The nodes are uniquely 
identified by their router id included in each routing packet.  
 
2.1.4 Reactive ad hoc routing protocols  
2.1.4.1 DSR  
In the Dynamic Source Routing protocol (DSR) [44] routes are established on 
demand. Route requests are flooded into the network. Intermediate nodes append their 
addresses to the route request messages as the queries travels through the network. 
The target of the route request returns a route reply to the initiator containing a copy 
of the accumulated route recorded in the route request message. This “source route” is 
then included in packets sent to the target. The source route defines which hops the 
packet is to traverse. Packets are acknowledged hop-by-hop. If a link breaks, a route 
error message is returned to the source nodes that use this link. 
2.1.4.2 AODV and DYMO  
The Dynamic MANET On-demand (DYMO) [13] routing protocol is a descendant 
of the Ad hoc on-demand distance vector routing protocol (AODV) [86]  and DSR 
[44] designs. In AODV and DYMO routes are discovered on demand by flooding a 
route request (RREQ) into the network. During this dissemination process, each 
intermediate node records a route to the originating node. The destination (or 
intermediate nodes with a valid route to the destination) unicasts a route reply (RREP) 
along the path that the RREQ was received. Each node that receives the RREP records 
a route to the target node, and unicasts the RREP towards the originating node. In 
DYMO, only the destination node initiates RREPs. 
Differently from AODV, DYMO also allows intermediate nodes append additional 
routing information to the routing messages. That is, if the nodes believe that this 
information will alleviate future RREQs. Other nodes may remove the additional 
routing information if they consider it outdated.  
Each destination in the routing table is recorded with its latest known destination 
sequence number (DYMO calls it DYMO sequence numbers). All nodes increment 
their sequence numbers before issuing a new RREQ. The destination sequence 
numbers ensure no routing-loops. The routing tables are not updated unless a route 
with a higher sequence number is detected. That is, of two routes with same 
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destination sequence number, the one with the lowest HopCount is chosen. The 
HopCount is incremented by each node that the routing message traverses, and 
indicates the number of hops from the originator of the message.  
The nodes maintain their routes and monitor links over which traffic is moving. A 
route error (RERR) is sent to the packet source if the current route is broken.  
AODV nodes should use an expanding ring search technique to prevent 
unnecessary network-wide dissemination of RREQs. This means that the flooding 
scope of RREQs is gradually increased until a RREP is received. The range of 
dissemination is controlled by the TTL (Time To Live) field of IP header. Expanding 
ring search is optional in DYMO. 
AODV and DYMO messages are encapsulated in UDP over IP. The nodes are 
identified by their IP addresses.  
 
2.2 Protecting the ad hoc routing protocols  
2.2.1 Trust model 
A typical assumption for the protection of ad hoc routing information is that nodes 
in possession of a valid secret key are trustworthy. Others are not. The key can be a 
group key established through the collaborative effort of all or a subset of the MANET 
nodes, or a key distributed from a trusted third party (TTP) or approved by a TTP, 
e.g., through a certificate signed by the TTP. 
RFC 3756 [71] discusses trust models for various networks, including ad hoc 
networks. The RFC assumes truly ad hoc networks where the nodes meet for the first 
time and no prior trust relations exist. It assumes that there is no guarantee that other 
nodes behave according to the protocol. But with IP addresses derived from public 
keys, the nodes can trust that they communicate with the same node all the time. That 
is, the node picks a private key and calculates the corresponding public key. The IP 
address is then calculated from the public key. Others cannot easily steal the IP 
address. Only the owner of the private key will be able to produce a signature that can 
be verified with the public key, and hence, prove the ownership of the address.  
The trust model for disaster relief MANETs assumed in our work, is related to the 
hierarchical organizational structure depicted in Figure 1. A Key Administration 
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Centre (KAC) or trusted entity is assumed in each security domain. The KAC may be 
a national key administration centre related to a national rescue co-ordination centre.  
All the nodes within the security domain trust the KAC to conceal its secret keys 
and to protect them from unauthorized access. In case of a traditional public key 
scheme, the KAC is believed to issue certificates only to authorized nodes. The KAC 
is also trusted to generate secret keys for the other nodes in the security domain, and 
to distribute these in a secure way (through a confidential and authenticated channel).   
Ordinary nodes in possession of a secret valid key are trusted to operate according 
to the agreed protocol and forward data correctly. Nodes from other security domains 
may be trusted in the same way, e.g., as a result of the KACs of the involved security 
domains have cross-certified each other.  The ordinary nodes are in addition trusted 
not to disclose their secret key to unauthorized parties.  
Hence, the assumed trust hierarchy includes ordinary nodes and the KAC. For 
practical reasons, key material can also be distributed through nodes that are more 
protected and trusted than the ordinary ones, e.g., nodes at the local co-ordination 
centre. This means an additional level between ordinary nodes and the KAC in the 
hierarchy of trust. These “distribution nodes” can be trusted to store key material for 
other nodes in a secure way, and only let authorized nodes receive keys –after proper 
identification. Both the KAC and “distribution nodes” are typically located outside the 
MANET.   
 
2.2.2 Definition of security for ad hoc routing protocols 
The general terms used to describe security; availability, integrity, authentication, 
confidentiality and non-repudiation apply to MANETs as to other networks. However, 
every factor is not equally important for the protection of ad hoc routing information. 
Nodes can be trusted to forward data correctly without necessarily being authorized to 
gain access to the information contained in the transferred data. Ordinary payload is 
typically end-to-end and can be protected with any end-to-end security system like 
IPsec [50]. Routing messages are sent to immediate neighbors, processed, possibly 
modified, and re-transmitted [110].  
Availability is a number one concern. The transmission of ordinary payload can 
assume an already running network service. The routing messages are a necessary pre-
condition for the establishment and maintenance of routes that makes communication 
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of application data possible. Integrity and authenticity is important both for protection 
of payload and for the establishment of reliable routes through authorized nodes.  
However, whereas confidentiality of the application data usually is a primary concern, 
hiding the contents of routing messages is normally not necessary. Furthermore, 
whereas several applications may require non-repudiation for log and audit, routing 
information has basically only instant value. 
The routing messages demand end-to-end protection.  Reactive protocols such as 
AODV and DYMO require special attention to the HopCount field that is modified by 
intermediate nodes. In contrast, the proactive OLSR and OLSRv2 make no use of 
mutable fields such as Hop Count and TTL in the route calculation. These fields need 
not be protected. On the other hand, neighbor detection and topology changes are of 
great concern.  
With malicious nodes in the network, route replies from intermediate nodes 
instead of the destination node in AODV are a security risk. The intermediate nodes’ 
inclusion and removal of additional routing information in the DYMO routing 
messages may also represent a security challenge. 
 
2.2.3 Basic protection mechanisms  
Whereas the security schemes proposed for ad hoc routing protocols are different, 
the designs generally rest on one or more methods from the same set of primitives. 
The next sections describe the most common basic protection mechanisms. These 
mechanisms are prerequisites for the schemes in sections 2.2.4 and 2.2.5. 
2.2.3.1 Message authentication codes  
Message authentication codes (MACs) are a candidate type of mechanism for 
integrity protection and authentication of routing message origin.  
A MAC algorithm is a family of functions that take a secret (symmetric) key and 
an input text of arbitrary length, and produce a fixed length MAC as output [63].  
Given the key and the text, the MAC is easy to compute. Without knowledge of the 
key, it is computationally infeasible to compute a valid text-MAC pair.  
On reception of a routing message with a corresponding MAC, nodes in 
possession of the correct key can calculate the MAC of the data and verify that it 
equals the received MAC. In this way, integrity and authenticity can be checked.  
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The MAC length is typically short – 32 or 64 bits are common choices. The small 
sizes plus low computational cost are important advantages. 
MACs can be generated in different ways. Both stream-ciphers and block-ciphers 
may be used. One possibility is to use a block-cipher in cipher-block-chaining (CBC) 
mode. The Advanced Encryption Standard, AES [72] has replaced the Data 
Encryption Standard (DES) [73] as a generally adopted standard that can be used to 
generate CBC-MACs. Other modes of operation may also be used. Reference [27] 
describes Galois Message Authentication Codes (GMAC) generated with the aid of 
AES in Galois/Counter mode of operation for IPsec’s [50] ESP [49] and AH [48]. 
Message authentication codes can in addition be generated with the aid of keyed hash 
functions. An example is HMAC [54].  
 
2.2.3.2 Cryptographic signatures  
Stinson [99] defines a signature scheme as a method of signing a message stored in 
electronic form. The signature scheme consists of two components; a signing 
algorithm and a verification algorithm. If a message is signed with the private signing 
algorithm, the resulting signature can subsequently be verified using the public 
verification algorithm. Cryptographic signatures can be used for data integrity, 
authentication and non-repudiation.  
Cryptographic signature schemes can be classified as signature schemes with 
appendix or signatures schemes with message recovery.  Signature schemes with 
appendix require the original message as input to the verification algorithm [63]. 
Signature schemes with message recovery do not. The original message is recovered 
from the signature itself. The latter may give shorter messages, but the contents cannot 
be evaluated before the message has been recovered.  
Protection schemes for ad hoc routing information normally rely on signature 
schemes with appendix. It is beneficial to be able to evaluate the routing message 
contents for further processing without first having to spend energy on the recovery. 
Cryptographic signatures with appendix are assumed in the further.   
Cryptographic signature schemes include both traditional certificate-based digital 
signatures and identity-based signature (IBS) schemes [95]. IBS schemes use the 
identifiers, e.g., IP addresses, as public keys. The private keys are provided by a 
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trusted third party, and are derived from the identifier (public key) of the node plus the 
private master key of the trusted entity. 
 RSA [92] and DSA [74] are representatives of well-known digital signature 
schemes.  Shamir’s original IBS scheme [95] was also derived from RSA. Newer IBS 
schemes include Cha and Cheon [12], Hess [35], Paterson[83], and SOK[93] rely on 
the Weil and Tate pairings on elliptic curves. 
Signature schemes are almost always used in conjunction with a very fast public 
cryptographic hash function. MD5[91] and SHA-1[76] have been much used hash 
functions. The collision-free hash function takes a message of arbitrary length and 
produces a message digest of a specified size (160 bit is a popular choice) [99]. The 
message digest is then signed using the signature algorithm. Relying on discrete log 
and factoring problems, signature algorithms are known to be computationally 
expensive. The signatures are also generally large; 1024 and 2048 bits are common 
RSA signature sizes. DSA signatures are shorter. Typical sizes are 160 – 224 bits.    
2.2.3.3 Hash Chains  
Hash chains [55] have been proposed for the protection against short distance 
frauds and sequence number deceptions in a number of secure routing protocols. It has 
also been proposed to prevent topology information from being distributed further 
than a specified number of hops (SLSP [80]). 
Hash chains are created with the aid of a cryptographic hash function.  If a hash 
function is to be considered secure, it requires preimage resistance (one-way 
property), second preimage resistance (for a given input it is hard to find another that 
gives the same hash value) and collision resistance (hard to find pairs of different 
inputs that return the same hash value). However, hash chains only depend on the one-
way property. 
Hash chains are constructed by repeated hashes of an initial random seed RND: 
h1=h(RND), h2=h(h1),…,hn-1=h(hn-2), hn=h(hn-1) ( h() is the cryptographic one-way 
hash function). If the last value in the hash chain, i.e., the hash anchor hn, is 
distributed through an authenticated channel, the receiver can verify whether later 
disclosed values originate from the same hash chain or not. Repeated hashes of the 
received value should return the hash anchor. Forward hash calculation is fast and 
easy. The one-way property makes it hard for anyone but the creator to find the 
preceding values in the hash chain.  
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After SHA-1 was reported broken in 2005 [103], there is a move towards other 
members in the SHA family such as SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512. However, the 
reported attack concerned the collision resistance and not the one-way property. SHA-
1 may still be applied for hash chains. 
2.2.3.4 Redundancy  
Redundancy increases the robustness against malfunctioning and selfish nodes and 
nodes that for other reasons exhibit Byzantine behavior. Examples include the OSPF 
MANET protocols [14] [77] that have backup nodes that forward the routing 
messages if the ordinary overlapping relays or MDRs  fails to do so. The self-healing 
community approach in [52] extends the responsibility of backup forwarding to all 1-
hop neighbors that the strict 2-hop neighbors have in common.  
Redundancy intrinsic in the routing protocols in the form of periodic refresh and 
route maintenance message also increase the resilience. As an example, even with 
signed routing messages and adversaries capable of sporadically forging a message 
signature, the protocol will only be disturbed temporarily. Acknowledged forwarding 
of routing messages as in the OSPF MANET protocols and DSR represents 
“redundancy” that increase the reliability of the routing protocol. 
 
2.2.3.5 Reputation schemes  
Reputation schemes have been proposed to thwart selfish nodes and other types of 
Byzantine behavior.  Reputation schemes typically rely on monitoring of node 
behavior and accusations. The nodes listen to the transmissions of routing packets in 
promiscuous mode. Bad behavior can be detected by keeping a copy of the packets 
and comparing them to the retransmitted versions. If node hears another node 
retransmit the packet with modified contents, it can warn the others. Examples of 
reputation-based schemes include CONFIDANT [10] and Watchdog and Pathrater 
[62] (sections 2.2.4.2 and 2.2.4.3).  
Assuming signatures are used to distinguish legitimate members of the network 
from unauthorized ones, reputation schemes can be used as an additional measure to 
counter misbehavior by insiders.  
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2.2.3.6 Message identifiers  
The ability to uniquely identify routing messages is important for protection 
against routing loops and replay attacks. The node addresses are normally part of the 
identifier. In addition, most commonly, sequence numbers are used. The secure 
routing protocol ARAN [94] uses nonces and timestamps in the message 
identification. A nonce is a value used no more than once for the same purpose [63]. 
Sequence numbers represent one type of nonces.   
Sequence numbers included in the routing messages enables the recipients to 
evaluate the freshness of the message. Old messages and duplicates of new messages 
that have already been processed are discarded. This prevents routing loops. It also 
protects against replay attacks. However, the sequence numbers need to be protected 
by a signatures or a MAC. Otherwise, the built-in suppression of duplicates and old 
messages could easily be exploited in DoS attacks.  It is also necessary to keep a 
record of the latest sequence numbers received.   
In [107], Winjum et al. propose acknowledged sequence numbers combined with 
message authentication codes are for the protection against replay attacks in OLSR.  
Adjih et al. [2] and Hafslund et al. [29] use sequence numbers, signatures and 
timestamps for the same purpose. 
 
2.2.3.7 Packet leashes  
Hu, Perrig and Johnson [42] propose packet leashes to counter wormhole attacks. 
A leash is information that is added to a packet to restrict the packet’s maximum 
allowed transmission range. Strict timing or localization information is a prerequisite. 
A geographical leash includes information about the locations of the nodes. Temporal 
leashes include a timestamp that enables the receiver to evaluate whether the packet 
has traveled longer than the maximum transmission distance (assuming the speed of 
light). Temporal leashes require stricter time synchronization than geographical 
leashes. It may be hard to distinguish a delay due to an additional travel distance from 
that introduced by lower layers’ normal media contention. Signing the temporal leash 
at transmission time makes it even more difficult. The time required for the signing 
process normally exceeds the transmission time with several orders of magnitude. 
Geographical leashes combined with a signature scheme ease detection of adversaries 
claiming to reside at multiple locations simultaneously. 
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2.2.3.8 Use of the protection mechanisms  
Cryptographic signatures and message authentication codes are used to prevent  
successful insertions of false or modified routing information, black and grey holes, 
masquerade/spoofing and externals exhibiting Byzantine behavior. MAC and 
signatures can also be combined with sequence numbers (or time stamps) to protect 
against replay attacks and routing loops. Wormholes necessitate additional measures, 
e.g., packet leashes [42]. Redundancy is important for robustness and survivability. 
Hash chains can amongst other be used in the protection of mutable fields of routing 
messages in reactive protocols.   
MACs and signature schemes are the fundamental mechanisms used in most 
protection schemes for routing information. The generic features of symmetric and 
asymmetric methods are therefore discussed in more detail in the sequel.  
Table 1 provides a simplified overview and comparison of some of the attributes 
of symmetric and asymmetric methods that are relevant for protection of ad hoc 
routing information. The “+” sign means the scheme meets the requirements or has an 
advantage regarding this attribute. Drawbacks and missing features are marked “-”. 
The “+/-” indicate the method can meet the requirements, but not necessarily very 
easily. 
 
Table 1 Features of symmetric and asymmetric schemes for protection of ad hoc routing 
information 
Asymmetric methods
+-+No certificates
--+Overhead
--+Computational complexity
++-Source authentication
+/-+/--Revocation
++-Intrusion tolerance
ID-based 
Signatures
Digital 
Signatures
Symmetric
MAC
 
 
Computational complexity and overhead: Symmetric schemes are superior to the 
asymmetric ones in computational efficiency. For the same level of security they also 
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provide less overhead. The computational cost and overhead of asymmetric schemes 
are a challenge. And, differently from symmetric schemes, the processing cost and 
bandwidth consumption also grow rapidly with increasing security levels. Bandwidth 
consuming certificate exchanges imposed by traditional asymmetric schemes comes in 
addition.  
If identifiers that are by default sent as part of the routing messages can be used as 
public keys, identity-based public key signature schemes may scale better than the 
traditional certificate based schemes. That is, Shamir’s original identity-based 
signature scheme [95] expands the signature size with a factor of two compared to 
RSA for the same modulus.  Newer IBS schemes such as Cha and Cheon [12], Hess 
[35], Paterson [83], and SOK[93] that are based on the Weil or Tate pairings, provide 
shorter signatures. Implementations with supersingular elliptic curves with an 
embedding degree of 2 give signature sizes comparable to RSA. Various choices of 
curves and embedding degrees impose different message expansions and 
computational cost. The signature sizes can to some extent be traded for 
computational complexity and vice versa. Further details are found in [51]. 
Source authentication and intrusion tolerance: Symmetric MACs generated with a 
group key can be used to distinguish authorized members of the network from 
unauthorized ones. But a group key precludes unique identification of the source node. 
All nodes in possession of the secret key can generate a valid MAC. A node can insert 
and modify messages on other nodes’ behalf. This makes the system more vulnerable 
to attacks from malicious insiders. Another disadvantage is that the system security is 
compromised by a single captured node.  
Pairwise unique keys would provide better intrusion tolerance, but would also 
necessitate a separate message authentication code for each possible recipient. For 
routing messages that are flooded in the network, this scales badly. Besides, all 
possible recipients of the routing message may not even be known in advance.  
Signatures enable unique identification of the message originators. The 
asymmetric nature prevents that nodes can undetectably modify or insert messages on 
other nodes’ behalf. This means a stronger protection against inside attacks compared 
to symmetric schemes relying on a group key. Asymmetric schemes also fulfil the 
requirement that one or a few compromised nodes should not cause a total break of 
the system security. 
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Revocation and exclusion of nodes: With systems relying on a symmetric group 
key, exclusion of a single node implies re-keying. A typical solution would include a 
key distribution centre that sends a new group key encrypted with unique keys to each 
of the remaining nodes. This is bandwidth consuming, and there is no guarantee that 
all nodes receive the new key in a timely manner. This represents a threat to network 
availability. Although still challenging, revocation is easier with asymmetric schemes. 
Nodes can be excluded without need for the remaining nodes to change their keys. 
However, revocation is known to be difficult in wired networks, and is even harder in 
the ad hoc environment. There are problems related to factors such as timeliness, 
overhead, and no guaranteed connectivity. Revocation and exclusion of nodes are 
discussed in more detail in section 2.3.3. 
Conclusion: None of the methods in Table 1 is fully compliant with the 
requirements. The protection of ad hoc routing messages would benefit from an 
asymmetric component, but the complexity and amount of overhead introduced by 
such schemes need close attention. A proper revocation scheme also needs further 
consideration.  
 
2.2.4 Basic security modules 
Basic security modules here refer to frameworks or security protocols that can be 
applied in various secure ad hoc routing protocol designs. The modules typically 
include one or more of the basic security mechanisms. The distinction made between 
basic security modules and secure routing protocols is not very strict, and there is to 
some extent overlap between the two categories. 
 
2.2.4.1 TESLA 
TESLA [87] (Timed Efficient Stream Loss-tolerant Authentication) is an 
authentication scheme designed for source authentication in multicast streams in lossy 
channels. It relies on symmetric cryptography and delayed disclosure of keys. The 
keys are subsequent values from a hash chain. The key used at time i equals a hash of 
the key used at time i+1.  The hash anchor must be sent in the initial packet, and is 
authenticated with the aid of a digital signature. The hash anchor enables the nodes to 
verify that later disclosed keys originate from the claimed source.  To send an 
33 
authenticated packet, the sender computes a message authentication code (MAC) with 
a key that is secret at that point in time. The receiver stores the message until the key 
later is disclosed. The nodes must be loosely time synchronized and know the key 
disclosure schedule. Otherwise adversaries could forge messages with the aid of 
already disclosed keys.  
The TIK (TESLA with instant key disclosure) [42] extension to TESLA enables 
key disclosure without delay. It requires accurate time synchronization between all 
communicating parties, and makes use of a Merkle hash tree construction [64] to 
commit to the keys. 
  
2.2.4.2 CONFIDANT 
CONFIDANT [10] (Co-operation of nodes: Fairness in dynamic ad-hoc networks) 
is a reputation-based scheme that aims at detecting and isolating misbehaving nodes. 
It works as an extension to a reactive source routing protocol, e.g., DSR. The nodes 
monitor the behavior of their one-hop neighbors. By keeping a copy of a packet while 
listening to the re-transmission of the next node, malicious actions such as changes in 
message contents and dropped packets can be detected. When a threshold number of 
suspicious events have been detected from a node, the monitoring node alerts its 
friend nodes about the suspicious behavior. (Detailed specifications for how to make 
friends are not provided.) If there is sufficient evidence that the node is malicious, it is 
omitted in the route discovery. The signatures on the alert messages prove the 
accusations’ trustworthiness.  
 
2.2.4.3 Watchdog and Pathrater 
Watchdog and Pathrater [62] are two extensions proposed for DSR. The method 
can also be used for other reactive source routing protocols. The approach is 
reputation-based. The watchdog identifies misbehaving nodes and the pathrater helps 
the routing protocol avoid these routes. The watchdog listens in promiscuous mode to 
check that the next node in the path forwards data as agreed. It requires that the 
watchdog module keep a copy of the recent packets, and compare each overheard 
packets with the stored versions. The source of the route is notified if misbehavior is 
detected. The pathrater module uses the information from the watchdog combined 
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with link reliability data to pick the most reliable route. The path should be free from 
misbehaving nodes.   
A main problem with the watchdog and pathrater approach is the vulnerability to 
blackmail attacks. 
 
2.2.4.4 TIARA 
TIARA (Techniques for Intrusion Resistant Ad hoc Routing Algorithms) [90] is a 
set of design techniques to protect ad hoc networks against DoS attacks. The 
techniques include flow-based route access control (FRAC), multi-path routing, 
source-initiated flow routing, flow monitoring, fast authentication, and the use of 
sequence numbers and referral-based resource allocation. The FRAC mechanisms 
drop packets not destined to and originating from authorized destinations and sources 
of packet flows. Multi-path routing refers to the maintenance of redundant routes. 
When multiple paths exist between the source and the destination, source-initiated 
flow routing enables the source to specify which path to use. The source node 
periodically sends encrypted and digitally signed flow status message to the 
destination. This flow monitoring helps detect path failures. Fast authentication refers 
to the inclusion of a path label at a node specific secret location within the packet. The 
sequence numbers are proposed to counter replay attacks. Resource depletion is 
thwarted by limiting the maximum amount of network resources a node is willing to 
allocate to a specific flow of packets. Additional resources are only granted if 
“referrals” from a number of other trusted nodes can be presented.  
The techniques provided by TIARA are protocol independent, but they require 
extensive changes to existing protocols in order to be successfully incorporated [4]. 
 
2.2.4.5 SAR 
Security-aware Ad hoc Routing (SAR) [109] is a framework for the inclusion of 
security metrics into the route discovery process of reactive ad hoc routing protocols. 
The aim is to find a route with a quantifiable guarantee of security. The nodes can be 
assigned different trust levels. Only nodes with the correct level of trust are able to 
process the route requests and replies. This can be implemented by encrypting the 
routing messages with different group keys for each trust level.  
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The authors of SAR call the implementation of SAR with AODV SAODV -
Security-aware AODV. This should not be mixed with the Secure Ad hoc On-Demand 
Distance Vector (SAODV) protocol proposed in [110].   
 
2.2.4.6 TMR 
Trust Metric Routing (TMR) [105] is a framework for protection of ad hoc routing 
protocols that operates in the setting of proactive link-state routing. It has some 
similarity with SAR [109]. It relies on pre-shared group keys. However, whereas SAR 
encrypts the routing messages and builds routes through nodes with equal levels of 
trust only, TMR allows routing cooperation between different security domains. The 
users may choose between trustworthy routes and ordinary routes. 
 
2.2.5 Secure ad hoc routing protocols 
The next sections present a representative subset of secure ad hoc routing 
protocols. Secure ad hoc routing protocols are here defined as protocols where the 
protection scheme comes as an integral part of the protocol. That is, security 
enforcement is not left to other layers of the protocol stack. Surveys of secure ad hoc 
routing protocols are found in [4] and [39].  
 
2.2.5.1 Secure proactive ad hoc routing protocols 
2.2.5.1.1 SEAD 
The secure efficient ad hoc distance vector routing protocol (SEAD) [38] is based 
on the DSDV [85] routing protocol, which is a proactive distance-vector protocol. 
Each node periodically broadcasts information about its shortest routes to all other 
destinations. Updates may also be sent when a change in the metric for one or more 
destinations have been detected. The neighbors use this information to update their 
own routing tables. In SEAD a hash chain is used to ensure other nodes cannot 
retransmit the routing message with a higher sequence number than just received or 
with a shorter distance than currently received.  
Authenticated hash anchors for all nodes in the network are a prerequisite. The 
hash chain is divided into a number of sub-chains. The length of each sub-chain 
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equals the maximum network diameter. A node advertises a route with a distance and 
a sequence number together with a value from a hash chain. The sequence numbers 
are used for indexing the sub-chains. (The lowest sequence number points to the sub-
chain that has the hash anchor as its last value).  HopCounts are used for indexing 
within the sub-chains. (HopCount zero points to the first value in the sub-chain). 
Hashing the received value a number of times derived from the sequence number and 
the advertised distance should return the hash anchor. This ensures other nodes cannot 
retransmit the routing message with a higher sequence number than just received or 
with a shorter distance than currently received.  
In addition to protection of the HopCount, it is also necessary to authenticate the 
routing message origin. SEAD suggests a broadcast authentication mechanism such as 
TESLA [87] is used for this purpose. The problem is that TESLA demands 
synchronized clocks. Pairwise shared symmetric keys is proposed as an alternative 
that does not require synchronized clocks. But this benefit comes at the price of 
increased key-administration cost. 
 
2.2.5.1.2  SLSP 
The proactive secure link state protocol (SLSP) [80] secures the discovery and 
distribution of link-state information with the aid of digital signatures. It uses hash 
chains to prevent topology information from being distributed further than a specified 
number of hops. SLSP can be used as a stand-alone proactive protocol or combined 
with a reactive protocol into a hybrid routing framework. Certificates are distributed 
in public key distribution packets, or are attached to link state update packets. 
Certificate issuance is not part of the protocol. Though, [80] indicates that this service 
can be provided by a coalition of nodes with the aid of a threshold scheme, the use of 
local repositories of certificates provided by the network nodes or a distributed 
instantiation of a certificate authority (CA).  
 
2.2.5.1.3 Security extensions to OLSR 
A number of security extensions have been proposed for OLSR. Adjih et al. [2], 
Hafslund et al. [29] and Winjum et al. [107] address replay attacks. The Winjum et al. 
proposes sequence number receipts and routing messages protected end-to-end with 
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the aid of symmetric message authentication codes. The other two rely on timestamps. 
In [29], Hafslund et al. suggest the messages are authenticated hop by hop with the aid 
of digital signatures. Adjih et al. [2] propose end-to-end protection enforced through 
asymmetric signatures or symmetric message authentication codes. Raffo et al. [88] 
extends the scheme in [2] with geographical leashes in order to protect against 
wormhole attacks. SOLSR [36] also focuses on wormhole attacks, suggesting 
temporal leashes combined with digital signatures. In addition, SOLSR use hash 
chains for protection of the mutable TTL and Hop Count fields. However, these fields 
are not used in the OLSR route calculation, and there is basically no need to protect 
them. 
Fourati, Agha and Claveirole [26] suggest OLSR routes secured with the aid of 
threshold cryptography. Each MPR chooses a private/public key pair. The MPRs 
flood their public keys into the network. In addition, each MPR unicasts a share of its 
private key to each of its 1-hop neighbors, encrypted with the public key of the 
neighbor node in question. The neighbors sign the TC messages from this node with 
the received share. When a threshold number of different signed versions of the same 
TC message have been received, the signature can be verified.  
It is not evident how a node can authenticate the neighbor nodes and their public 
keys before handing out shares of its private key. Trusted third parties are omitted. 
System security is jeopardized by Sybil attacks [25]. 
 
2.2.5.2 Secure reactive ad hoc routing protocols 
2.2.5.2.1 SAODV 
The Secure Ad-hoc On-demand Distance vector (SAODV) routing [110] is a 
security extension to AODV. Integrity and authenticity is protected trough signatures 
covering all non-mutable fields of the routing messages. SAODV also protects against 
short distance frauds. The hop count field that is modified by the intermediate nodes is 
authenticated with the aid of hash chains.  
A hash anchor is included in the signed part of the routing message. The hash 
anchor is set to a random seed hashed a number of times equal to the maximum 
number of hops allowed.  The current hash value (initially set to the seed) is included 
in hash field in the unsigned part of the message. Every time a node receives a RREQ 
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or a RREP it verifies the hop count by hashing the value found in the hash field a 
number of times equal to the max hop count minus the current hop count.  The 
message is discarded unless the result equals the hash anchor. The hop count is 
incremented and the hash value is replaced with a hash of the value received before 
the message is retransmitted. Thus, an intermediate node cannot undetectably forward 
the routing message with a lower hop count than received from its predecessor. (A 
different SAODV is presented in [109]. SAODV there stands for Security-aware 
AODV and refers to the implementation of SAR [109] for AODV).  
 
2.2.5.2.2 Ariadne 
Ariadne [40] is derived from DSR. As in DSR, the intermediate nodes append their 
ID to the RREQ message before relaying it. In addition, both the source node and each 
node traversed add a message authentication code to the RREQs. The MACs are 
calculated with the aid of pairwise keys shared between the node and the target. Pre-
shared or TESLA keys can be utilized. Alternatively digital signatures can be used. 
The approach enables the target to authenticate both the source of the request as well 
as all intermediate nodes.  A per-hop-hashing technique is used to ensure that no 
intermediate nodes are left out; each node replaces a hash value field in the routing 
message with a hash of its ID and the hash value received. The result is included in the 
input to the MAC calculation.  
The RREP includes an accumulated list of addresses from the request, and is 
protected through a MAC added by the message originator. Multiple RREPs may lead 
to redundant routes. Ariadne suggests monitoring of packet delivery, multiple routes 
and packets sent along different routes in order to detect and mitigate routing 
misbehavior. Routes are chosen on the basis of prior performance in packet delivery. 
Differently from the Watchdog and Pathrater, feedback on which packet were 
successfully delivered is obtained from the target. This renders the system less 
vulnerable to blackmail attacks from intermediate nodes. The feedback is obtained 
through an extra end-to-end network layer message or by exploiting cross-layer 
information.  
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2.2.5.2.3 SRP 
The Secure Routing protocol (SRP) [79] is a lightweight security extension for 
routing protocols that broadcast route requests, e.g., DSR and the reactive routing 
component of ZRP. The solution is similar, but simpler and less secure than the 
approach of Ariadne [40]. There is no authentication of the intermediate nodes. The 
integrity and authenticity of the route requests and route replies are ensured with the 
aid of a single message authentication code added by the message originators. 
Pairwise keys shared between the source and target nodes are a prerequisite. 
Differently from Ariadne, SRP does not prevent unauthorized nodes to be included in 
the route.  
In [61], Marshall, Thakur and Yasinsac points out that SRP is vulnerable to nodes 
that passively relay routing messages without adding their address in accordance with 
the protocol, i.e., invisible nodes or “wormholes” consisting of one node. 
Ramachandran and Yasinsac show in [89] that this problem is not limited to SRP, but 
a generic problem to any “out-and-back” route discovery protocol in which 
intermediate nodes fix the reverse path during the forward request. 
 
2.2.5.2.4 ARAN 
ARAN (Authenticated Routing for Ad hoc Networks) [94] assumes route 
discovery packets are protected end-to-end and hop-by-hop by digital signatures. The 
scheme is designed with AODV and DSR in mind. The originator of the message 
includes its certificate and signs the message. The neighbors verify the signature, add 
their own certificate and sign the message before it is retransmitted. The next nodes 
that receive the message verify the signature with the given certificate. The signature 
and certificate appended by the successor is replaced with this node’s certificate and 
signature before the message is retransmitted.  
Differently from SRP[79] where the MAC can only be verified by the end-nodes 
that possess the pairwise secret key, the digital signatures enable the intermediate 
nodes to verify the message origin. Furthermore, the end-to-end plus hop-by-hop 
digital signatures ensure routes are established through authorized nodes only. That is, 
as the intermediate signatures are changed hop-by-hop and not just appended as in 
Ariadne [40], there is no end-to-end authentication of the intermediate nodes.  The 
nodes must trust the others to authenticate their neighbors correctly. On the other 
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hand, the hop-by-hop signatures represent a lower bandwidth cost than if all 
signatures were appended. 
  
2.2.5.2.5 SPAAR 
The Secure Position Aided Ad hoc Routing (SPAAR) [11] protocol take a different 
approach than the other protocols surveyed here in that location information is used to 
make routing decisions. A necessary precondition for SPAAR is that each device is 
able to determine its location. The routing tables contain information about node 
identities, location, transmission range and velocity. The routing messages are 
encrypted. The position information is thus hidden from unauthorized nodes. Time 
stamped sequence numbers prevent successful replay attacks. In order to counter 
wormhole and invisible node attacks (described in section 1.6.2), routing messages are 
only accepted from verified 1-hop neighbors.  
SPAAR relies on asymmetric cryptography. The neighbors are authenticated with 
the aid of their public (authentication) key and certificate signed by a common trusted 
third party in advance. Each node in addition generates a private/public group 
encryption/decryption key pair for concealing the contents of RREQ and other forward 
messages. The public group decryption key is distributed to all verified neighbors 
encrypted under their respective public (authentication) keys. RREQs are encrypted 
hop by hop with the aid of the group encryption key of the current forwarding node. 
The authentication keys are used on the reverse path; RREPs are signed by the 
originator and encrypted hop-by-hop with the public (authentication) key of the next 
forwarding node.  
The hop-by-hop protection has resemblance with ARAN [94] . Whereas ARAN 
only provides integrity and authenticity, the SPAAR approach provides hop-by-hop 
confidentiality in addition. However, as specified in [11], the RREQ in SPAAR is 
encrypted but not signed by the originator. Differently from ARAN, the authenticity 
of origin of the RREQs can thus not be verified end-to-end. It is different with the 
reverse RREPs. These are both signed by the originator and encrypted hop-by-hop. 
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2.2.6 Security extensions proposed in the MANET WG and OSPF WG 
Internet-Drafts and RFCs 
The secure ad hoc routing protocols presented in section 2.2.5 all assume that the 
cryptographic protection scheme is an integral part of the routing protocol, but the 
Internet-Drafts and RFCs from the MANET WG and the OSPF WG described in 
section 2, generally suggest security is added by the lower layers.  
OSPFv3 [19] relies on IPsec [50]. OSPF-MDR [77] provides no additional 
security specifications. OSPF-OR [14] suggests the ability to connect to the MANET 
is controlled by layer 2 security mechanisms such as IEEE 802.11i [43]. The AODV 
RFC [86] and DYMO Internet-draft [13] propose IPsec authentication header 
(AH)[48] as an appropriate authentication mechanism if the nodes share an 
appropriate security association. IPsec AH is also proposed in the TBRPF RFC [78] to 
counter impersonation attacks, and to prevent unauthorized nodes from joining the 
network via neighbor discovery. In addition, IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload 
(ESP)[49] is suggested for confidentiality. 
The OLSR RFC [18] and OLSRv2 Internet-draft [17] suggest that digital 
signatures and other required security information are transmitted as separate OLSR 
messages in order to allow “secured” and “unsecured” nodes to co-exist in the same 
network. IPsec AH is also proposed to establish the authenticity of the OLSR control 
messages. However, it is pointed out that all OLSR control messages are point-to-
multipoint transmissions and all receivers must be able to validate the authenticity. 
The OLSR RFC and OLSRv2 Internet-Draft suggest OLSR control traffic encrypted 
with the aid of Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) [5] or a shared secret cryptographic 
technique in cases where the network topology needs to be concealed.  
The SMF Internet-draft [60] says authentication mechanisms should be considered 
to identify the source of an option header to reduce vulnerability to a variety of 
attacks. Further specifications are not provided. 
2.2.7 On the applicability of IPsec and IEEE 802.11i for ad hoc networks 
Routing messages are typically encapsulated as UDP over IP, e.g., OLSR, or sent 
as IP datagrams, which is the case with the OSPF-MANET protocols.  Protection 
could be an integral part of the routing protocol, or enforced through lower layer 
protection schemes such as IPsec [50] or IEEE 802.11i [43]. This is illustrated in 
Figure 3.   
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Figure 3 Various options for protection of ad hoc routing information 
 
The figure indicates end-to-end protected routing messages when the protection 
scheme is integrated with the routing protocol. In ad hoc mode, IEEE 802.11i requires 
a pre-shared symmetric group key. Unique identification of the source is precluded, 
and IEEE 802.11i only provides hop-by-hop protection.  
Routing messages are often point-to-multipoint transmissions. IPsec is geared 
towards two communicating parties that establish a secure channel with the aid of a 
unique symmetric key. That is, IPsec also allows protection of multicast traffic based 
on pre-shared group keys. The security offered is then parallel to IEEE802.11i. The 
routing messages will be protected hop-by-hop, and not end-to-end. Intermediate 
nodes in possession of the group key can undetectably modify the relayed routing 
messages.  Protection against insiders exhibiting Byzantine behavior is easier to 
achieve with an asymmetric component. An RFC describing the use of RSA-based 
digital signatures with ESP and AH has recently been published [104].  
Another challenge is that IPsec and IEEE 802.11i protects on a per-routing 
packet/frame basis, but the granularity needed may be on a per-message basis. Each 
packet may contain more messages, possibly from different sources. 
 A generally adopted assumption is that ad hoc networks are IP based. The ad hoc 
mode of IEEE 802.11 has become the most important MAC protocol for MANETs. 
But other protocols may also be used. Relying on the lower layers for protection of 
routing information places restrictions on the choice of protocols. 
Altogether, end-to-end unilateral authentication of routing information implies 
modification of the existing IPsec and IEEE 802.11i standards. 
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2.2.8 Summary 
Due to the wireless media and ad hoc nodes operating both as routers and 
communication end-points, the routing protocols of ad hoc networks are more prone 
to attacks than routing protocols in fixed networks. Possible attacks comprise a 
number of attacks that all can be classified as various forms of denial of service 
attacks.  
Whereas the secure ad hoc routing protocols assume the protection is an integral 
part of the routing protocol, the ad hoc routing protocols specified in RFCs and 
Internet-Drafts from the IETF MANET WG and the IETF OSPF WG assume security 
is enforced with the aid of lower layers security mechanisms such as IPsec AH or 
IEEE 802.11i. However, due to the point-to-multipoint transmission and the need for 
each receiver to be able to validate the authenticity of the routing messages; 
modifications in the existing standard may be required. 
 
2.3 Key Management 
The security and the applicability of any cryptographic scheme depend upon a 
proper key management scheme.  Key management comprises key generation, 
validation, storage, distribution, update, revocation and deletion. Furthermore, key 
lengths, the frequency of key changes/updates and how keys are used play an 
important role for the security of the scheme.  
Key management schemes proposed for ad hoc networks surveyed in paper I range 
from self-organizing contributory schemes to managed distributive ones. The 
proposals include both symmetric, identity-based public key as well as traditional 
certificate-based public key schemes. The next sections present some important 
aspects of key management and state-of-the-art that are not addressed or less 
emphasized in the articles presented in part II.   
 
2.3.1 Key generation and authentication 
No matter whether cryptographic keys are generated and distributed by a single 
entity or set up through a collaborative effort of multiple entities, mutual 
authentication of involved parties is required in order to provide a secure key 
management system.  
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Secure initialization of security associations can be achieved through physical 
proximity and out-of-band identification.  Methods proposed so far for ad hoc 
networks rely on demonstrative identification through physical contact or range-
limited channels [7] [97] [98] or trust evaluation through own observations [101]. The 
resurrecting duckling model presented in [97] and [98] assumes that the first neighbor 
a node (the duckling) sees, is its trustworthy mother. It therefore accepts imprinting of 
keys from this node. The imprinting means a key is transferred in plaintext from the 
mother node. It is not evident what should happen if the mother duck does not want its 
duckling. 
SUCV [67] and CAM [96] suggest identifiers derived from public keys of 
private/public key pairs. The aim is to provide unique and cryptographically verifiable 
IPv6 addresses. There are no certificates and trusted third parties. The nodes simply 
generate a private/public key pair, and derive the address from the public key. Only 
the node that knows the secret public key can provide a signature that can be verified 
with the public key. The technique prevent that other nodes can easily masquerade as 
one of the other nodes. But the method cannot be used to distinguish trustworthy from 
untrustworthy nodes, as assumed in the Simple Ad hoc Key Management protocol 
(SAKM) [111]. Nor does the method prevent Sybil attacks.  
 
2.3.2 Key Lengths and security levels 
The key lengths must be chosen large enough to provide an adequate level of 
security. Table 2 shows hash lengths and key sizes of comparable security levels in 
accordance with the recommendations in [57], [58] and [75]. The security level is 
measured in bits of a symmetric key.  
Table 2 shows that the required key lengths and asymmetric signature sizes are 
expected to increase over time. It also shows that the number of bits in traditional 
asymmetric schemes grows faster than the hash sizes and the symmetric key lengths. 
Contrasting hash functions and symmetric schemes, the computational cost of 
asymmetric schemes generally increases more rapidly with augmenting key lengths.  
The estimates in Table 2 assume that whereas more efficient attack methods are 
found for asymmetric schemes, exhaustive key search is the most efficient method 
available for breaking a symmetric cryptosystem. The security of asymmetric schemes 
rests on different computational problems such as the difficulty of factoring large 
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integers and the discrete log problem. The complexity of solving these problems 
depends on the best factoring and discrete log algorithms available. The estimates in 
[57] and [58] are based on the assumptions that cryptanalytic progresses follow the 
same trend in next decades as in the past decades.  It is assumed that a cryptosystem 
offers adequate protection until a given year if the cost of a successful attack measured 
in that year can be expected to be about 40M dollardays, i.e., with 40 million dollars it 
would take one day to break. Anyone who believes that the assumptions do not hold 
should adjust the key length accordingly. 
MANET routing information has only instant value. Ad hoc networks are 
expectedly short term networks formed for a specific event. The lifetime may range 
from hours to days, or possibly weeks. A key that is disclosed when the network 
terminates is of little value to an attacker. A malicious node in possession of a valid 
key may only harm the routing as long as the compromise is not detected and the key 
revoked. Even if an attacker succeeds in occasional signature forgeries the network 
service may not be severely affected. With sequence numbered and periodical routing 
messages, the attacker must be able to provide more forged signatures in sequence in 
order to succeed in a persisting attack.  
 
Table 2 Comparable security levels  
Source 
Security 
level 
(bits)*  
Hash 
Size** 
IFC & 
TDL 
N 
FFC (SDL) 
p/q 
ECC 
key 
length 
Safe 
until 
year 
80 80 1024 1024/ 160 160-223 2010 
NIST [75] 
112 112 2048 2048/ 224 224-255 2030 
80 80 ≥ 1280 ≥ 1280 /160 160  2018 Lenstra [57] 
112 112 ≥ 3072 ≥ 3072 /223 224 2065 
Lenstra & Verheul [58] 80 80 1464 1120/ 141 149-165 2012 
*Security level is measured in bits of a symmetric key,   
**Hash size refers to preimage resistance ( collision resistance: double the  number of bits)  
IFC: integer factorization cryptography, TDL: Traditional discrete log, SDL: subgroup discrete 
log, ECC: elliptic curve cryptography, n: bits in modulus, p: bits in prime modulus, q: subgroup 
size in bits 
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These factors indicate that shorter key lengths may suffice for ad hoc routing 
information. Short keys and small signature sizes are also beneficial for bandwidth 
efficiency. However, factors such as the expected key period may pull in the opposite 
direction. Key changes are likely to represent a significant administrative cost, 
especially in organizations with a large number of nodes. Keys can therefore be 
expected to last for more than one MANET instantiation. In addition, frequent 
changes of keys that are used to bootstrap the network service are undesirable as they 
represent a threat to network availability. A framework for the decision of proper key 
lengths in ad hoc networks remains a topic for further work. 
 
2.3.3 Revocation and exclusion of nodes 
The exclusion of a single node in systems relying on a symmetric group key 
implies a re-keying process where the remaining nodes switch to a new group key not 
known by the excluded node. A typical solution includes a key distribution centre that 
sends the new group key encrypted with unique keys for each of the remaining nodes. 
Connectivity to a key distribution centre at all times cannot be guaranteed in a mobile 
ad hoc network. Furthermore, distribution of a new group key imply a bandwidth 
consuming process, and there is no guarantee all nodes receive the new key in a timely 
manner. As the group key is used to bootstrap the protected network service, the re-
keying represents a threat to network availability.  
An alternative to re-keying the remaining nodes is to use key-zeroing messages 
that delete the key material in the node to be excluded, e.g., as proposed for VANETs 
in [45]. Still, this approach is better suited for infrastructure based networks with 
guaranteed connectivity and where the nodes have to “sign in” at a base station or 
access point to obtain access to the network. The solution requires access to a 
centralized key management centre and tamper-proof devices (otherwise the group 
key could be extracted before erasure and exploited by malicious nodes). By default, 
there is no guarantee that the node to be excluded actually receives the key-zeroing 
message. Hence, the key erasure should be acknowledged by the excluded node. 
Furthermore, the management centre must be able to verify the integrity and 
authenticity of origin of the acknowledgement. This typically requires the 
management centre shares a unique symmetric key with each node. Furthermore, there 
is no guarantee that the management centre actually receives the acknowledgement on 
47 
the first attempt. Although still challenging, revocation is easier with asymmetric 
schemes.   
Several of the proposals from the OSPF WG and the MANET WG assume 
protection is added by IPsec or IEEE802.11i. Schemes for key changes or revocation 
of keys to exclude nodes during MANET operation are not part of these standards. 
With IEEE802.11i in infrastructure mode of operation, the nodes can be denied access 
when they try to reconnect to the wireless network. In ad hoc mode of operation there 
is no such possibility. Standard key management protocols for IPsec such as IKEv2 
[47] does not apply to point-to-multipoint traffic. Nor does IPsec specify methods for 
revocation or changes of keys used to protect multicast traffic. In the secure multicast 
architecture described in RFCs 3740 [30], a central group controller / key server 
administers the security associations. 
Revocation is to a little extent addressed in the secure ad hoc routing proposals 
described in section 2.2.5. ARAN [94] assumes a trusted certificate server broadcasts 
a signed revocation message informing which certificate has been revoked. 
Revocation schemes proposed for ad hoc networks typically rely on accusations 
and the exchange of revocation information between the ad hoc nodes, plus 
downloads from a trusted entity during periods with connection to the fixed network 
[20] [21] [45] [68]. Surveys of revocation schemes for fixed net are found in [108] and 
[112].  
The detection of compromised nodes and the decision to revoke a key can be made 
on the background of reports of stolen items, monitoring of node behavior, 
accusations of malicious actions or other intrusion detection schemes. Intrusion 
detection schemes for mobile ad hoc networks are surveyed in [3] and [66].  
  
2.3.4 Summary 
A proper key management system is the basis for any cryptographic authentication 
schemes. The initial key generation and distribution requires some form of physical or 
out-of-band authentication of the involved parties. The short term value of ad hoc 
routing information indicates shorter key lengths than for sensitive payload. However, 
the key periods may exceed the lifetime of an ad hoc network instantiation. The keys 
may be (re)used in more MANETs. This pulls in the direction of increased key sizes. 
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A framework for the decision of proper key lengths for ad hoc routing information is a 
topic for further research. Revocation is also not a fully solved problem. 
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3 Contributions of the thesis 
The contribution of this thesis is mainly within authentication of routing messages 
and key management. These are key elements for securing MANETs for emergency 
and rescue operations. Appropriate security mechanisms are proposed and evaluated.  
The majority of secure ad hoc routing protocols proposed so far, tend to focus on 
the protection techniques, rather than the computational cost and bandwidth 
consumption. Our work highlights the importance of taking these factors into 
consideration in the design of secure routing protocols. In addition, attention must be 
paid to the nature of routing control traffic and it s discrepancies from ordinary 
application data. 
 Figure 4 outlines the contributions and the flow of the work conducted. The 
survey of key management schemes [34] showed that no single technique dominates. 
It revealed in particular that bandwidth consumption has been neglected. This is an 
important aspect in ad hoc networks. An interesting alternative is ID-based systems 
that make certificates superfluous. This initiated the analysis of ID-based signatures 
for protection of ad hoc routing information in paper II [33].  
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Figure 4 Outline of the work and contributions 
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The ability to scale remained an issued even though ID-based systems remove the 
bandwidth cost caused by certificate exchanges. We therefore proposed a hybrid 
solution.  The hybrid protection scheme for OLSR (proposed in paper III) [32] reduces 
both the overhead and computational cost.  
In the last paper [31] we looked at revocation. A proper revocation scheme enables 
exclusion of compromised and malfunctioning nodes. We proposed a simple and 
robust, yet bandwidth efficient method for the distribution of revocation information 
in ad hoc networks. The next sections summarize the contributions of each article in 
more detail.  
 
3.1 Contribution of Paper I: A Survey of Key Management in Ad 
Hoc Networks 
Authentication is a fundamental issue for a reliable network service. The nodes 
must be able to distinguish trustworthy from untrustworthy nodes in the neighbor 
discovery process, and they must be able to verify both routing message origin and 
integrity.  
Any cryptographic authentication scheme requires proper key management. That 
is, mutual authentication of the involved parties is required during the key setup. This 
is typically solved through physical proximity and some out-of-band proof of identity. 
Ad hoc networks with a planned origin rooted in organizational structures where pre-
configuration is possible, makes the key setup easier than in truly ad hoc environments 
where the nodes have no prior trust relationships. Still, it may be desirable to include 
nodes from different security domains, e.g., in cross-border disaster relief operations. 
This paper provides a comprehensive overview of key management schemes for ad 
hoc networks. It also presents an evaluation of their applicability for initialization and 
maintenance of a protected network service.  
The key management schemes are classified as either contributory or distributive, 
and are evaluated according to a set of evaluation criteria. The criteria cover 
applicability, security, robustness, scalability and simplicity. Applicability refers to 
fundamental assumptions such as network origin, network size, mobility, range and 
human involvement. The applicability in ad hoc networks with nodes from a single 
security domain and multiple security domains is evaluated. Security includes metrics 
such as authentication, intrusion tolerance, trust management, revocation and 
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vulnerability. The key management system should survive despite denial-of-service 
and be robust to Byzantine behavior. Timeliness and strict synchronization are other 
factors. The key management scheme should be simple and scale well enough to 
handle the expected number of nodes. 
None of the studied key management schemes were found superior to one another 
in all situations. Several of the proposals made assumptions that do not fit the nature 
of ad hoc routing protocols and the requirements for network availability. Examples 
include assumptions such as guaranteed connectivity during key setup, a common 
view upon node ordering, and re-keying every time a node leaves or joins the network.   
In general, the proposed schemes did not state for what purposes the keys were 
intended. Keys for protection of application data were typically implicitly assumed. 
But the pre-conditions for ordinary payload and network layer routing information 
differ. The setup of keys for ordinary application data can assume an already running 
network service. Key setup for routing information cannot.  
The performance analysis tends to be restricted to computational complexity, 
whereas the practical constraint of MANETs may equally well be communication 
capacity. Both the size and number of messages are important. Due to the overhead 
introduced by lower layers of the communication protocol stack, the number of 
messages can have more impact than the size.  
The evaluation revealed a lack of appropriate, robust and bandwidth efficient key 
management solutions. 
 
3.2 Contribution of Paper II: Analysis of IBS for MANET Security 
in Emergency and rescue Operations 
A reliable network service can be achieved with the aid of authenticated routing 
messages. If identifiers that are by default sent as part of the routing messages can be 
used as public keys, identity-based schemes may potentially scale better than 
traditional certificate based digital signatures. This paper analyses the consequences of 
IBS protected ad hoc routing messages. The optimized link state routing protocol is 
used to exemplify the implications of IBS protected network services.  
Identity-based signature (IBS) schemes necessitate long term identifiers. 
Otherwise, the key administration cost becomes excessive. Keys used to protect the 
network layer should be related to the identifiers known by the routing protocol. In 
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order to provide unique IP addresses, a number of schemes for MANET address 
assignment and how to detect and resolve duplicate addresses have been proposed. 
Some suggestions are described in [1], [15],[81], [82], [100], and [102]. A survey of 
proposed methods is found in [8].  
The requirement for long term identifiers restricts the possibilities for dynamic 
address allocation. However, the proposed solutions generally assume that any node is 
welcomed in the network. This is not necessarily the case in dedicated networks for 
emergency and rescue operations.  The structure of emergency and rescue operations 
may enable address assignment co-located with the key administration. Fixed 
addresses may be acceptable. With IPv4, the MANET may be interconnection to the 
Internet through Mobile IP [84]. 
Asymmetric cryptographic schemes are known to introduce a considerable amount 
of overhead and resource consumption. Our analysis revealed bandwidth cost as a 
more limiting factor for the applicability of the signature scheme than the processing 
cost. The channel may become congested before the processing capabilities are 
exhausted. The calculations showed that signatures sizes of more than a few hundred 
bits are only applicable in small ad hoc networks. 
The calculations assumed that the routing protocol control traffic was sent at a rate 
of 1Mbps utilizing IEEE 802.11b for the lower layers. However, other routing 
protocols, higher data rates or other MAC layer protocols could have uncovered the 
processing cost as the most critical factor.  In any case, it shows the importance of 
considering both channel occupation as well as computational cost. With resource 
constrained nodes, little overhead as well as low computational cost is beneficial.  
 
3.3 Contribution of Paper III: Hybrid Protection of OLSR 
Symmetric schemes are efficient both regarding computational efficiency and 
bandwidth consumption. However, with a group key, the security is compromised 
with a single captured node. Source authentication is precluded, and malicious 
insiders may masquerade as others. Furthermore, exclusion of compromised nodes is 
challenging. The alternative of pairwise exclusive keys provides better intrusion 
tolerance, but scales badly. 
Digital signatures and IBS schemes provide intrusion tolerance, and in addition 
enable unique identification and authentication of the origin of routing messages. 
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Another advantage is that revocation of asymmetric keys enables exclusion of 
compromised and malicious nodes without other nodes having to change their key. 
These are desirable features in the protection of ad hoc routing information. 
Asymmetric schemes are known to be computationally expensive. Another 
drawback of traditional digital signature schemes is the potential need for bandwidth 
consuming certificate exchanges. The identity-based signature (IBS) schemes make 
certificates obsolete.  
This paper proposes a hybrid protection scheme for proactive link-state routing 
protocols, and provides specific formats for its implementation with the optimized link 
state routing protocol (OLSR). The hybrid protection scheme suggests asymmetric, 
identity-based signatures combined with shorter and computationally cheaper hash 
values from a hash chain. The aim is a bandwidth efficient solution providing an 
adequate level of security. Both the security and the performance of the protection 
scheme are analyzed.  
Bandwidth and computational cost is saved by signing only some routing 
messages. Unsigned messages include a hitherto undisclosed value from the hash 
chain. The hash values serve as lightweight proofs of authenticity, and make 
successful attacks harder. The hash values also simplify the detection of message 
sequence number wrap-around and make replay attacks easier to detect. The hash 
values prevent both inside attackers as well externals from successfully inserting 
unscheduled routing messages on the behalf of other nodes. However, under specific 
circumstances, as discussed in the security analysis, there is a risk that malicious 
nodes may succeed in temporarily introducing false routing information. An informal 
security analysis shows that attacks are not straight forward to mount. Signed routing 
messages will erase any false information.  
Whereas the hybrid protection scheme is proposed for OLSR, the method may also 
be used for other proactive link-state routing protocols. Furthermore, the IBS scheme 
could be replaced with a digital signature scheme. Certificate distribution must then be 
taken into consideration.  
The performance evaluation in the paper assumes asymmetric schemes and hash 
functions of similar security levels. It could be argued that more trust is put in the 
signed message than the ones followed by a hash. This implies a shorter hash value 
may be sufficient. However, the hash values represent a small overhead compared to 
the signatures. Reducing (or increasing) the hash length a few bits or bytes has little 
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impact on the bandwidth efficiency. For practical reasons both signatures and hash 
values should fit with byte boundaries.   
 
3.4 Contribution of Paper IV: On the Distribution of Revocation 
Information in Ad Hoc Networks 
Most practical communication systems will require a way to expel compromised, 
malfunctioning or maliciously behaving nodes. An appropriate revocation scheme is 
required. 
The revocation methods for fixed networks are generally not very well suited for 
the ad hoc environment. Some require guaranteed connectivity to a central trusted 
entity to check certificate status on-line. Others trade update cost for timeliness or vice 
versa. The online certificate status protocol (OCSP) [70] and the Certificate 
Revocation Status (CRS) [65] are representatives of the first. The well known 
certificate revocation list (CRL) method is one example of the latter.  
The CRLs usually include all revocations within the security domain, and are 
typically updated weekly or every second week [112]. Keys used to protect the 
network service of a MANET that lasts hours or days, necessitate higher granularity.  
Including only certificates that have been revoked since last CRL update, ∆-CRLs 
are shorter and provide fresher information. However, ∆-CRLs are also normally 
issued with a frequency, e.g., daily, that may be to low. Higher frequencies lead to a 
significant update cost. Besides, if one or more of the ad hoc nodes did not receive the 
last CRL, the CRL may need to be distributed in the MANET anyway. Moreover, 
CRLs and ∆-CRLs normally list revocations concerning the entire security domain 
and not only the subset of nodes that takes part in a specific MANET. This represents 
a waste of bandwidth.   
There may be a large number of nodes in the security domain corresponding to the 
national emergency and rescue organizations. But only a subset of the nodes will 
normally take part in a specific operation and the MANET formed for this event. If the 
revocation information concerns other keys than those used by the nodes in the 
network, there is no need to distribute this information over the ad hoc network. 
Schemes proposed for ad hoc networks typically rely on the ad hoc nodes’ 
exchanges of accusations or CRLs and downloads of CRLs from trusted entities 
during periods with connection to the fixed net.  Accusations may lead to revocations 
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on false reasons.  The MRL (MANET revocation list) scheme introduced in this paper 
ensures that only revocation information relevant for the particular MANET is 
distributed into the ad hoc network.  
The MANET is assumed to be connected to the external network through one or 
more trusted gateways. The trusted gateway periodically informs the central trusted 
entity about the continued existence of the MANET and reports any new nodes 
detected. In response, the trusted entity returns a MRL listing revocations (if any) 
concerning keys of the (accumulated) nodes reported. Only non-empty MRLs are 
flooded into the network from the gateway.  
The trusted gateways must be able to detect which nodes are in the MANET. This 
comes intrinsically with proactive ad hoc routing protocols, and may be achieved at 
some additional cost with reactive protocols.   
The scheme is intended for ad hoc networks with a planned origin, and where a 
common point of trust exists. It is designed for revocation of keys used to protect the 
ad hoc network service, and the MRLs are distributed as an integral part of the routing 
protocol. The trusted entities are assumed to reside in the external network, but could 
also reside inside the MANET. Robustness can be strengthened through redundant 
trusted gateways.  
The method can be used both for certificate revocation as well as revocation in 
identity-based public key schemes. The complete revocation lists are assumed to be 
distributed in a preparation phase prior to ad hoc network participation. But there is no 
need for the revocation list held by each participating party to be synchronized. And 
there is no need for the trusted gateways to synchronize the MRLs they spread into the 
network. On this background, the MRL scheme provides a simple, scalable, efficient 
and robust solution for the distribution of revocation information in ad hoc networks 
with a planned origin where common points of trust exists.  
The article shows that there is a gain with the MRL scheme compared to CRL and 
∆-CRLs even if the revocation information is inserted through only one gateway. With 
more gateways pouring the revocation information into the network, the bandwidth 
savings obtained with the MRL scheme compared to the other two methods becomes 
even more significant. The MRL technique also scales well with multiple security 
domains involved. Contrasting CRL and ∆-CRLs the size and frequency of revocation 
messages depends upon the number of nodes in the ad hoc network rather than the 
number and size of the involved security domains.      
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4 Concluding Remarks 
Security is important in any communication system for emergency and rescue 
operations. We have concentrated on a subset of the aspects of security in ad hoc 
networks for such applications; protection of the routing protocols. Our research 
indicates that a reliable ad hoc network service is achievable. From this perspective 
there is nothing that precludes the use of MANETs in emergency and rescue 
operations. Related work, such as [105], which considers other aspects of ad hoc 
networks in emergency and rescue operations, points in the same direction. This 
indicates that ad hoc networks can become an important component in future disaster 
relief networks. And it is important that they are included in plans for future 
emergency and rescue communication systems.  
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Abstract 
The wireless and dynamic nature of mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) leaves them 
more vulnerable to security attacks than their wired counterparts. The nodes act both as 
routers and communication end-points. This makes the network layer more prone to 
security attacks. A main challenge is to judge whether or not a routing message originates 
from a trustworthy node. The solution thus far is cryptographically signed messages. The 
general assumption is that nodes in possession of a valid secret key can be trusted. 
Consequently, a secure and efficient key-management scheme is crucial. Keys are also 
required for protection of application data. However, the focus here is on network-layer 
management information. Whereas key management schemes for the upper layers can 
assume an already running network service, schemes for the protection of the network layer 
cannot. Keys are a prerequisite to bootstrap a protected network service. 
This article surveys the state of the art within key management for ad hoc networks, and 
analyzes their applicability for network-layer security. The analysis puts some emphasis on 
their applicability in scenarios such as emergency and rescue operations, as this work was 
initiated by a study of security in MANETs for emergency and rescue operations. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
MOBILE ad hoc networks have wireless links and work independently of fixed 
infrastructure. They are self-organizing and self-configuring. The wireless nodes operate 
both as communication end-points as well as routers, enabling multi-hop wireless 
communication. The wireless devices imply limited power resources and bandwidth. 
Network topology may change rapidly due to mobility, interference, physical obstacles on 
the path, and so forth. Application areas range from conference hall networks to ad hoc 
networks for emergency and rescue operations and military tactical use.  
The wireless and dynamic nature of ad hoc networks leaves them more vulnerable to 
security attacks than their wired counterparts. Passive eavesdropping as well as active 
message insertions, denial of service and battery-exhaustion attacks are inherently easy. 
Security attacks can be launched towards any layer of the protocol stack. Defense 
mechanisms for the lowest layers call for physical tamper protection and transmission 
security measures such as spread-spectrum techniques, frequency hopping, and 
interleaving. Cryptographic techniques are essential for the protection of the higher layers.  
In wired networks the routers are part of an established and (at least to some extent) 
controllable infrastructure. The same is not true in ad hoc networks where the nodes act 
both as routers and communication end points. This makes the network layer more prone to 
security attacks. There is no guarantee that malicious nodes do not mingle and interfere. 
Examples of possible attacks are misdirection and insertion of bogus routing information, 
black holes (nodes attracting traffic by maliciously advertising shortest path to other 
nodes), and wormholes (adversary nodes colluding by tunneling packets from one part of 
the network to another).  
A primary challenge is to decide which routing information can be trusted. A number of 
schemes relying on cryptographically signed routing messages have been designed – most 
without detailing key management further. Nevertheless, the possession of cryptographic 
keys serves as proof of trustworthiness. Consequently, a proper key-management service is 
required. This is to ensure that nodes which are legitimate members of the network – and 
only those – are equipped with the necessary keys whenever needed. Whereas key-
management services are needed for application layer security as well as for protection of 
the network layer, this article focuses on the more challenging of the two, namely providing 
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keys for the network layer. Key management schemes for the application layer can assume 
an already running network service. Schemes for the network layer routing information 
cannot.  Keys are a prerequisite to a protected network service.  
This survey was motivated by an investigation of security in ad hoc networks for 
emergency and rescue operations. Most of the discussions have relevance for mobile ad hoc 
networks (MANETs) in general. However, emergency and rescue operations have some 
additional requirements. Where appropriate, concerns regarding the applicability of the 
various key-management schemes in settings with the characteristics of emergency and 
rescue operations are highlighted. 
 Emergency and rescue operations imply MANETs with nodes that have gone through a 
preparation phase prior to MANET initialization. That is, predistribution of keys and other 
parameters is possible. MANETs for emergency and rescue operations present stronger 
requirements than most commercial applications. Time is scarce. When the rescue team 
arrives on the scene of an accident, communication should be established immediately and 
maintained with as little human interaction as possible. Availability is a number one 
requirement. 
The network resources should be reserved for the members of the emergency and rescue 
team, and not used to convey arbitrary data for others. It should be possible to distinguish 
legitimate nodes from untrustworthy ones and build a reliable route through trusted nodes 
only.  
The structure of emergency and rescue operations has implications for key management 
as follows. 
--Single administrative domain involved (SAD) 
SAD operations refer to operations where all involved parties belong to the same regime 
or share a common, predefined point of trust. Local, regional or national rescue operations 
including only predefined actors are in this category. This setting enables pre-configuring 
of security credentials. 
--Multiple administrative domains involved (MAD) 
MAD operations represent operations involving ad hoc partners. That is parties that have 
had no prior contact and belong to different organizational/security domains. This means 
cases where overall preconfiguring of security parameters is not possible. Examples include 
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cross-border operations and operations involving industrial companies. 
Standards: None of the emerging MANET Internet-drafts and RFCs have so far 
encompassed key management. Of other standards, the IEEE 802.11i [1] security 
amendment for IEEE 802.11wireless local area networks assumes keys are preshared or 
established with the aid of fixed infrastructure. In case of truly ad hoc communication, 
preshared symmetric keys are the only option. The aim of IEEE 802.11i is protection of 
payload (data frames) on layer 2. IEEE has in 2005 begun work on 802.11w that will cover 
security on management frames. Other standards for wireless communication include the 
ZigBee [2]/IEEE 802.15.4 [3] and the Bluetooth [4] specifications for personal area 
networks. The preconditions of these standards are infrastructure-based networks and do 
not apply to MANETs.  ZigBee specifies key management for the security elements of 
IEEE 802.15.4. ZigBee assumes the initial keys are predistributed, installed out-of-band, or 
received in the clear over the air from a trust center. Keys in Bluetooth are derived with the 
aid of PIN codes. A common PIN code is entered out of band in pairs of nodes that wish to 
communicate. Standards for key management in ad hoc networks lack. 
The contribution of this paper is a survey of proposed key management schemes for ad 
hoc networks, and an analysis of their applicability for MANET network layer security –
with some emphasis on their applicability in MANETs for emergency and rescue 
operations.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Desirable features for key management 
schemes in MANETs are described. Next we classify and evaluate proposed key-
management schemes. Conclusions are then made. 
 
II Desirable Features of MANET Key Management 
Schemes 
The evaluation parameters reflect the intention of bootstrapping a protected MANET 
network service. Evaluations of key-management protocols often focus on computational 
complexity. However, with the wireless media, bandwidth is regarded as a more 
constrained resource than computational power. A key-management service for protection 
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of the network layer should not demand an already running network service or overall 
connectivity. 
--Applicability: The various key-management schemes focus on different targets. The 
aim may range from group key establishment to availability of central management entities. 
Their applicability for SAD and MAD operations depends on the fundamental assumptions 
as to network origin (planned or truly ad hoc), network size, node mobility, geographic 
range and the required level of human involvement.   
--Security: Authentication and intrusion tolerance is a primary concern to ensure no 
unauthorized node receives key material that can later be used to prove status as a 
legitimate member of the network. Nobody should provide private keys or issue certificates 
for others unless the others have been authenticated. Intrusion tolerance means system 
security should not succumb to a single, or a few, compromised nodes. Other central 
security issues are trust management and vulnerability. Trust relations may change during 
network lifetime. The system should enable exclusion of compromised nodes.  In order to 
judge the security of a key-management scheme, possible vulnerabilities should be 
pinpointed. Proper key lengths and cryptographic algorithms of adequate strength are 
assumed. 
 --Robustness: The key-management system should survive despite denial of service 
attacks and unavailable nodes. The key-management operations should be able to be 
completed despite faulty nodes and nodes exhibiting Byzantine behavior, that is, nodes that 
deliberately deviate from the protocol. Necessary key-management operations caused by 
dynamic group changes should execute in a timely manner. Key management operations 
should not require networkwide and strict synchronization.   
--Scalability: Key management operations should finish in a timely manner despite a 
varying number of nodes and node densities. The fraction of the available bandwidth 
occupied by network management traffic should be kept as low as possible. Any increase in 
management traffic reduces available bandwidth for payload data accordingly. Hence, 
scalability of key-management protocols is crucial. 
--Simplicity: Simplicity regarding user-friendliness and communication overhead is an 
additional intuitive and overall critical factor to the success of a key-management scheme. 
We reckon, however, that a system that is secure, robust and scalable implies simplicity. 
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Given that these conditions are fulfilled, we believe simplicity is first and foremost a matter 
of implementation.  
The ideal key-management service for ad hoc networks should be simple, formed on the 
fly, never expose or distribute key material to unauthorized nodes, ensure that system 
security does not succumb to (a few) compromised nodes, easily allow rekeying/key 
updates, enable withdrawal of keys when nodes are compromised or keys for other reasons 
should be revoked, be robust to Byzantine behavior and faulty nodes, scale well enough to 
handle the expected network sizes and node densities, and efficiently manage network 
splits and joins. 
Signed routing information requires a security relation that allows one-to-many signing 
and verification. Routing messages are often broadcast, and all receiving nodes should be 
able to check the validity. Messages such as neighbor-detection messages are not forwarded 
by other nodes. Other routing messages, such as topology-information messages in 
proactive routing protocols and route requests and route replies in reactive routing 
protocols, are flooded into the entire network. The receiving nodes may not be known to 
the transmitting node. In addition, bandwidth is limited. Unique signatures for each receiver 
scale badly. In other words, pairwise keys provide no good option for protection of routing 
information.  
III Overview of Key Management Schemes 
Key management schemes can be classified in several ways. In this article we have the 
main categories contributory and distributive, rather than the more commonly used 
contributory and centralized. The distributive category is here defined to encompass 
schemes where each key originates from a single node. The nodes may very well co-
operate during key distribution, but any key originates from a single source.  
Distributive schemes may be centralized, but can also be distributed. In the latter, each 
node generates a key and tries to distribute it to others. In contributory schemes, the key is a 
result of a collaborative effort of more nodes. Some of the contributory schemes studied 
here rely on a centralized entity, others do not. Altogether, we chose the categories 
“contributory” and “distributive” as we found this classification best reflected the origin of 
the keys in the schemes studied here. Our classification is illustrated in Fig.1. 
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Key Management Schemes
Contributory Schemes
- key agreement
Distributive Schemes
- key distribution
Public Key Schemes
Certificate 
based
Identity 
based
MANET 
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WSN 
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Symmetric Schemes
 
Figure 1.  Classification of key management schemes 
 
The distributive category is divided into symmetric and public key schemes. Public key 
schemes include traditional certificate-based and identity-based schemes. The symmetric 
schemes are classified as either MANET schemes or WSN (wireless sensor networks) 
schemes. WSNs represent a new class of ad hoc networks with more constrained nodes 
than traditional MANETs. 
Contributory schemes are characterized by the lack of a trusted third party responsible for 
generation and distribution of the cryptographic keys. Instead, all communicating parties 
cooperate to establish (i.e., “agree” upon) a secret symmetric key. The number of 
participants ranges from two parties (establishing a pairwise key) to many parties 
(establishing a group key). Although not necessarily designed with ad hoc networks in 
mind, intuitively the contributory approach of collaboration and self-organization may 
seem to fit the nature of ad hoc networks. A number of contributory schemes are therefore 
reviewed and evaluated later. Only one of these was designed specifically for ad hoc 
networks.   
Distributive schemes involve one or more trusted entities and comprise both public key 
systems and symmetric systems. Truly ad hoc networks require the trusted entity to be 
established impromptu during network initialization.   
Certificate-based public key schemes require the public keys to be distributed in a way 
that allows the receiving nodes to verify the authenticity of the key material. The wired 
network solution is a public key infrastructure (PKI) where a centralized certificate 
authority (CA) issues certificates binding the public keys to specific users/nodes.  
If it is suspected that a node has fallen into the wrong hands, or the node for other reasons 
should be expelled, the certificate is revoked. Revoked certificates are added to the 
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certificate revocation list (CRL). The CA signature guarantees the authenticity of 
certificates and CRLs. Under the assumption that a centralized trusted entity is not well 
suited for ad hoc networks where overall availability cannot be guaranteed all the time, the 
proposed key-management schemes for ad hoc networks involving certificate-based PKI, 
advocate various ways to distribute the CA functionality. The intuitive approach of naive 
CA replication is not reckoned as good enough as it poses poor intrusion tolerance. With 
more nodes holding the private CA key, the higher is the risk of getting it compromised.  
Identity-based public key schemes [5] represent a new type of public key system. They 
allow user identities (e.g., e-mail - or IP addresses) to be used as public keys, and make 
certificates superfluous. A trusted entity is however required in order to generate and 
distribute the private keys corresponding to the various identities.  The trusted entity is also 
needed for revocation. The trusted entity may sign a list of withdrawn identities. As with 
traditional public key systems, it has been suggested to spread the trusted entity over more 
nodes.  
Symmetric systems aim at distributing one or more shared secrets through secure 
channels. Many of the symmetric key management systems for ad hoc networks found in 
the literature are intended for Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs). The sensor nodes possess 
very limited power, memory and computational resources compared to traditional MANET 
nodes. Symmetric systems may thus be the only option. WSNs normally include a base 
station. That is, WSNs have a certain amount of infrastructure and are thus not truly ad hoc 
networks. This survey distinguishes between symmetric schemes for traditional MANETs 
and WSN schemes. A number of WSN schemes have been included in order to evaluate 
their applicability in traditional MANETs.  
Related surveys of key management-schemes: A survey of key distribution mechanisms 
for wireless sensor networks is found in [6]. Key Management schemes for secure group 
communication are surveyed in [7]. Reviews of key management protocols for ad hoc 
networks and sensor networks are also found in [8-10]and [11]. 
A. Contributory Schemes 
The main implications and limitations of various types of contributory schemes in ad hoc 
networks are demonstrated by the schemes studied in this section.  Table 1 summarizes the 
features of the different schemes.  
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Figure 2.  Outline of the contributory schemes (all exponentiation of generator g are 
modulo prime p) 
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1) Diffie-Hellman (D-H)1 –D-H [12] establishes a unique symmetric key between two 
parties.  It relies on the discrete log problem (DL); deciding S given g^S mod p being a hard 
problem. D-H is outlined in Fig.2. The parties agree upon a large prime, p, and a generator, 
g. Each party randomly chooses a secret, SA and SB, and transmits the public values, (g^SA) 
mod p and (g^SB) mod p, as shown in the figure. Raising the number received from the 
other party to the power of its own secret, gives a common secret key, g^ (SASB) mod p, 
shared only by the two.  
Like any schemes involving pairwise unique keys, D-H provides intrusion tolerance. A 
captured node only compromises the keys it shares with its communicating peers. 
Byzantine and faulty nodes basically only disturb their own key establishment with 
communicating peers. D-H is vulnerable to man-in-the middle (MIM) attacks. It is left for 
the nodes to judge who to trust. But as authentication lacks, Alice cannot be sure that she 
actually communicated with Bob and not Charlie.  
The generic D-H scheme is not applicable for protection of routing information in ad hoc 
networks. It applies to two parties only. Protection of routing messages with pairwise keys 
necessitates a different signature for each possible recipient, which scales badly. D-H has 
been included in this survey solely because the majority of the contributory schemes are 
founded on this scheme. They basically seek to remedy the shortcomings of D-H regarding 
MIM vulnerability and extendibility to more than two parties.  
2) Ingemarsson, Tang and Wong (ING) –ING [13] provides a symmetric group key by 
extending the two-participant D-H scheme to n participants. Fig.2 shows the principles with 
4 nodes. All nodes are arranged into a logical ring. After n-1 rounds, each node can 
calculate the secret key. Each round involves an exponentiation from every node, and every 
node must transmit its share to the next node in the logical ring as shown in the figure. 
ING lacks authentication and is vulnerable to MIM attacks. It scales poorly. 
Communicational complexity grows proportionally to the number of nodes squared. 
Byzantine behavior or faulty nodes may inhibit successful key establishment. A captured 
node means the group key is compromised, and necessitates a rekeying. The scheme does 
not specify how compromised nodes can be detected. The requirement for the nodes to 
                                                 
1For simplicity, the key management schemes are given short names. The short names do 
not necessarily represent generally adopted abbreviations.  
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organize into a logical ring during the key agreement procedure makes ING unsuitable for 
ad hoc networks. The establishment of keys for protection of routing information implies a 
logical ring of one-hop neighbors only (all nodes within direct transmission range).  With 
mobile nodes and unstable links it is questionable whether ING will ever complete 
successfully.  
3) Burmester and Desmedt (B-D) –B-D[14] seeks to establish a group key. It relies on 
the DL problem. But, contrary to the other contributory schemes studied here, it is not 
based on D-H. An outline of B-D with four nodes is shown in Fig.2. B-D completes in three 
rounds. Every node picks a secret, Si , and multicasts its public value, Zi=g^Si , to all other 
nodes in the group. In round 2, every node calculates and multicasts a new public value. 
This value is derived by dividing the public value received from the next node with the 
public value received from the previous node in the logic ring of nodes, and raising the 
result to the power of its own secret, Si, as illustrated in the figure. In the third and final 
round every node calculates the conference key from its secret and the information received 
from all the other nodes in the previous rounds.  
B-D is apparently more efficient than ING as it completes in three rounds. However, each 
round requires a high number of exponentiations and reliable multicast. Reliable 
multicasting is difficult in wired networks, and even more challenging in ad hoc networks. 
Changes in group membership necessitate a restart of the key-agreement procedure. In an 
ad hoc network with moving nodes it may thus never be possible to establish a group key 
by B-D, nor handle later changes in group membership. Group changes will certainly cause 
delay and disruption. B-D also demands an already running routing protocol or only one-
hop neighbors, that is, the key-agreement schemes depend on an already established routing 
infrastructure – but the infrastructure cannot be established before the keys have been set 
up. B-D authentication of the public values (not shown in the figure) can be implemented 
with the aid of pre-distributed public keys. Trust is managed through the certificate issuer. 
This implies a planned network and the basic key-management problem reverts to a public 
key scheme.   
4)  Hypercube and Octopus (H&O) –H&O [15] reduces the number of rounds and 
exponentiations of ING from n to d (n=2d) by arranging the nodes in a hypercube, that is, a 
d-dimensional cube. Figure 2 illustrates H&O in a network with 4 (22) nodes. In step 1, 
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nodes 1 and 2 perform a D-H key agreement. Nodes 3 and 4 do the same. The symmetric 
keys established in step 1 are used as the secret values in a new D-H key agreement in step 
2: node 1 and 4 perform a D-H key agreement and node 2 and 3 do the same and so on.   
H&O actually consists of two protocols: Hypercube and Octopus. Hypercube (shown in the 
figure) assumes the number of participants is a power of 2. Octopus extends Hypercube to 
allow an arbitrary number of nodes.   
 H&O is vulnerable to MIM attacks as authentication is absent. Byzantine or faulty nodes 
may preclude successful key agreement. Changes in group membership require rekeying.  It 
is left for the nodes to decide when re-keying is needed. Like B-D and ING, H&O relies on 
an underlying communication system to provide a consistent node-ordering view to all 
group members. Besides the difficulty of keeping a consistent node ordering where nodes 
join and leave dynamically, it implies an already running (unprotected) routing protocol or 
only 1-hop neighbors. The latter scales badly. Altogether, H&O is unsuitable for network 
layer security in ad hoc networks. 
5) Password authenticated key agreement (A-G) –A-G [16] is the only one of the 
contributory systems studied that has been designed with ad hoc networks in mind [16]. A-
G is basically H&O extended with password authentication as indicated in Fig.2. It assumes 
all legitimate participants receive a password offline (written on the conference hall 
blackboard or distributed through another location limited channel). The nodes must prove 
knowledge of the password during the pairwise D-H key agreements of the H&O protocols 
as shown in Fig.2. The figure shows the password authenticated key agreement between 
two nodes.  The password is used to encrypt the public value and an initial challenge in a 
challenge-response protocol as illustrated in the figure. 
A-G doubles the number of messages and increases the computational complexity 
compared to H&O. It remedies H&O’s vulnerability to MIM attacks at the price of 
scalability. 
A-G inherits the deficiencies of H&O regarding dependability of an already established 
communication infrastructure and node ordering scheme. Hence, it is not suitable for 
network layer security in mobile ad hoc networks. 
6) CLIQUES (CLIQ) -CLIQ [17, 18] is outlined in Fig.2. It extends the generic D-H 
protocol to support dynamic group operations. CLIQ distinguishes between initial key 
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agreement (IKA) and auxiliary key agreement (AKA). IKA takes place at group formation. 
AKA handles all subsequent key-agreement operations. In both cases, a group controller 
synchronizing the key agreement procedure is required. 
The figure shows the IKA protocol with four nodes. Stage 1 (the upflow stage) starts 
from node 1 which picks a secret exponent, S1, and unicasts g^S1 to next node. Node 2 
picks a secret exponent S2, and unicasts to node 3 the values shown in the figure. The 
procedure is repeated until the final node – the group controller is reached. The group 
controller is now able to calculate the secret group key g (i.e., the generator) raised to the 
power of the secret exponents of all nodes in the group.  In stage 2 (the downflow stage) the 
group controller multicasts the intermediate values required by each of the other nodes to 
calculate the secret group key, as shown in the figure.  
Both AKA (not shown in the figure) and IKA rely on the group controller. The group 
controller of CLIQ thus represents a single point of failure. Each AKA operation results in 
a new group key that is independent of all previous keys. Adding a new member with AKA 
basically extends stage 1 of the IKA protocol with one node. The role of the group 
controller can be fixed or floating. Allowing any node to take over the role as group 
controller renders the system vulnerable to malicious nodes. CLIQ omits authentication. 
The designers have left security properties (such as authentication) out while focusing on 
group changes, but argue that authentication could easily be added. Other major drawbacks 
with CLIQ, as with B-D, are dependency upon reliable multicast and availability of a 
consistent view of node ordering. With variable connectivity it is questionable whether IKA 
and AKA would ever complete successfully. With unstable links, highly mobile nodes and 
rapid splits and joins, instability may result.  
7) Other contributory schemes –A large number of key agreement schemes relying on 
already distributed keys have been proposed. The basic key-management problem thus 
reverts to distribution of the initial keys. Several schemes are also two-party protocols 
unsuitable for network layer security and are therefore left out of further discussions. 
Examples include MQV[19] based on traditional public keys, schemes relying on identity-
based public keys such as [20] and [21], and the D-H based protocols proposed in [22]. 
8) Summary of the contributory key management schemes: Although the contributory 
approach at first glance may seem to fit the self-organizing nature of ad hoc networks, none 
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of the contributory schemes are good candidates for key management in ad hoc networks. 
D-H, ING and H&O can be skipped due to missing authentication. They are vulnerable to 
MIM attacks. B-D and CLIQ can be left out – no matter whether the authentication scheme 
is included or not – as they have an inherent survivability problem with the dependency on 
reliable multicasting. A-G fails on scalability and robustness due to the dependency upon 
node ordering, and availability of all nodes during group changes. 
 
B. Distributive Schemes 
This section surveys public key and symmetric key management schemes proposed for ad 
hoc networks.  Tables 2 and 3 summarize the features of the public key schemes and the 
symmetric schemes, respectively.  
1) Public Key Schemes 
--Partially distributed Threshold CA Scheme (Z-H) -Z-H[23] assumes a PKI system and 
puts forward a framework to provide an available, intrusion-tolerant, and robust CA 
functionality for ad hoc networks. The private CA key is distributed over a set of server 
nodes through a (k,n) Secret sharing scheme [24]. The private CA key is shared between n 
nodes in such a way that at least k nodes must co-operate in order to reveal the key. 
(Finding the private CA key S is comparable to finding f(0) given a polynomial f(x) of 
degree k-1 and knowing k values, e.g. f(1), f(2) … f(k).)  
When queried, each server generates a partial signature of the certificate using its private 
key share in a threshold signature scheme [25]. A server acting as combiner collects the 
partial signatures and produces a valid signed certificate.  
Z-H advises share refreshing to counter mobile adversaries, i.e. adversaries that 
temporarily compromise one server and then attack the next. Proactive secret sharing 
schemes [26] allow the shareholders to periodically refresh their shares through 
collaboration. An adversary must thus compromise more than t shares between refreshes in 
order to compromise the system. The original secret does not change, only the shares held 
by the servers. Bear in mind the homomorphic property: If (s1,s2...,sn) is a (k,n) sharing of S 
and  (a1,a2...,an) is a (k,n) sharing of A, then (s1+a1, s2+a2,...,sn+an) is a secret sharing of 
S+A [27]. Choosing A=0 gives a new sharing of S). The scheme is made robust to missing 
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and erroneous shares through verifiable secret sharing [28]: Extra public information 
testifies to the correctness of each share without disclosing the share.  
Although not clearly stated, the system relies on a central trusted dealer to bootstrap the 
key management service, and decide which nodes shall act as servers. Z-H assumes an 
underlying (unsecured) routing protocol.   
According to [23] nodes cannot get the current public keys of other nodes or establish 
secure communication with others if the CA service is unavailable. However, every node 
should hold a copy of its own certificate. For network layer security, it would be more 
efficient to receive the certificates directly from the communicating peers (or other nodes in 
the neighborhood). If the certificate is needed to verify a signature on routing information, 
the node in question must certainly be available; otherwise there would be no requirement 
to verify its routing message. Thus, the need for on-line CA access is limited. Every node 
must contact the CA to get its initial certificates (and receive the public key of the CA). The 
same is true if the node for some reason has lost its private key or has had its certificate 
revoked. However, to get a new certificate, the node should be authenticated by the CA 
service – which necessitates some sort of physical contact between the node and the CA 
service. Certificate updates call for CA service. For scenarios like emergency and rescue 
operations, it would be better to make sure certificates are renewed in the preparation phase 
and not during network operation.  
The CA service is needed for revocation and distribution of CRLs. Z-H postulates that 
public keys of nodes that are no longer trusted, or have left the network, should be revoked. 
In an ad hoc network it can be hard to decide when a node has actually left the network. 
Revoking keys due to temporal missing connectivity would not be wise. More important is 
revocation of keys belonging to captured nodes. The frequency of such revocations in 
networks for emergency and rescue operations will expectedly be low. 
Periodical share refreshing implies some form of synchronization. Synchronization is 
bandwidth consuming and difficult in ad hoc networks. Management traffic between server 
nodes and certificate exchanges also consumes much bandwidth, and makes Z-H scale 
badly. A single CA or hierarchy of CAs is likely to prove better than the Z-H approach. 
SAD operations allow predistributed certificates. MAD operations call for on-scene cross-
certification of the root CAs of the merging domains. Efficient spreading of the cross-
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certificates in the respective domains is a problem for further investigation. There is no 
easy way to update the private/public CA key pair and make sure all nodes are informed.   
--MOCA -MOCA [29,30] is basically an extension to Z-H [23]. The focus is on 
distributed CA services and communication between the nodes and the server nodes – 
MObile Certificate Authorities (MOCAs). Whereas Z-H does not state how to select CA 
servers, MOCA suggests the nodes that exhibit best physical security and computational 
resources should serve as MOCAs. The MOCA scheme furthermore “moves” the combiner 
function of Z-H from the CA servers to the requesting end-nodes. The benefit is a less 
vulnerable scheme as the nodes no longer depend on the availability of the CA server nodes 
to combine the partial certificate signatures.  
A MOCA certification protocol, MP, is proposed to provide efficient and effective 
communication between clients and MOCAs. According to MP, certificate requests should 
be unicast to β specific MOCAs that, based on fresh routing entries or short distance, are 
likely to be accessible. With the (k,n) threshold scheme, k MOCAs are required to complete 
a certification service. To increase probability of receiving at least k responses: β = k+α. 
When availability drops, the protocol returns to flooding (as in Z-H). It is assumed that MP 
maintains its own routing tables and co-exists with a “standard” ad hoc routing protocol. 
Placing the CA servers in more protected nodes fits with the organization of emergency 
and rescue operations. Whereas the rescue teams typically move on foot, the on-site rescue 
management is normally vehicle mounted nearby. The rescue management represents a 
common point of trust. These nodes may be better protected and less resource constrained 
than the ordinary nodes. However, the comments regarding the Z-H focus on CA 
availability and applicability for SAD and MAD operations applies to MOCA as well. The 
MP maintaining its own routing tables in parallel with a “standard” ad hoc routing protocol 
is superfluous and a waste of bandwidth. 
--Secure and Efficient Key Management (SEKM) -In essence, SEKM [31] suggest the 
servers of MOCA form a multicast group. The aim is efficient updating of secret shares and 
certificates. A node broadcasts a certificate request to the CA server group. The server that 
first receives the request, generates a partial signature, and forwards the request to an 
additional k+α servers (not a true multicast). Only k partial signatures are required. The 
additional ones are for redundancy in case some are lost or corrupted. SEKM does not state 
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how a server can tell it is the first to receive the refresh request and start the k+α 
forwarding. On the whole, SEKM has the same features as MOCA. The required number of 
servers still has to be contacted, and the partial signatures returned.  
--Ubiquitous Security Support (UBIQ) -UBIQ [32] is a fully distributed threshold CA 
scheme. Similar to the partially distributed CA schemes Z-H, MOCA, and SEKM, it relies 
on a threshold signature system with a (k,n) secret sharing of the private CA key. 
Differently from the partially distributed CA schemes, all nodes get a share of the private 
CA key. A coalition of k one-hop neighbors forms the local CA functionality. It does not 
require any underlying routing protocol – only a node density of k or more one-hop 
neighbors. Mobility may help finding the required number of CA nodes. UBIQ prescribes 
share refreshing. 
The nodes earn trust in the entire network when they receive a valid certificate. Any node 
holding a certificate can obtain a share of the private CA key. A new secret share is 
calculated by adding partial shares received from a coalition of k neighbors. The first nodes 
receive their certificates from a dealer before joining the network. After k nodes have been 
initialized, the dealer is removed. The authors suggest that as the certification service is 
delivered within one-hop neighborhoods, some reliable out-of-bound physical proofs, such 
as human perception, can be used to authenticate new nodes.  
Limiting CA service requests to one-hop neighborhoods is bandwidth efficient and good 
for the scalability. From a network point of view, the distributed trust management fits with 
both SAD and MAD operations scenarios. A local coalition can decide to let in nodes from 
different domains. A drawback in the rescue operations scenario is the possible requirement 
of human involvement. In addition, k, should be chosen carefully. A low value reduces 
intrusion tolerance. A large k necessitates many neighbors. Reference [33] suggests more 
shares per node to succeed also with less than k neighbors. In effect, this solution gives 
little else than reducing the value of k.  Distributing the CA functionality boosts the 
availability of private key shares. Anyone capable of collecting k shares or more can 
reconstruct the private CA key. Like any public key scheme relying on a trusted entity, 
there is no easy way to change the private/public CA key pair during operation. 
In [34] it is argued that UBIQ may succumb to a Sybil attack [35] where a single node 
takes on more identities. With offline authentication of new nodes and the certificates 
87 
   
 
serving as proof of trustworthiness, this is hardly a realistic threat – at least not in settings 
like emergency and rescue operations. Secure and efficient revocation is an unsolved 
challenge.  
--Autonomous Key Management (AKM) -AKM [27] provides a self-organizing and fully 
distributed threshold CA. With few nodes in the network, the scheme is parallel to UBIQ. 
Each node receives a share of the private CA key. As the number of nodes increases, a 
hierarchy of key shares is introduced. New nodes then receive a share of a share of the 
private CA key.  
The root CA private/public key pair is bootstrapped by a group of neighbor nodes 
through distributed verifiable secret sharing [36]: Each of the n neighbors, chooses a secret 
value Si, and distributes secret shares of this to the other neighbors using a (k,n) secret 
sharing scheme2. Authentication is added offline. The sum of the individual secret values 
S=(S1+S2+S3+..+Sn) represents the private CA key. The corresponding public CA key 
equals g^S (operations are mod prime p). Assuming the nodes publish the individual public 
values, g^Si, the public key can be derived without revealing the private CA key by 
multiplying individual values g^S= g^S1* g^S2 *...* g^Sn. Figure 3 shows the principles.  
The nodes (N1-N6) and their shares, f(Ni), can be regarded as the leaves of a tree-
structure.  “R” in Figure 3 is a virtual node representing the private CA key. The probability 
of a compromise increases with more nodes holding a share of the private CA key. 
Therefore, when the number of share-holders reaches a certain level, the nodes split into 
smaller regional groups that set up a new regional key. Before splitting, the nodes N1-N6 
hold shares f(N1) - f(N6) of the private CA key. Assuming the nodes N1-N3 decide to form 
a new group and N4 -N6 another; N1 distributes a share of its secret share f(N1) to the other 
nodes in the new group. The others do the same with their key shares. The new regional 
secret of N1, N2, and N3 equals the sum of their shares S’= f(N1)+ f(N2)+ f(N3), 
represented as virtual node “G” in Fig. 3.  
 
 
                                                 
2 This approach is contributory in nature. However, derivation of the individual 
private/public key pairs of the nodes is not. AKM is therefore classified as a distributive 
scheme. 
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Figure 3. The principles of secret sharing in AKM; initialization, node addition and 
regional splits. (All operations are modulo prime p.) 
 
When the number of shareholders in any region reaches the specified level, the region is 
split. Regions are also merged. With less than k nodes, there are too few nodes to provide 
CA service.  Certificates signed with regional keys have less assurance then those signed 
with the CA key.  A high-assurance certificate requires partial signatures from nodes in 
different regions. The scheme assumes the network evolves from the nodes that initiated the 
AKM service.  
MAD operations require nodes from one domain to be included in the other as key-share 
trees rooted in different private CA keys cannot be merged. 
In AKM, each node maintains a CRL. AKM does not specify network wide 
dissemination of revocation information. A certificate is revoked when at least k neighbors 
have posted accusations against it. From a security point of view, it is questionable to what 
extent a certificate signed by the private CA key should be revoked by a group holding only 
a share of the private CA key.   
AKM increases intrusion tolerance at the price of communicational cost. Nodes are 
assumed to disassociate with the previous region and associate with the new when they 
move from one region of the network to another. Implicitly, the nodes must maintain a 
view of the key hierarchy and be able to detect regional boundaries. With mobile nodes and 
unstable links, it is not evident how this can be implemented. The scheme requires the 
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nodes to collaborate on changes in regions and key hierarchy. Byzantine or faulty nodes 
may delay these operations. In scenarios like emergency and rescue operations, where the 
CA services primarily are needed for issuance of initial certificates and revocation, a 
hierarchical AKM with several regions represents a waste of bandwidth. For robustness and 
scalability, a single region is preferable. The scheme then equals UBIQ.   
--Self-organized Key Management (PGP-A) -In [34], Capkun, Buttyán, and Hubaux 
propose a fully self-organizing key management scheme (PGP-A) – a PGP [37] scheme 
adapted to ad hoc networks. The CA functionality is completely distributed. All nodes have 
equal roles. They generate their own private/public key pair and issue certificates to the 
nodes they trust.  Certificates are stored in the nodes rather than in centralized repositories. 
PGP-A assumes trust is transitive (i.e., if Alice trusts Bob, and Bob trusts Charlie, then 
Alice should also trust Charlie). The nodes merge their certificate repositories, and try to 
find a verifiable chain of certificates. The Maximum Degree algorithm is suggested to 
construct a certificate graph with high connectivity even if the sizes of the users’ certificate 
repositories are small – due to the Small World phenomenon (the hypothesis that everyone 
in the world can be reached through a short chain of social acquaintances). Certificates are 
revoked through revocation messages from their issuer, or implicitly revoked at expiry 
time. Renewals require contact with the issuer. Certificates are also exchanged periodically 
between neighbor nodes. Evaluation of expiration times and periodical exchanges requires 
some sort of synchronization between the nodes. It is not evident from the paper how this 
synchronization should be established. 
The periodic certificate exchanges and contact with issuers to have certificates updated is 
bandwidth consuming and scales badly. PGP-A implicitly requires an already running 
routing protocol. Trust could be established ad hoc through physical contact and key-
exchange via a side channel. This enables improvisations suitable for both SAD and MAD 
operations. However, human interaction to keep network service running is undesirable.  
Byzantine behavior or faulty nodes have limited power to prevent others from 
exchanging certificates. A compromised node only discloses the keys held by this node. 
Still, a compromised node could be used to issue certificates allowing other illegitimate 
nodes to gain access to the network.  
There is only a probabilistic guarantee that a chain of trust can be found between parties 
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wishing to communicate. On the other hand, trust transitivity combined with the reliance on 
the small world phenomenon implies that everyone will soon end up trusting everyone. The 
result is no intrusion resistance. An alternative would be to restrict the maximum number of 
hops, and allow the nodes to differentiate the level of trust they put in the various 
certificates, as suggested in COMP [38]. 
--Composite key management for ad hoc networks (COMP) –COMP [38] combines 
MOCA’s [29,30] partially distributed threshold CA with PGP-A [34] certificate-chaining. 
The aim is higher security than obtainable with PGP-A, and increased availability of the 
CA service compared to MOCA. Nodes that have been certified by the CA are allowed to 
issue certificates to others. Nodes requesting a certification service should first try the 
MOCA CAs. If this fails, they should search for neighbors that have been certified by the 
CA. Depending on configuration, nodes with longer certificate chains to the CA may also 
be entitled to issue certificates to others.  
Each certificate in COMP includes a confidence value reflecting the level of confidence 
the certificate issuer has in the binding between node identity and key (0=no trust, 1=full 
trust).  Multiplication of the confidence values gives a measure for the level of trust in a 
certificate chain. Short certificate chains are generally preferred over long ones. The 
probability of one or more compromised nodes in the chain grows as the length of the chain 
increases. Similarly to PGP-A, COMP assumes a level of trust transitivity. However, 
signing a certificate, verifying you believe a key belongs to a certain identity, does not 
necessarily have to mean you also trust this identity to correctly sign certificates of others.  
The confidence values enable fine grained evaluation of trust, and the nodes do not have 
to trust the CA fully. However, deciding a proper confidence level is difficult. COMP does 
not state how the certificate issuers should accomplish this. Byzantine or compromised 
nodes may in any case assign full trust to untrustworthy nodes. Nevertheless, intrusion 
tolerance is increased compared to pure PGP-A as COMP restricts the maximum length of 
the certificate chains.  
Offline authentication typically includes human interaction, which is cumbersome in the 
setting of emergency and rescue operations. Interaction with one neighbor is less 
demanding than the UBIQ requirement for involvement of several neighbors, though. Still, 
COMP scales no better than MOCA as nodes requesting CA service should first try the 
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MOCA CAs. Transfers of certificate chains limit the scalability additionally.   
In MANETs for applications like emergency and rescue operations, the CA will be 
expected primarily to be needed to issue and revoke certificates. Periodical updates of the 
certificates should not take place online during a rescue operation. Revocation is not 
addressed by COMP. It is reasonable that the node that issued a certificate is entitled to 
revoke it. But empowering single ordinary nodes to revoke certificates issued by the CA 
solely because they hold a certificate signed by the CA, renders the system vulnerable to 
compromised and Byzantine behaving nodes. Allowing a single node to issue certificates 
contradicts the purpose of the distributed CA.  
A search for neighbors certified by the CA in order to obtain an initial certificate requires 
knowledge of the public CA key. Hence, at some point there should have been an 
authenticated channel between the searching node and the CA. The initial authenticated 
channel is typically obtained through physical contact, or a short-range side channel. A 
natural question for the node asked to provide CA service is then: Why did the requesting 
node not receive its certificate through the authenticated channel simultaneously?  
In SAD operations the certificates could be pre-distributed. In MAD operations it may be 
hard for a node to verify whether a certificate from the other domain really has been 
certified by the correct CA or not. 
--Mobility-based key management scheme (MOB) -MOB [39,40] seeks to mimic human 
behavior: if people want to communicate securely, they just get close to each other in order 
to exchange information. Security associations are established between pairs of nodes that 
get close.  The scheme can be fully self-organizing (MOB-so) or rely on an offline 
authority (MOB-a). MOB-so can be based on symmetric or public keys. MOB-a is 
intrinsically public key based.  
A major difference between MOB-so and MOB-a lies in the level of human involvement. 
In MOB-so, the users should authenticate the communicating peer physically before they 
establish a security association. The security credentials, triplets, are then exchanged over a 
secure (short-range) side channel. The triplets include user identifier, key and node address. 
The nodes also sign and exchange a statement that proves a security association has been 
established between the two. MOB-so accepts one level of transitivity in trust: security 
associations can be established through friends (i.e., nodes that have security associations to 
92 
   
 
both nodes in question). MOB-a assumes pre-distributed certificates, and suggests the 
exchange of security credentials is restricted to one-hop neighborhood.  
In both MOB-so and MOB-a, only the keys held by the specific node are compromised 
when a node is captured. Byzantine behavior or faulty nodes do not inhibit others from 
exchanging security credentials. The off-line authority assumed by MOB-a implies no 
revocation. The authors suggest compromised nodes should revoke their own certificates. 
However, it can be hard to tell whether a compromise has taken place or not. Revocation on 
suspicion represents a vulnerability. It may be a threat to availability. Furthermore, if the 
node has been captured, it may no longer operate according to protocol.  With MOB-so, it 
is left for the user to decide which of its security associations are no longer valid and what 
friend nodes have turned into enemies.  
The MOB schemes are bandwidth efficient in the sense that security credentials are only 
exchanged within one-hop neighborhoods. Still, the scalability is limited. The MOB 
schemes imply a long delay to establish security associations with all communication 
partners. This is also unsuitable for emergency and rescue operations.  
The designers suggest MOB-a for routing security and lower layers, and MOB-so for the 
application layer. MOB-a fits the SAD operations setting. MAD operations would require 
an on-line certificate authority to distribute cross-certificates of the merging domains.  
MOB-a brings little achievement over pre-distributed certificates without restrictions on 
certificate exchanges. Depending on routing protocol, confining certificate exchanges to 
one-hop neighborhood may inhibit efficient network formation.  There is no security 
achievement from such a restriction. The signature of the authority ensures the validity of 
the certificate no matter from whom the certificate was received. The assumption of MOB 
that no one should communicate securely with parties they have not been close to, 
contradicts the evolution of PKI.  
--Identity-based public key (IBC-K) -Identity-based Cryptography [5], introduced by 
Shamir, removes the need for certificates. Identities are typically short – at least compared 
to certificates with a size of several kilobytes. Assuming information that is by default 
transferred in the routing messages can be used as the public key, identity-based schemes 
may scale better than the traditional certificate-based approaches. This makes Identity-
based protocols interesting for bandwidth-limited ad hoc networks. 
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Shamir constructed an identity-based signature (IBS) scheme. To verify a signature, it is 
enough to know the ID of the sender plus the public system parameters. The public system 
parameters are defined by the private key generator (PKG) during system set up. The public 
system parameters include the public key of the PKG and information about the message 
space. The PKG also generates the private signature keys corresponding to the user IDs.  
Figure 4 shows a sketch of Shamir’s IBS scheme. During the setup phase, the PKG, 
chooses a secret master key and generates the corresponding public system parameters.  
Afterwards, in the extraction phase, it issues private keys. The private keys are uniquely 
given by the IDs and the PKG private master key.  
Several IBS schemes have later been proposed. Some examples are found in [41-43]. 
Boneh and Franklin [44] introduced the first practical identity-based encryption scheme 
(IBE). This scheme has later been extended by Lynn [45] to provide message authentication 
at no additional cost. The ciphertext itself serves as the message authentication code.  
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Figure 4.  Shamir’s identity-based signature scheme (IBS)  
 
Integration of identity-based signature and encryption schemes (IBSE) is studied in [46]. 
The latest progresses in IBE encompass strengthened security. Boneh and Boyen [47] 
suggested the first IBE scheme proven to be secure also in security models without random 
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oracles. Waters suggests a more efficient version in [43].  However, the IBE, IBSE and 
IBSC schemes presuppose pairwise communication. None are applicable for network layer 
one-to-many signing and verification of routing information. 
The PKG represents a single point of failure. If the private master key of the PKG is 
compromised, the entire system is compromised. To counter this, Boneh and Franklin [44], 
suggest spreading the PKG master-key over more locations using threshold cryptography. 
Khalili, Katz and Arbaugh [48] propose a key-management technique (IBC-K) for ad hoc 
networks combining identity-based cryptography with threshold cryptography [25]. The 
nodes that initialize the ad hoc network form a threshold PKG, spreading the PKG private 
master key over the initial set of nodes by a (k,n) threshold scheme. This eliminates the 
PKG as a single point of failure, and adds intrusion tolerance. It makes the service robust in 
the sense that an adversary must compromise minimum k nodes in order to recover the 
secret master key. It also reduces vulnerability as the service is available as long as k 
correctly behaving PKG nodes are within reach. 
In order to receive the private key corresponding to some identity, a node must present its 
identity to k (or more) of the n PKG nodes. The node receives a share of the private key 
from each of them. With k correct shares, the node can then compute its personal private 
key. 
In SAD operations the private keys and system parameters could be handed out from an 
off-line PKG in the preparation phase. The IBC-K approach fits both SAD and MAD 
operations scenarios as it makes self-configuration of the PKG service possible. However, 
offline and mutual authentication is in any case required between entering nodes and any 
PKG node issuing a private key or key share. A secure channel is required. This implies 
physical contact or a short-range dedicated communication channel. Multihop connectivity 
is not good enough. It would enable passive eavesdropping as well as man-in-the-middle 
attacks. 
When time is scarce, physical interaction with a number of geographically distributed 
PKG nodes is no good solution. Hence, for scenarios like emergency and rescue operations, 
a single PKG (e.g., located at the on-site rescue management) or a hierarchy of PKGs [49] 
would be more acceptable.  
Explicit key revocation remains an unsolved problem. There is no easy way of 
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distributing revocation lists (withdraw IDs) and make sure all nodes are informed. Another 
alternative is to change the PKG master key and system parameters. All private keys are 
derived from these parameters. In essence, an update of the PKG key makes all keys in the 
system obsolete. 
--Summary of Public Key Schemes – The capabilities of the public key schemes are 
summarized in Table 2. IBC-K, making certificate exchanges superfluous, is an interesting 
candidate for ad hoc networks. The reliance of a PKG makes it best suited for SAD 
operations. Depending on whether the security policy demands centralized trust 
management or not, IBC-K or COMP/UBIQ fits better in case of MAD operations.  
 
2) Symmetric Schemes  
--Pre-shared group key (PSGK): This is the old and well-proven key-management 
scheme with a key distribution centre predistributing a symmetric key to all members of the 
group.  A key distribution centre could also provide pairwise unique keys, but the focus 
here is on group keys. The symmetric group key can be used to “sign” routing information 
with a cryptographic checksum – MAC (Message Authentication Code).  
PSGK lacks intrusion tolerance in the sense that security succumbs to a single captured 
node. But if the security policy allows it, it is a simple solution. Assuming an offline key 
distribution center and predistributed keys, the scheme scales well. It is immune to faulty 
nodes and Byzantine behavior.  MAD operations would require a means of transferring the 
group key from one node to another (via a location limited optical channel or similar). 
Authentication should be added off-line.  With a single group key, there is no easy way to 
exclude compromised nodes. 
PSGK was not designed specially for ad hoc networks. It is included here as several of 
the symmetric schemes studied basically represent extensions to this scheme. 
--SKiMPy [50] –SKiMPy is designed for MANETs in emergency and rescue operations. 
It seeks to establish a MANET wide symmetric key for protection of network-layer routing 
information or application layer user data. On MANET initialization, all nodes generate a 
random symmetric key and advertise it within one-hop neighborhoods through HELLO 
messages.  The best key (i.e., the one with lowest ID number, freshest timestamp etc.) is 
chosen as the local group key.  The best key is transferred to the nodes with worse keys 
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through a secure channel established with the aid of pre-distributed certificates. The 
procedure is repeated until the “best” key has been shared with all nodes in the MANET. 
Once established, the group key serves as proof of trustworthiness. SKiMPy proposes 
periodical updates of the group key to counter cryptoanalysis. The updated keys are derived 
from the initial group key. 
SKiMPy is bandwidth efficient in the sense that nodes agree on the best key locally. 
There is no need for an already running routing protocol as the key information is 
exchanged between neighbors only. SKiMPy implies a delay to spread the best key to all 
nodes. Still, the currently best local key can be used to communicate securely until the 
“ultimate” key is received. 
Byzantine behavior or faulty nodes may disturb local key agreement, for example, by 
announcing a better key but not responding.  
SKiMPy is designed for SAD operations. MAD operations would require some means of 
spreading cross-certificates.  The authors indicate persons with special roles or ranks could 
be empowered to administer certificates. However, online revocation is not possible before 
the network has been initialized. As the network is initialized, the symmetric group key is 
also established. Once the symmetric key has been received, there is no efficient way to 
expel the node from further participation. The group key (or a key derived from it) now 
serves as proof of trustworthiness. Thus, SKiMPy adds complexity compared to PSGK, but 
does not increase the security accordingly.  
--Self-Healing session key distribution (S-HEAL) [51] –S-HEAL is a symmetric group 
key distribution scheme with revocation, designed for networks with unreliable links. The 
concept demands preshared secrets and a group manager that broadcasts the current group 
key K “masked” with a polynomial h(x); f(x)=h(x)+K. Individual secrets h(i) are pre-
distributed (i refers to node ID). Each member node can then extract the current key by 
evaluating the received expression at x=i, and subtracting the secret value; f(i)-h(i)= K. All 
operations take place in a finite field Fq where q is a prime larger than the number of nodes.  
Revocation is enabled by replacing the polynomial h(x) with a bivariate polynomial 
s(x,y). The group manager now broadcast the current key K masked as f(N,x)=s(N,x)+K. In 
order to extract the key, the nodes must first recover the polynomial s(x,i) and evaluate it at 
s(N,i). Then they must subtract the result from the received s(N,x)+K, evaluated at x=i; K= 
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f(N,i)-s(N,i).   
The thought is that only non-revoked nodes shall be able to recover the polynomial s(x,i). 
Given s of degree t, t+1 values are required to find s(x,i). The value N and the individual 
secrets, s(i,i) are pre-distributed. The other t values, s(r1,x), s(r2,x)... s(rt,x), that are required 
to reveal s(x,i), are incorporated in the key update message from the group manager. If the 
revoked nodes are included in the set {r1, r2...rt}, these nodes will only acquire t of the 
required t+1 values. Consequently, they will not be able to extract the new group key.  The 
scheme enables revocation of maximum t nodes. 
A main feature of S-HEAL is its self-healing property.  Nodes that lose one or more key 
distributions can still reveal the missed keys. Each key update message includes shares of 
all of earlier as well as all possible future keys. The key shares received before are 
complementary to the shares received after the key has been distributed. Assuming p(x) is 
the share received before K is distributed, the share received in key update messages after K 
has been distributed equals K-p(x). Hence, missed keys can be derived by combining shares 
received before the lost update with shares received after the lost update. Whereas the self-
healing feature may be of great value in mail systems and similar applications, network 
layer routing information has only instant value. Hence, retrieving earlier keys is of little 
interest.  Further details are therefore left out.   
S-HEAL’s reliance on a group manager – possibly multi-hops away – to provide the 
initial group key, makes it inapplicable for protection of routing information. The group 
key is needed in order to bootstrap the network service, but S-HEAL demands an already 
running network service to distribute the group key. Nevertheless, S-HEAL could 
potentially be used for revocation and re-keying, assuming a protected network service has 
been bootstrapped with an initial pre-distributed group key (PSGK). It would improve 
intrusion tolerance compared to pure PSGK. Robustness to packet losses could be increased 
by periodically retransmitting the latest key update rather than waiting for the next key 
update as implied by [51].  
Regarding scalability, the message sizes and number of key update messages are 
independent of the number of nodes in the network. The size of the key updates is only 
proportional to the size of the polynomials (if self-healing is left out.)  
Predistributed individual shares are acceptable for SAD operations, but incompatible with 
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merging of nodes from different security domains. Thus, S-HEAL has limited applicability 
in MAD operations.  
Missing source authentication of the broadcasts from the group manager is a 
shortcoming. A MAC generated by the previous group key could easily be added.  Still, a 
Byzantine behavior node could potentially transmit garble, claiming to be the next key from 
the group manager, and cause disruption.  
--Logical Key Hierarchy (LKH) –Group keys can be updated brute force: A group 
manager distributes the new group key, encrypted with a separate (individual) key for each 
node.  In essence, LKH represents a family of schemes that improve the scalability of this 
brute force method by organizing the keys into a logical hierarchy and giving the nodes 
additional keys.  
LKH was introduced by Wong, Gouda, and Lam [52]  and Wallner, Harder, and Agee 
[53]. The concept is illustrated in Fig.5.  All group members (N1-N8) possess the group key 
K12345678. The subgroup key K1234 is shared by members N1- N4, and K12 is common to N1 
and N2. K1 – K8 refer to the individual keys. Assuming node N8 is to be revoked; all group 
and subgroup keys known to N8 (K12345678, K5678 and K78) should be updated. N7 shares all 
intermediate keys from the leaf to the root with N8. N7 must therefore receive the updated 
keys encrypted with its individual key. The new group key and subgroup key can be 
distributed to N5 and N6 encrypted with their key in common; K56. To N1-N4, the group 
manager sends the new group key K1234567 encrypted with K1234. Thus, bandwidth and 
computational cost is saved compared to updates encrypted with the individual keys.  
The key tree can be binary or k-ary, and balanced or unbalanced. 
  
N1 N2 N3 N4
K1 K2 K3 K4
K12 K34
K1234
N5 N6 N7 N8
K5 K6 K7 K8
K56 K78
K5678
K12345678
 
Figure 5. Logical key hierarchy 
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Whereas the basic LKH scheme was not designed specifically for ad hoc networks, Rhee, 
Park and Tsudik [54, 55] suggest a LKH scheme for hierarchical ad hoc networks. They 
propose that the group manager functionality is distributed over several managers, each 
controlling different cells of the network. The approach is cellular and infrastructure based 
rather than ad hoc. The nodes are fully dependent upon the cell managers. Each cell has a 
different group key.  
The nodes must contact the cell manager to receive the key when they move from one 
cell to another. In other words, the nodes must be able to detect cell boundaries and be 
within communication range of a cell manager. In addition, the scheme requires that cell 
managers communicate during “key hand-off” from one cell to another. The intention of 
the scheme is to limit re-keying to part of the network. The price is reduced robustness and 
increased bandwidth consumption. The scheme is inapplicable for MANET use.  
  A number of other refinements of the basic LKH scheme [52, 53] focusing on 
communicational and computational cost, have been  proposed. OFT [56,57], OFC [58], 
ELK [59], LKH+ [56], EBHT [60], LKH++ [61], Poovendran and Baras [62], and the 
Internet-draft by Selcuk, McCubbin and Sidhu [63] all propose different ways to reduce 
communication overhead –primarily focusing on message sizes. Of these schemes, only 
LKH++ is designed for wireless networks.  
ELK reduces the size of the key update messages by sending only part of the key plus a 
key verification value. The receivers must search brute force for the remaining part of the 
key.  The verification value is used to decide whether the correct key has been found or not. 
LKH+ and EBHT suggest new keys are derived by applying a one-way function to the old 
key(s) when members are added. In OFT, OFC, and LKH++ the keys of parent nodes are 
related to keys of their child-nodes through one-way functions. After a group change, the 
group manager only sends enough information to enable the nodes to compute the rest of 
the updated keys themselves. Poovendran and Baras [62] show that the overhead can be 
reduced by placing nodes that are most likely to be revoked as close as possible to the root, 
that is, giving them only a minimum number of keys.  Similar ideas are also studied in [63]. 
In a practical situation it can be hard to decide which nodes are most likely to be 
compromised. Furthermore, in ad hoc networks, the number of messages may be more 
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devastating than the size of the messages [64]. Hence, the actual gain of the proposed 
refinements is not evident. Simulations are required in order to judge which approach is the 
better.  
LKH++ claims to reduce the number of messages as some of the nodes will be able to 
calculate the new key by themselves. The keys of parent nodes are related to keys of their 
child nodes through one-way functions.  According to LKH++ and referring to Fig. 5, K12 
equals a hash of K1, and K1234 represents a hash of K12. Consequently, children to the left 
will be able to calculate the new key of their parent node. The others receive it from the 
group manager. Still, the nodes to the left must also be made aware that a key update is 
required. LKH++ does not address how to do this.   
In an ad hoc network, rekeying every time a new node join or leave the network is 
unnecessary and undesirable. Routing information has only instant value. Backward and 
forward secrecy on joining and leaving nodes is of little importance. However, LKH may 
be of interest as an extension to PSGK for revocation purposes. Assuming the network 
service has been initialized (with the aid of the pre-distributed group key); LKH could be 
used to expel compromised nodes. A static tree, large enough to hold the keys of all 
anticipated members, would be required in order to avoid re-keying when new nodes are 
added. This may be possible for SAD operations. MAD operations would require the merge 
of two (or more) trees and necessitate re-keying.  
For (infrequent) revocations in ad hoc networks for emergency and rescue operations, 
robustness is even more important than communicational and computational cost. In the 
basic LKH scheme, innocent nodes that miss the update from the group manager may be 
cut off. Periodical retransmissions of the last update(s) could help. In ELK, the group 
manager sends repeated hint messages that enable nodes that lost the key update to 
calculate the key. Forward error correction codes (FEC) on key updates, as suggested by 
Wong and Lam [65], enable correction of bit errors, but does not help nodes that missed the 
entire update.  
The group manager represents a single point of failure. Replication of the group manager 
for reliability and performance, as suggested in [52], is of limited value for ad hoc 
networks. Replication demands synchronized servers and increase the number of targets for 
security attacks.  
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A general weakness of schemes that rely on symmetric keys only, is the missing 
possibility for source authentication. Byzantine nodes may pose as group manager and 
cause disruption. Reference [52] proposes authentication through digital signatures. The 
basic key management problem then reverts to public key distribution. 
--Probabilistic Key Pre-distribution (PRE) –PRE [66] assumes WSN nodes outfitted 
with a preinstalled key ring, that is, a set of keys drawn randomly from a large pool of keys. 
When bootstrapping the network, the nodes broadcast the identifiers of the keys in their key 
ring. A wireless link is established between nodes only if they share a key. Hence, 
resilience to Byzantine behavior and faulty nodes is fine. The scheme relies on a controller 
node (base station) to broadcast a signed list of the key identifiers to be revoked.  
A number of probabilistic key pre-distribution schemes for WSNs have been proposed. In 
[67], Chan, Perrig, and Song suggest extensions to [66] that increase the resilience against 
node capture. It requires q common keys (q>1) instead of just a single one to establish a 
connection. Liu and Ning [68] propose probabilistic pre-shared polynomials for 
establishment of pairwise keys in WSNs. Polynomial sharing increases resilience to 
captured nodes. A trusted entity defines a bivariate polynomial, f(x,y) with the property 
f(x,y)=f(y,x). Secret polynomial shares; f(i,y) are predistributed to each sensor node, i. Any 
two nodes, i and j, can set up a pairwise key by evaluating the polynomial at f(i,j) and f(j,i), 
respectively. Similarly, Du, Deng, Han and Varshney [69] suggest another scheme relying 
on probabilistic preshared polynomials for pairwise keys in sensor networks. In [70], Du et 
al. suggest use of deployment knowledge to increase the probability that two nodes find a 
common secret key. The latter may be possible in a WSN with planned positioning of 
sensors, but not in a MANET.  
Zhu, Xhu, Setia and Jajodia [71] propose probabilistic key predistribution combined with 
secret sharing to set up pairwise exclusive keys in MANETs. A node, wishing to 
communicate securely with another, picks a secret symmetric key. It then sends shares of 
this secret symmetric key, encrypted with different pre-distributed keys to the opposite 
party (i.e., the shares are sent through different logical paths). Assuming the aggregated set 
of predistributed keys used are known to the two nodes in question only, no other nodes 
will be able to decrypt enough shares to reveal the secret symmetric key. Depending on 
configuration, the scheme may produce a large number of messages. Reference [71] claims 
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it is desirable to trade computation for communication in ad hoc networks. This assumption 
does generally not hold.  
The idea of the key ring of PRE is intrusion tolerance. The price is availability. There is 
only a probabilistic assurance that a node actually will share a key with one or more 
neighbors and be able to bootstrap communication. Emergency and rescue operations, 
where availability is a number one concern, would require a key ring large enough to 
achieve close to zero probability of failure. The consequence is intrusion resistance reduced 
to a level comparable to a predistributed group key (PSGK). This contradicts the intension 
of the scheme.  The applicability and scalability for network layer security is limited. 
Different keys in common with the various neighbors imply more signatures for each 
routing message. End-to-end signatures on routing messages to be flooded are precluded. 
-- Security Protocols for Sensor Networks (SPINS) [72] –The SPINS security protocols 
for WSNs assume preinstalled individual (pairwise) keys between the sensor nodes and a 
base station. Nodes that want to communicate securely, request the base station for a 
common key. The base station returns the key, encrypted with their individual keys. This 
scheme demands an already running routing protocol and reliable access to the base station. 
It is inapplicable for the purpose of protecting routing information in a traditional MANET.  
SPINS also includes a scheme for authenticated broadcast; µTESLA, and describes how 
this can be used to provide an authenticated routing protocol for sensor networks. µTESLA 
relies on a predistributed commitment (i.e., the last key of a one-way key chain) and 
delayed disclosure of subsequent keys in the key chain. The key chain can be derived by 
repeated hashes of an initial random key. The key used at time i equals a hash (or similar 
one-way function) of the key used at time i+1.  The commitment enables the nodes to 
verify that later disclosed keys originate from the claimed source; repeated hashes of the 
disclosed key should return the commitment. To send an authenticated packet, the sender 
computes a message authentication code (MAC) with a key that is secret at that point in 
time. The receiver stores the message until the key later is disclosed. The nodes must be 
loosely time synchronized and know the key disclosure schedule. Otherwise, adversaries 
could forge packets as the receiver would not know whether the key used to calculate the 
MAC of an incoming packet had been disclosed or not.  
The SPINS authenticated routing protocol discovers routes from the nodes to the base 
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station with the aid of µTESLA key disclosure packets flooded from the base station. The 
sender, from which a node first received the valid µTESLA packet, is set as parent node in 
the route to the base station. The predistributed commitment enables the nodes to verify 
that the received packet originated from the base station.  
This may work for communication from sensor nodes to a base station. The same 
technique cannot be used in a traditional MANET with a scattered communication pattern. 
One possibility would be to preload all nodes with commitments of the key chains of all 
other nodes. This would allow any node to authenticate the messages from any other node. 
Intrusion tolerance would be fine, and robustness to Byzantine behavior and fault nodes is 
good. However, the nodes would have to be loosely time synchronized and know the key 
disclosure schedule of all other nodes. The solution would give little flexibility and scale 
badly. MAD operations and late registered nodes in SAD operations would be precluded.  
Furthermore, delayed key disclosure is problematic in the setting of mobile nodes and 
rapidly changing network topology.  Altogether, the SPINS key management scheme and 
authenticated routing protocol is inapplicable for protection of routing information in 
traditional MANETs.  
--GKMPAN [73] –GKMPAN is designed for secure multicast in ad hoc networks. It is 
basically a revocation and re-keying scheme for PSGK, founded on PRE [66] and µTESLA 
[72]3. GKMPAN assumes a pre-distributed group key plus a pre-distributed commitment. 
The group key is used to protect multicast communication. The commitment is used for 
authentication of revocation messages from the key server. In addition, GKMPAN assumes 
each node is equipped with a preinstalled subset of symmetric keys drawn from a large key 
pool.  
In contrast to PRE, the keys in the key set are determined from the ID of the node. On 
revocation, the key server issues a revocation message containing the ID of the revoked 
node. All keys in the key set of the revoked node should be erased or updated. Any node 
can automatically tell from the ID which keys to revoke. The revocation message also 
                                                 
3 Actually, [73] claims TESLA [74] is used for authentication. At the same time [73] 
assumes a pre-distributed commitment, and states that only symmetric key techniques are 
used – which implies µTESLA.  The difference is subtle. µTESLA relies on a pre-
distributed commitment. TESLA assumes the initial packet is authenticated with a digital 
signature.   
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identifies a key that is not in the key set of the revoked node, to be used as “update key.”  
A new group key is derived from the old one with the aid of a keyed one-way function; 
the old group key is used as data input and the “update key” as key input. The output is the 
new group key. Nodes that have the “update key” in their key set, can calculate the new 
group key without assistance. The others receive it from their parent node, encrypted with 
one of the (non-revoked) keys in their key set. It is distributed through a multicast tree 
rooted at the key server. The validity of the revocation message cannot be checked before 
the key server later discloses the key that was used to compute the message authentication 
code. 
In order to avoid potential disruptions, the old and new group key should coexist until all 
nodes have received the new group key.  However, there is no easy way to make sure all 
nodes have received the new group key. Byzantine behavior or faulty nodes may inhibit 
efficient exclusion and re-keying. The reliance on a key server and time synchronization are 
other vulnerabilities. GKMPAN scales fairly in the sense that new group keys can be 
calculated by the nodes themselves or transferred locally.  In addition, GKMPAN increases 
intrusion tolerance compared to PSGK as it enables node exclusion. The price is reduced 
availability. Innocent nodes may be expelled if all their keys happen to be in revoked key 
sets. This is not acceptable in settings like emergency and rescue operations.  
--Secure Pebblenets (PEBL) [75]: Pebblenets refer to large ad hoc networks where the 
nodes are called pebbles due to their small size and large number (e.g., WSNs). The aim of 
PEBL is protection of application data. It establishes and updates a network-wide traffic 
encryption key, TEK. At the network layer a preinstalled group key guarantees the 
authenticity of a pebble as a member of a group. Hence, PEBL can be regarded as an 
extension to PSGK. The assumption is that only nodes possessing the group key are 
capable of encrypting and decrypting HELLO messages correctly. Furthermore, PEBL 
assumes the pebbles organize into clusters of one-hop neighbors. Each cluster selects a 
clusterhead node. The clusterheads establish a backbone, and compete to become the key 
manager. The key manager generates the traffic key, TEK, which is intended for encryption 
of application-layer data traffic. The TEK is distributed from the key manager to the regular 
nodes through the clusterheads. It is updated periodically. Each TEK update is preceded by 
a reclustering and new selection of clusterheads. This rotation of the clusterhead role is to 
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avoid exhaustion of the nodes acting as clusterheads, and to account for mobility. Nodes 
that were one-hop neighbors when the cluster was formed may have moved out of the 
neighborhood.  
Nodes that do not behave according to the protocol may disturb cluster formation and 
TEK updates. PEBL offers no protection against replay or intrusion.  PEBL security 
succumbs to tampering. Both network layer HELLO messages and TEKs are all protected 
by keys derived from the group key. Anyone possessing the group key will be able to 
participate in the TEK updates. PEBL in its entirety, with cluster formation and periodic 
TEK updates, is bandwidth consuming, demands synchronization and makes availability 
assumptions that renders it not suited for MANET use.  
--Key Infection (INF) [76] –INF is intended for WSNs. The scheme assumes static 
sensor nodes and mass deployment.  INF sets up symmetric keys between the nodes and 
their one-hop neighbors. The security is based on surprise: It relies on the assumption that 
during the network deployment phase, any attacker is only able to monitor a fixed 
percentage of the communication channels. At bootstrap time, every node simply generates 
a symmetric key and sends it in the clear to its neighbors. A key whispering approach is 
used, i.e. the key is initially transmitted at a low power level. The transmission power is 
then increased until the key is heard by at least one of its one-hop neighbors and a reply is 
received. INF is simple, self-organizing, and robust to Byzantine behavior and faulty nodes. 
It is bandwidth efficient, and scales well. However, the security is weak. INF is vulnerable 
to eavesdropping during key whispering. In addition, there is no authentication of the 
communicating parties. INF’s “security through surprise” fails for MANETs where static 
nodes and instant mass deployment is no option. 
 --Localized Encryption and Authentication Protocol (LEAP) [77] is designed for static 
WSNs. LEAP suggests different keys for different purposes. It requires a number of pre-
distributed keys. Predistributed individual keys are used for communication between sensor 
nodes and the base station. A preshared group key is applied for protection of broadcast 
information from the base station. A preinstalled network wide initial key, K, is used to 
derive pairwise keys for secure communication between one-hop neighbors.  
During neighbor discovery immediately after deployment, each node n derives its master 
key, Kn. The master key is derived as a function of its node ID and the initial key; 
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Kn=fK(IDn). The master key is used to “sign” HELLO messages. Any node that knows the 
initial key is able to calculate the master key of any other node ID. Hence, each node can 
verify the HELLO messages received from its neighbors. The node then calculates the 
pairwise keys shared with its neighbors, v, as a function of their master key and the node 
ID; Knv=fKv(IDn).  
Intrusion tolerance is obtained under the assumption of stationary nodes; the network key 
is erased after the pairwise keys have been established. Nodes that have erased the network 
key can no longer establish pairwise keys. New nodes can still be added though. As the new 
nodes have not yet erased the group key, they can set up pairwise keys with their neighbors. 
When a node is captured, only the keys held by the captured node are compromised.  
The pairwise keys are used both to secure ordinary data and to distribute cluster keys. The 
cluster keys are employed for secure local broadcasts. Any node simply generates a cluster 
key and sends it to all neighbors, encrypted with the respective pairwise keys. 
Whereas LEAP may work in a static sensor network, the heart of this key management 
scheme – the setup of pairwise keys – will not work in a traditional ad hoc network.  
Deletion of the initial key is incompatible with mobile nodes and constantly changing 
network topology. Evaluating the scalability of LEAP in MANETs makes little sense, as 
pairwise key set up is precluded after the initial key has been erased. 
--Distributive symmetric Schemes-Summary –Table 3 gives an overview of the 
capabilities of the distributive symmetric key management schemes. The WSN key 
management schemes generally assume static nodes, mass deployment, node-to-base 
station communication pattern or are designed to establish pairwise keys. Their aim and 
assumptions render them inapplicable for protection of routing information in traditional ad 
hoc networks with mobile nodes. PSGK, or PSGK extended with S-HEAL or LKH for 
revocation, appear to be the most promising alternatives of the symmetric schemes.  
 
IV Conclusions  
We find it useful to classify key management schemes for MANETS (mobile ad hoc 
networks) as either contributory or distributive.  Figure 6 provides an overview of the 
schemes surveyed in this paper.  Distributive schemes based on symmetric techniques are 
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either intended for traditional MANETs or for wireless sensor networks (WSN). 
Distributive key management based on asymmetric cryptographic techniques may take on 
the standard distinction between certificate-based and identity-based schemes.  
We were not able to select one single scheme that is intrinsically superior to the others in 
our comparative work. A general observation is that none of the proposed key-management 
schemes for MANETs are truly effective for all MANET scenarios. The application must 
be taken into consideration at current state of the art. There is a lack of reported attention to 
the challenges presented by the concrete limitations of communication capacity in 
MANETs.  The performance evaluations tend to be restricted to computational complexity 
considerations, whereas the practical constraint of MANETs is more likely the 
communication capacity rather than the computational power and energy 
consumption.  Both the size and the number of messages are important. The number of 
messages can have more impact than the size due to overhead introduced in lower 
communication layers. 
The optimal combination of bandwidth efficiency and robustness against link loss under 
a given power consumption should be sought in future key management proposals. Also, 
secure and efficient key revocation remains an open challenge in MANETs. 
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O, MIM, 
Byz. 
behavior 
O, Byz. 
behavior 
O,MIM, 
Byz. 
behavior 
O, Byz. 
behavior 
O,MIM, 
Byz. 
behavior 
Availa-
bility 
assump-
tions 
Peer Ring O O + RM Hypercube O 
Hypercu
be O 
O+GC+R
M 
Byz. 
behavior 
& Faulty 
nodes 
Y N N N N N 
Robust-
ness 
 
Group 
changes NA Re-key Re-key Re-key Re-key Re-key 
Scala-
bility  Poor Poor Poor Poor Poor Poor 
Byz.: Byzantine, G: Group Key (symmetric), GC: Group Controller, MIM: Man-in-
the-middle, N: No/None, NA: not applicable, O: node ordering, P: Pairwise 
symmetric key, PK: public key, RM: reliable multicast, S.O.:self organizing, Y: 
yes 
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TABLE 2 SUMMARY OF PUBLIC KEY SCHEMES 
  Z-H MOCA SEKM UBIQ AKM PGP-A COMP MOB IBC-K 
C
ha
ra
ct
er
is
tic
s 
 
Group of 
servers 
forms 
Thres-hold 
CA  
 
Most 
power-ful 
nodes 
form 
Thres-
hold CA  
 
 
Thres-
hold CA 
servers 
form 
multicast 
group 
All nodes 
part of 
thres-hold 
CA  
“Hierarchical 
UBIQ” 
Anar-
chy: 
All nodes 
act as 
distinct 
CAs 
MOCA+ 
PGP-A 
Move close 
for exchange 
of security 
credentials   
No C, 
Key= 
ID  
Aim PD TCA PD TCA PD TCA FD TCA FD TCA FD CA PD CA 
MOB-a: Off-
line CA 
MOB-so:  
FD TCA 
Thresh
old 
PKG 
A
pp
lic
ab
ili
ty
 
Net Planned Planned Planned Planned/ Self-org. Self-org. Self-org. 
Planned/ 
Self-org 
MOB-a: 
Planned 
MOB-so: 
Self-org. 
Planne
d Self-
org 
Aut-
henti-
cation 
Off-line Off-line Off-line Off-line Off-line Off-line Off-line Off-line/ side channel Off-line 
Intru-
sion tol. Good Good Good Fair Fair/Good Limited Limited/Fair Good Good 
Trust 
Mnmt CA CA CA 
CA:  
k*1-hop 
neighbors 
CA: k 1-hop 
neighbors Nodes 
CA + CA 
certified 
nodes  
MOB-a: N 
(Off-line CA) 
MOB-so: 
Nodes 
PKG 
Se
cu
rit
y 
Vuln-
erabili-
ties 
Combiner, 
CRL distrib, 
CA key 
update  
CRL 
distrib, 
CA key 
update 
CRL 
distrib, 
CA key 
update 
CRL distrib, 
1-hop 
neighbors 
<k, 
(Sybil 
attack), 
CA key 
update 
Regional 
changes, 
Revocation 
CRL distrib 
1-hop 
neighbors <k, 
CA key 
update 
Com-
promised 
nodes, 
CRL 
distrib,  
Com-
promised 
nodes, 
Distributed 
trust mnmt, 
 CRL distrib, 
CA key 
update 
Revocation, 
Delay due to 
restriction on 
Security 
credential 
exchanges, 
CA key 
update  
IRL 
distrib, 
PKG 
key 
update 
Avail-
ability 
ass-
umption
s 
RP,  
#CA 
srvrs>k, 
Combiner, 
CA srvrs 
conn., 
sync 
RP, 
#CA 
srvrs>k, 
CA srvrs 
conn., 
sync 
RP, 
#CA 
srvrs>k, 
CA srvrs 
conn., 
sync 
#1-hop 
neighbors> 
k, 
sync 
#1-hop 
neighbors 
from same 
region> k, 
Region-
awareness 
RP, 
Chains of 
trust, 
sync 
#CA srvrs>k 
or CA 
certified 
neighbor >1  
MOB-a: off-
line CA 
MOB-so: 
side channel 
#PKG 
nodes 
> k,  
PKG 
node 
conn., 
sync 
Byz. 
behavio
r & 
Faulty 
nodes 
Good Good Good Good Limited Good Limited Good Good R
ob
us
tn
es
s 
Group 
change
s 
C + CRL C + CRL C + CRL C + CRL 
C+CRL/ 
accusations+ 
Region size  
C + CRL C (+CRL) 
C  
+CRL IRL 
Sc
al
ab
ili
ty
 
 Poor Limited Limited Fair Limited Poor Limited Limited Fair 
#:The number of, Byz..:Byzantine, C:Certificate, CA:Certificate Authority, CRL:Certificate Revocation List,, conn.: 
Connectivity, distrib:Distribution, FD:Fully distributed, IRL: ID (Key) revocation list, k : threshold value,  
mnmt:management, N:No/none , PD:Partially distributed, PKG:Private Key Generator, RP:Already running 
routing protocol, srvrs:Servers, sync:synchronization, TCA: Threshold CA, tol.:tolerance 
 
 
 
 
117 
   
 
TABLE 3 Summary of symmetric Key Management Schemes 
  PSGK SKiMPy S-HEAL LKH PRE SPINS GKMPAN PEBL INF LEAP 
Characteris-
tics 
 
Pre-
shared 
group 
key 
Estab-
lish key 
on 
network 
form-
ation 
Polynomial 
sharing 
Key 
Hierarch
y 
Probabilisti
c key 
distribution 
Suite of 
protocols for 
WSN.  Key 
manage-
ment: Pre-
shared keys 
between 
nodes and 
base station 
PRE+ 
µTESLA 
assisted 
revocation 
for PSGK 
in WSN 
Keys for 
application 
and 
network 
layer -
based on 
PSGK 
Whis-
per key 
to 
neigh-
bor 
Resists 
intrusion 
through 
non-
mobile 
nodes 
Aim GK GK Rev &  re-key**) 
Rev &  
re-key**) 
 
Keys 
between 
subsets of 
1-hop 
neighbors 
PK and 
Authenticate
d route to 
base station 
GK, 
rev & re-
key 
GK 
Keys 
betwee
n 1-hop 
neighb
ors 
GK, PK, 
cluster 
keys 
A
pp
lic
ab
ili
ty
 
Net Plan Plan Plan Plan Plan Plan Plan Plan S. O. Plan 
Authenti
-cation Off-line C, KP N KP KP 
Off-line, 
µTESLA 
KP  
µTESLA KP N KP 
Intrusion 
tole-
rance 
Poor Limited Fair Fair Fair Fair Limited Poor Poor Limited 
Trust 
Mnmnt Off-line 
Off-line / 
special 
nodes 
G Mngr G Mngr Controller node Base station 
On-line 
Key 
Server 
Off-line N Base station 
Se
cu
rit
y 
Vulner-
abilities Tamper 
Tamper, 
Rev,CA, 
Periodic 
key 
updates 
G Mngr, 
colluding 
nodes>t, 
Byz nodes 
GMngr, 
Byz 
nodes 
Controller 
node 
Base 
station, 
Synch 
Key 
Server, 
synch,  
Byz 
nodes, 
 rev of 
innocent 
Tamper, 
Re-key, 
synch, 
Cluster 
head 
selection 
Eaves-
droppin
g 
Initial 
key, 
Node 
mobility, 
Base 
station 
Avail-
ability 
assump-
tions 
N N 
G Mngr, 
Reliable 
key 
distribution 
G Mngr, 
Reliable 
key 
distrib. 
Key ring 
fits with 
neighbors’ 
Base station  Key Server 
Synch, 
Full 
connectivit
y during 
TEK 
establish-
ment, 
Cluster 
head 
1-hop 
neighb
ors> 1 
No 
mobility 
Byz 
behavior 
& Faulty 
nodes 
Good Fair Poor Poor Good Good Limited Limited Good Limited 
R
ob
us
tn
es
s 
Dynamic 
group 
changes 
N N Re-key Re-key Key re-advertising N Re-key 
Periodic 
TEK 
update 
N Re-key 
Sc
al
ab
ili
ty
 
Re-
source 
efficien-
cy 
Good Fair Fair Fair Limited Poor Fair Limited Good  *)
Byz: Byzantine, C: Certificate, CA: Certificate authority, G:Group, GK: Group key (symmetric), KP: Key Possession, 
Mnmt:Management, Mngr.:manager, N:No / none / Not addressed, PK: Pairwise keys, PKI:Public key infrastructure, Plan : 
planned, Re-key:re-keying, rev: revocation, S.O. : self organizing, synch: synchronization, TEK : Traffic Encryption Key, WSN: 
Wireless Sensor Network,  
 
*) assumes static nodes – scalability in MANETs with mobile nodes makes little sense  
**) It is here assumed a predistributed group key and S-HEAL/LKH used for revocation 
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Abstract 
 
Protection of the network layer in mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) imply 
cryptographically signed routing messages. Identity-based signature (IBS) schemes 
make bandwidth consuming certificate exchanges obsolete. User identifiers serve as 
public keys. However, long-term identifiers are required. 
This paper analyzes the applicability of IBS schemes for securing routing 
information in MANETs for emergency and rescue operations. The Optimized Link 
State Routing protocol (OLSR) serves as example. 
 
1 Introduction 
With the wireless media of MANETs, there is no guarantee that malicious nodes 
do not mingle and interfere. A key issue is to judge whether a routing message comes 
from a trusted node or not. This calls for one-to-many signing and verification of 
routing messages. Traditional public key schemes require certificates that bind the 
public keys to identities. The newer identity-based signature (IBS) schemes make 
certificates obsolete. User identifiers serve as public keys.  Assuming information 
that is by default transferred in the routing messages, e.g. IP addresses, can be used 
as public key; identity based public key schemes may scale better than traditional 
public key schemes. This makes identity-based protocols interesting for bandwidth 
limited ad hoc networks. 
This paper analyzes the applicability of IBS for protection of routing information 
in MANETs for emergency and rescue operations. The aim is to pinpoint the 
consequences of an IBS system, rather than to track the best solution. OLSR [7] is 
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used as example. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes 
the characteristics of emergency and rescue operations. Section 3 outlines identity-
based signature schemes. OLSR is described in 4. IBS protection of ad hoc routing 
protocols is analyzed in 5. Related work is described in section 6. Conclusions and 
suggestions for future work are found in section 7. 
 
2 Emergency and rescue operations 
In emergency and rescue operations, an off-site Rescue Coordination Centre (RCC) 
establishes the on-site rescue management (OSRM) with an on-site coordinator (OSC) 
as head. The OSRM administers the on-site rescue team consisting of professional 
teams (typically including, police, health services and the fire brigade). Thus, the 
involved parties and roles are to a large extent predefined. Arbitrary civilian volunteers 
are not allowed to participate. This enables pre-configured security credentials.  
However, “ad hoc” partners from multiple security domains may be pulled in, e.g. in 
operations involving industrial fire brigades and cross-border operations.  
Whereas the members of the professional units normally move on foot on the site of 
the accident, the OSRM is typically vehicle mounted nearby. The members of the on-
site rescue team are equipped with wireless mobile nodes forming a MANET. There 
may be a communication channel back to fixed network through one or more MANET 
Gateways – possibly co-located with the OSRM. The MANET Gateways can be mobile 
base stations, TETRA base stations, or a satellite links, i.e. possibly low capacity links. 
It is assumed that all MANETs will be “stub” networks where the nodes only route 
traffic that originates and/or terminates in the particular MANET. 
 
3 Identity-based signature schemes  
Identity-based Cryptography [16] removes the need for certificates. User identifiers 
serve as public keys.  The first IBS scheme, introduced by Shamir [16], is outlined in 
Fig.1.  During the setup phase, the trusted entity, the Private Key Generator (PKG), 
chooses a secret master key and generates the corresponding public system parameters. 
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e
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Fig. 1 Shamir’s IBS scheme 
Afterwards, in the extraction phase, it issues private keys. The private keys are 
uniquely determined by the IDs and the PKG private master-key.  Signature verification 
requires the ID of the sender plus the public system parameters. A merge of nodes from 
multiple security domains requires new public system parameters to be signed by 
OSRM/RCC (PKG) and flooded through the gateways.  
Secure and efficient revocation is an unsolved challenge. Revocation decisions are 
naturally made by RCC or OSRM nodes with access to the gateways. Lists of revoked 
IDs, signed by the PKG, can thus be distributed through the gateways. If no gateways 
are accessible and operable, revocation is precluded.  
 
4 The optimized Link State Routing Protocol (OLSR) 
OLSR [7] is a proactive link state routing protocol designed for large and dense 
MANETs. Bandwidth consumption is optimized compared to classical flooding through 
the use of Multipoint Relay (MPR) nodes. Only nodes that are chosen as MPRs forward 
routing information. Each node selects MPRs from its 1-hop neighbors in such a way 
that all 2-hop neighbors are covered by at least one MPR node. Each node broadcasts its 
links and MPR selections through HELLO messages. HELLO messages are not 
forwarded. In contrast, Topology Change (TC) messages disseminate topology 
information throughout the network, and are generated and forwarded merely by MPR 
nodes. Routing tables are computed from the information exchanged through TC 
messages. An OLSR node may have several network interfaces, but there should always 
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be one main address identifying the node. The main address is used as the originator 
address in all OLSR messages [7]. Other OLSR interfaces are announced through 
Multiple Interface Declaration (MID) messages, and will be visible as source and 
destination addresses in the IP header. OLSR packets are encapsulated in UDP over IP. 
Interfaces to non-OLSR networks are declared through Host and Network Association 
(HNA) messages. Like TC messages, MID and HNA messages are flooded by the 
MPRs. 
 
5 Protecting MANET routing protocols with IBS 
5.1 Identifiers and public keys 
Routing information secured by IBS should be based on IP addresses. These are the 
only well-known IDs at the network layer, and will be transmitted as part of the routing 
messages anyway. We believe the alternative of MAC addresses, as proposed in [3], 
represent a more static and vulnerable solution. There is no well-known approach for 
global or multi-hop dissemination of MAC addresses, and a hardware failure or change 
of node would demand a new key.   However, with our suggestion, dynamic address 
assignment will be precluded, as fixed IP addresses will be needed. 
 
5.2 Address configuration 
Address requirements: The main OLSR address is a natural choice of IBS public 
key. It always follows as originator address in the OLSR routing messages. OLSR [7] 
assumes nodes are assigned addresses within a defined address sequence. This is not 
really needed for the OLSR protocol. However, the MANET nodes should be 
addressable from the external network. A gateway between the MANET and fixed 
network could hide the internal addresses. The Gateways could also be used to provide 
DNS service. 
Assigning unique addresses: Several proposals regarding IP address assignment 
and how to resolve duplicate addresses in MANETs have been put forward. The 
suggestions implicitly assume that any node may join the MANET, and the IP addresses 
should be obtained as the node enters the network. In emergency and rescue operations, 
address administration could be co-located with the PKG (OSRM/RCC). The PKG can 
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thus prevent duplicate addresses. Merging nodes from multiple security domains call for 
international conventions on address assignment in Emergency and Rescue 
organizations. A fall-back is stateful address configuration by a PKG service, accessible 
through the gateway(s).  
 
5.3 Securing OLSR with IBS 
 
OLSR protection schemes: The protection schemes proposed for the OLSR 
protocol, [1][8][19], rely on signed routing messages and sequence numbers or 
timestamps. The messages are signed hop-by-hop or end-to-end.  With end-to-end 
signatures, the OLSR main address is the natural choice of public key.  It is forwarded 
unchanged end-to-end in the originator address field of the OLSR message. The hop-by-
hop approach requires an ID of the retransmitting node as public key, e.g. the source IP 
address in the IP header.    
Sketch of protocol operation: Micro mobility within the MANET is handled by the 
MANET routing protocol. Ideally, all MANET routing messages are signed. The 
routing messages are processed according to the specifications in [7]. The IBS signature 
is verified as the final step before the message is accepted as valid. In case OLSR is 
extended with multicast-tree building information, these messages should be signed and 
treated as any other routing messages.  
Macro mobility could be managed by Mobile IP [13] (MIP) as described in [4]. Our 
assumption of fixed IP addresses maps with the MIP assumption of fixed home 
addresses. The MANET Gateways act as foreign agents (FAs) and provide temporary 
care-of-addresses (CoAs) reflecting the current internet attachment point of the mobile 
nodes (MNs). The CoA must be registered with a home agent (HA) router on the MN’s 
home network. The HA intercepts datagrams destined for the MN and tunnels them to 
the CoA. At the end of the tunnel the FA de-capsulates datagrams and forward them to 
the mobile node. Inside the MANET, the nodes may use their home addresses if these 
are not exposed to external networks. With the proactive routing protocol the nodes will 
know whether the destination is accessible within the MANET or the datagram should 
be routed to the FA Gateway.  Seen from the fixed network, each FA gateway should 
possess different subnet IDs on the MANET side. This enables tunneling of IP-
datagrams from the HA independently of MANET fragmentation and merging. The 
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subnet IDs need not be visible within the MANET. The FA should be set as default 
gateway. With more Gateways, the MANET node must choose which one to sign up 
with.  Changes in connectivity may require a change in FA binding. The HA and 
previous FA gateway should be informed as usual in MIP. On splits, MANET to 
MANET communication can continue through the Gateways and MIP.  We have   
assumed IPv4. IPv6 could be treated as implied in [15].  
 
5.4 Performance 
Assumptions and analytical approximations: The performance evaluation assumes 
a generalized protection scheme; OLSR messages extended with a signature field.    
OLSR message sizes are given in [2]. The methods for calculation of overhead and 
channel utilization are adopted from [18]. Our calculations are based on network 
topology information from [20]4. HNA and MID messages are assumed to contribute 
little to the overall OLSR traffic, and are therefore left out of the calculations. No 
message aggregation is assumed. TC intervals are set to 2,5*HELLO intervals, i.e. a 
HELLO interval of 2 seconds  imply 5 seconds between each TC message.  
There are few IBS implementations commercially available. In order to provide an 
estimate for processing delays and signature sizes, we assume Shamir’s original IBS 
scheme. Signing and verification is then comparable to RSA [14] operations, and 
implies a signature can be processed in a few milliseconds (Broadcom BCM5825 
security processor provides a 1024bit RSA operation in 0,083ms.) In Shamir’s IBS 
scheme both signing and verification include a modular exponentiation with a large 
prime (e in Fig.1). Signing and verification cost is therefore similar. A modulus of 1024 
bits gives a 2048 bits signature. 
Processor utilization: With a probability, pMPR, of being selected as MPR, n nodes 
in the network and N 1-hop neighbors, the number of signatures every node must 
process per second equals 
(pMPR*n*TCrate+N*HELLOrate)           ( 1) 
Fig.2a) shows the processor utilization for various signature processing times and 
                                                 
4 Obtained through calculations and simulations with ns2 simulator. The number of 
MPRs selected by each node was set 10-20% higher than minimum required by the 
standard protocol. Other simulation parameters: Random Waypoint mobility model, 
maximum speed 20 m/s and pause time 60s, nodes distributed over an 1500mx300m 
area,  transmission range 250m. 
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network sizes, given a HELLO interval of 2 seconds. Experience has showed that the 
default HELLO interval of 2s can be too long to handle mobile nodes. Fig. 2b) displays 
processor utilization with 32 nodes in the network for various HELLO intervals and 
signature processing delays. Fig. 2a) and b) illustrate that with a dedicated processor 
and processing delays in the order of a few milliseconds, processor utilization is a not 
limiting factor for the applicability of IBS.  
Overhead: The size of the TC messages is calculated under the assumptions that 
every TC message advertises (N-1)*mSxRATE links (N equals the number of 1-hop 
neighbors and mSxRATE the MPR selector rate; the average number of nodes that has 
selected this node as its MPR). The HELLO messages are assumed to include two 
different link codes. Fig.3a) displays the average OLSR traffic imposed per channel for 
various network sizes and signature lengths, given a HELLO interval of 2s. The figure 
indicates a maximum network size around 32 nodes under the assumption of 2048bit 
signatures and a requirement that imposed OLSR traffic should not exceed 10% of the 
1Mbps bandwidth. Fig.3b) displays the consequences of various HELLO intervals and 
signature sizes with a network size of 32 nodes as example.  It shows that the overhead 
introduced by OLSR signatures restrain shorter message emission intervals, especially 
with signature sizes larger than a kilobit. 
Channel Utilization: The channel utilization is measured as average fraction of a 
second a channel is occupied. The calculations assume IEEE 802.11b with CSMA/CS-
DSSS for the lower layers. OLSR traffic is broadcast traffic with a data rate of 1Mbps. 
UDP, IP and 802.11 MAC headers add an overhead of 8+20+34 bytes to each OLSR 
packet, respectively. A collision and error free channel is assumed. Additional 802.11b 
delay is 552us [9] per MAC frame.  Fig. 4a) shows the average channel occupation for 
various network and signature sizes with a HELLO interval of 2s. Assuming that OLSR 
traffic should not utilize more than 10% of the channel capacity, the figure shows that 
without signatures, the maximum network size is limited to 42 nodes.  A signature of 
2048 bits reduces the maximum network size to approximately 26 nodes. Fig. 4b) shows 
the channel utilization for various signature sizes and HELLO intervals in a network of 
32 nodes. It shows that channel utilization confines possible OLSR message emission 
rates, especially with signatures of more than some hundred bits. 
Discussion: The calculations show that whereas processing delays of some 
milliseconds have little impact on the applicability, signature sizes in the order of 
thousands of bits have. This is not limited to IBS schemes. Channel utilization confines 
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the maximum size of the network and possible OLSR message emission rates.  Shamir’s 
IBS doubles the size of the signatures compared to RSA for the same modulus. Shorter 
signatures are desirable. Recent IBS schemes [6] [12] [17] rely on bilinear pairings. 
Super-singular elliptic curves imply signature sizes comparable to RSA signatures. 
(Short signatures from the pairings are proposed in [5], but these are not identity-based.) 
Our calculations assumed a single verification per message and duplicate messages 
discarded. More attempts may be needed if the first verification fails.  Hence, 
processing delays can be a more limiting factor than our calculations indicates. 
However, other IBS schemes generally have a different computational cost for signing 
and verification. Each node verifies more signatures than it signs. Longer signature 
generation times may be acceptable. 
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       Fig.2 Processor utilization versus processing delays for:  
a) various network sizes, HELLO interval=2 seconds (n = number of nodes),  
b) various HELLO intervals, 32 nodes 
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 Fig. 3 OLSR traffic imposed per channel for various signature sizes with: a) 
various network sizes, HELLO interval =2seconds, b) various HELLO intervals, 
32 nodes 
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 Fig. 4 Average channel occupation by OLSR traffic for various signature 
sizes and a) various network sizes, HELLO interval = 2seconds, b) various HELLO 
intervals, 32nodes. 
 
 
6 Related work 
 
Khalili, Katz and Arbaugh [10] suggest identity-based cryptography for ad hoc 
networks, focusing on key distribution. They suggest spreading the private key 
generator over more nodes with the aid of threshold cryptography. However, they do 
not analyze the network implications of identity-based schemes.  
The IETF Host Identity Protocol (HIP) [11] suggests a new namespace that 
decouples the internetworking layer from the upper layers. With HIP, the host identifier, 
not the IP address, represents a long term identifier. 
 
7 Conclusions and future work 
 
This analysis of identity-based signature (IBS) schemes for protection of MANET 
routing information revealed channel utilization (assuming IEEE 802.11b) as the most 
limiting factor. The signature sizes confine the network size and possible routing 
message emission frequencies. Signatures of more than a few hundred bits are only 
applicable in small MANETs with standard message emission intervals. This result is 
not limited to identity-based signatures. From an addressing and key distribution point 
129 
   
 
of view, IBS fit emergency and rescue operations involving participants from a single 
security domain. Operations with participants from multiple security domains require 
distribution of new parameters in the merging networks.  
Our analysis assumed the OLSR routing protocol. We believe the results have 
relevance also for other MANET routing protocols. However, reactive protocols have a 
different message generation pattern. Further simulations and experiments are needed to 
verify the concept of IBS protected   MANET routing protocols combined with Mobile 
IP. Increased bandwidth efficiency is desirable. Hybrid solutions are topics for further 
work. Alternatively, messages could be signed only when changes are detected. Another 
topic for further studies is evaluation of the cost/gain of various MANET routing 
protocol protection schemes.  
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Corrections:  
• In the OLSR section it is claimed that routes are calculated from tc messages 
– should have been tc and hello messages.  
• Topology change – should have been topology control 
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Abstract  
The network layer of ad hoc networks is prone to attacks. Insertion of false routing 
information is inherently easy unless the routing messages are authenticated. Hence, 
protection of the routing protocol is a prerequisite for a reliable network service. The 
wireless broadcast media calls for bandwidth efficient solutions. This paper proposes a 
hybrid protection scheme for the ad hoc Optimized Link State Routing protocol (OLSR). 
Identity-based signatures are combined with hash chains. Only some messages are 
signed. Unsigned messages include a hitherto undisclosed value from the hash chain as 
a lightweight proof of authenticity. The result is a bandwidth efficient scheme providing 
adequate protection. 
 
Key words: Secure routing, ad hoc, authentication, hash chains, identity-based 
signatures, performance 
 
1 Introduction 
Protection of the network layer in mobile ad hoc networks calls for unilateral 
authentication of the routing messages. Possible solutions include symmetric message 
authentication codes, traditional digital signatures and identity-based signatures.  
Symmetric schemes are efficient both regarding computational efficiency and 
bandwidth consumption. However, with a single group key, the security succumbs to a 
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single captured node. Source authentication is precluded, and malicious insiders may 
masquerade as others. Furthermore, exclusion of compromised nodes is hard. The 
alternative of pairwise exclusive keys provides better intrusion tolerance, but scales 
badly.  
 Asymmetric (public key) schemes enable revocation of single nodes and provide 
better protection against Byzantine behavior from insiders. A drawback of traditional 
digital signature schemes is the potential need for bandwidth consuming certificate 
exchanges. The identity-based signature (IBS) schemes make certificates obsolete. If 
information such as IP-addresses that are by default transferred in the routing messages 
is used as public keys, identity-based schemes may scale better than the certificate based 
schemes.  
In [7] it is shown how the signature sizes confines the maximum size of the network 
and possible routing message emission frequencies. Bandwidth efficient solutions were 
sought. This paper proposes a hybrid protection scheme for proactive link state routing 
protocols, and provides specific formats for its implementation with the optimized link 
state routing protocol (OLSR) [3]. The aim is a bandwidth efficient solution providing 
an adequate level of security. Both the security and the performance of the protection 
scheme are analyzed.  
The hybrid protection scheme combines asymmetric, identity-based signatures with 
shorter and computationally cheaper hash values from a hash chain [11]. Bandwidth is 
saved by signing only some routing messages. Unsigned messages include a hitherto 
undisclosed hash value from the chain. The values serve as lightweight proofs of 
authenticity, and make it hard for malicious nodes to successfully insert additional and 
false routing messages on other nodes’ behalf, even if not all messages are signed. The 
hash values also ease sequence number wrap around detection and protect against 
replays. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. OLSR is described in section 2 and 
threats are described in section 3. Section 4 outlines the basic security mechanisms. In 
section 5 the hybrid protection scheme is described and analyzed. The performance of 
the protection scheme is evaluated in section 6. Related work is described in section 7. 
Conclusions and future work are discussed in section 8.  
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2 The Optimized link state routing protocol (OLSR) 
OLSR [3] is a proactive link state routing protocol designed for large and dense 
mobile ad hoc networks. The packet and message formats are shown in Fig.1. 
Bandwidth consumption is optimized compared to classical flooding through the use of 
Multipoint Relay (MPR) nodes. Only nodes that are chosen as MPRs forward routing 
information. Each node selects MPRs from its 1-hop neighbors in such a way that all 2-
hop neighbors are covered by at least one MPR node.  
 
0-7 8-15 16-23 24-31 0-7 8-15 16-23 24-31 0-7 8-15 16-23 24-31
Msg Type Vtime Msg Type Vtime Msg Type Vtime
TTL HopCnt TTL HopCnt TTL HopCnt
Htime Willingn. Htime Willingn. Htime Willingn.
Link Code Reserved Link Code Reserved Link Code Reserved
..
..
..
..
..
Netmask Netmask Netmask
..
Netmask Netmask Netmask
Network address Network address Network address
HNA message:
Network address Network address Network address
.. .. ..
.. .. ..
OLSR interface address OLSR interface address OLSR interface address
OLSR interface address OLSR interface address OLSR interface address
MID  message:
.. ..
.. .. ..
..
Advertised neighbor  main address Advertised neighbor  main address
Advertised neighbor main address Advertised neighbor main address Advertised neighbor main address
Advertised neighbor  main address
ANSN Reserved ANSN Reserved ANSN Reserved
TC  message:
Neighbor Interface Address Neighbor Interface MSN Receipt
MSN Receipt
MSN Receipt MSN Receipt Neighbor Interface 
Link Message Size Link Message Size Link Message Size
Neighbor Interface Address Neighbor Interface Address Neighbor Interface Address
Neighbor Interface Address
(Signature)
Reserved Reserved
Hello message:
Reserved
Msg Seq.Number (future use) Msg Seq.Number
Message Sequence Number 
Hash valueSignature 
Signature & Hash sizeSType
Message Size Message Size Message Size
Originator Address Originator Address Originator Address
Packet Sequence 
Message header:
Packet Length Packet Sequence Packet Length Packet Sequence Packet Length
Standard Formats: MSN-receipt  formats: Hybrid protection scheme:
Packet header:
Fig. 1. OLSR packet and message formats 
 
Each node broadcasts its links and MPR selections through HELLO messages. 
HELLO messages are not forwarded. Link state information is disseminated through 
Topology Change (TC) messages that are generated and flooded in the entire network 
by the MPR nodes. Routing tables are computed from the information exchanged 
through the TC and HELLO messages. The 1-hop and 2-hop neighbors are detected 
from the HELLO messages. Routing information concerning 3-hop nodes and more 
distant nodes are found from the TC messages.  
An OLSR node may have several network interfaces, but there is always one main 
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address identifying the node. The main address is used as the originator address in all 
OLSR messages [3]. Other OLSR interfaces are announced through Multiple Interface 
Declaration (MID) messages. These are visible as source and destination addresses in 
the IP header. OLSR packets are encapsulated in UDP over IP. Interfaces to non-OLSR 
networks are declared through Host and Network Association (HNA) messages. Like 
TC messages, MID and HNA messages are flooded by the MPRs. 
 
3 Threats 
The OLSR routing protocol is vulnerable to a number of attacks that can be classified 
as Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. The attacks may aim at a single node, a group of 
nodes or the whole MANET. The threats originate both from external malicious nodes 
as well as internal, legitimate members of the network not behaving according to 
protocol. Possible attacks include: 
Exhaustion: Insertion of routing information for the purpose of exhausting other 
nodes or congesting the channel.  
Route corruption: Insertion of bogus routing information or modified routing 
messages in order to corrupt the routing tables.   
Replay: Retransmission of earlier routing messages to corrupt routes or exhaust other 
nodes. 
Blackhole nodes attract traffic by falsely advertising they have the best routes to 
others. The target may be control of the traffic flow. Blackholes may choose to forward 
routing information but not payload.  
Masquerade, i.e. nodes pretending to be others, can be launch by replays of old 
routing messages or insertion of bogus routing information. The aim can be route 
corruption or node exhaustion. 
Selfish nodes refuse to forward or only selectively forward routing messages from 
others and give priority to own traffic. 
Wormholes, set up by colluding nodes tunneling routing messages through a high 
speed link from one part of the network to another, can make geographically distant 
nodes erroneously believe they are neighbors. The colluding nodes may act as 
Blackholes. 
Eavesdropping is assumed not to disturb routing. However, eavesdropping can be 
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used for traffic analysis and monitoring of network topology. The information learned 
could be utilized as background information for other attacks.   
Byzantine behavior refers to nodes that do not behave according to the protocol. This 
includes insertion of false or modified routing messages, masquerade, selfish behavior, 
delayed response and similar deviations from the protocol. 
  
4 Basic Security Mechanisms 
Identity-based signatures (IBS): Identity-based Cryptography [18] removes the 
need for certificates whereas preserving the benefits of public key systems. IDs such as 
IP-addresses that are by default transferred in the routing messages can be used as 
public keys. The first identity-based signature (IBS) scheme, introduced by Shamir [18], 
was derived from RSA [16]. More recent schemes such as [4],[8],[14], and [17] are 
based on bilinear pairings. 
During the setup phase of an identity-based scheme, the trusted entity, the Private 
Key Generator (PKG), chooses a secret master key and generates the corresponding 
public system parameters. Afterwards, in the extraction phase, it issues private keys. 
The private keys are calculated by combining the IDs and the private master-key of the 
PKG. Signatures, generated by the private key, are verified with the aid of the sender ID 
plus the public system parameters. 
 Hash chains [11] are constructed by repeated hashes of an initial random seed RND: 
h1=h(RND), h2=h(h1),…,hn-1=h(hn-2), hn=h(hn-1). The hash function h() is a 
cryptographic one-way function. The last value in the chain, i.e. the hash anchor hn, is 
distributed through an authenticated channel. This commitment enables its holder to 
verify whether later disclosed values originate from the same hash chain or not. 
Repeated hashes of the received value should return the hash anchor. Forward hash 
calculation is fast and easy. However, the one-way property makes it hard for anyone 
but the creator to find the preceding values in the hash chain. 
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5 A hybrid Protection Scheme for OLSR  
5.1 Aim and assumptions  
The aim of the hybrid protection scheme is a reliable network service. The scheme 
seeks to balance bandwidth efficiency and security. The routing messages are signed 
periodically. TC messages are signed when topology changes, or periodically if no 
changes are detected. In addition, all routing messages include a previously undisclosed 
value of a hash chain. The hash values make it hard for malicious nodes to succeed in 
routing protocol attacks even if not all messages are signed. 
The hybrid protection scheme assumes an IBS scheme where the OLSR main 
addresses are used as public keys, and the corresponding private keys and system 
parameters have been derived by a separate key management service. This implies a 
planned ad hoc network. 
5.2 Sketch of protocol operation 
Message formats: The message formats are shown in Fig.1. The hybrid protection 
scheme is based on the message sequence number (MSN) receipt technique for replay 
protection suggested in [20], i.e. the HELLO messages include not only the address of 
their neighbors but also the last MSN received from them. Ref. [20] suggests the MSN 
field is extended from 16 to 32 bits to avoid MSN wrap-around during network 
operation. The hash chain removes the need for more bits in the sequence number field. 
The hash value will prove whether a message with a lower MSN than previously 
received is fresh or not.  
If all messages were either hashed or signed and hashed, and the signature and hash 
sizes are fixed, one bit would be enough to signal signature type to the receivers. A 
more general format is suggested with the SType and signature & hash size fields 
shown in Fig.1. The SType field can be used to signal signature type plus configuration 
parameters such as signature and hash algorithms and the maximum interval between 
signed messages.  
Hash anchor distribution: The first hash value received in a signed message is 
stored in the receiver as the hash anchor of that originator. Note that this value does not 
have to be the original anchor of the chain. The hash value in every signed message 
represents a refreshed hash anchor.  
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MSN and the length of the hash chains: The hash chains are made long enough to 
avoid initialization of new chains during network lifetime. This is both to ease MSN 
wrap-around recognition and to increase the robustness to packet losses. If a signed 
message is lost, the receiver can still verify the hash value of the next message received.  
Whereas a single hash operation is computationally cheap, long hash chains imply 
more processing in the sender node. That is to “spool” from the seed to the wanted 
value when a new message is prepared. A trade off between work load and storage 
space is made by storing some intermediate values of the hash chain. The sender then 
only has to “spool” from the closest stored value in the chain.   
Routing message processing: When a signed message is received and the signature 
check fails, the message is discarded. Otherwise, the receiver stores the hash anchor and 
the message sequence number (MSN). When hashed messages are received, the node 
verifies that repeated hashes of the received value return the hash anchor. Subtracting 
the stored MSN number from the received MSN value provides the number of repeated 
hashes required.  
1) Local messages: When a new 1-hop neighbor is detected, but it has not yet been 
authenticated through a signed HELLO message, the neighbor and the link are set to 
“non-verified”. Still, if the hash value can be verified, i.e. a hash anchor has been 
received through flooded messages or the node has been in the neighborhood recently, 
the neighbor is accepted as a symmetric neighbor. In case no hash anchor is available, 
the link status is set to asymmetric until the link has been authenticated through a 
correctly signed HELLO message. MPRs are chosen among the authenticated nodes 
only, and only authenticated nodes are accepted as MPR selectors.  
2) Flooded messages are accepted over symmetric links only. The MPRs only flood 
messages from their authenticated MPR selectors, and only authenticated neighbors are 
advertised in the TC messages. TC messages are flooded regularly. TC messages 
announcing topology changes are signed. The TC messages are also signed if no 
topology changes have been detected within a given period. If a topology change is 
detected in an unsigned hashed message (the signed message may have been lost), the 
new entry is marked “non-verified”. The status is changed to “verified” when a 
correctly signed message is received. Correctly signed messages take precedence over 
unsigned messages. 
HNA and MID messages are signed periodically. The contents of these messages are 
expected to change little over time. Most messages will be used to refresh earlier 
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entries. When a new interface-to-main address association is listed in an unsigned 
hashed MID message, the new entry in the multiple interface association base is marked 
“non-verified”. When a corresponding entry is received in a signed message, the status 
is changed to “verified”. In case of conflicts, verified entries take precedence over non-
verified. HNA messages are treated similarly. Verified entries are preferred as 
gateways.  
   
5.3 Security analysis 
The cryptographically signed routing messages provide source authentication and 
proof of integrity. They also provide fresh, authenticated hash anchors. The hash values 
do not guarantee the integrity of the messages, but make successful attacks harder then 
when the messages are left unsigned. The receivers expect fresh values from the hash 
chains. Else, the messages are discarded. The hash values make it impossible for 
malicious nodes to insert additional messages on other’s behalf. The malicious nodes 
must wait for the true originator to disclose the next value in the chain. In addition, 
modified messages that arrive later than the original message are discarded. Hence, the 
hash values make successfully timed attacks hard. 
Local messages: Ideally, a node should not set the link status to symmetric before the 
link has been authenticated through a signed HELLO message as the routing tables are 
recalculated on detection of new 2-hop neighbors. However, accepting hash values as a 
temporary proof of trustworthiness makes neighbor detection faster at the same time as 
it is not straight forward for an attacker to launch an attack. The MPR selection is more 
important to protect as these nodes act on behalf of others. This is accounted for as only 
authenticated neighbors are accepted as MPRs and MPR selectors.  
Some attack situations for local messages are shown in Fig.2 a).  
Situation 1:  The true originator node A is within 1-hop neighborhood of the receiving 
node B. If the packet is not lost, the receiver will receive the message from the true 
originator at the same time as any malicious node. Any replay or modified messages 
received from the malicious node will arrive later than the true message, and be 
discarded.  
If the packet is lost on the way from A to B, the malicious node C may retransmit a 
modified message. If the message is signed, any modification will be detected by B. If it 
was left unchanged, node C basically improves the connectivity. On the other hand, if 
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the message was unsigned, node C may succeed in introducing false information. That 
is, it requires C to spoof the interface address of A, otherwise node B will detect that 
this packet was received from a different OLSR interface. This spoofing is detectable by 
node A. In addition, the next message received directly from A will remove any false 
information introduced by C. Both with and without packet losses, the hash values 
prevent C from introducing additional and unscheduled HELLO message on A’s behalf. 
Situation 2: Node C replays HELLO messages from node A recorded earlier in 
another part of the network. If node B already has a fresher hash anchor obtained 
through flooded message from A, the replayed message is discarded. Furthermore, 
neither Byzantine insiders nor external attackers will be able to produce a signed 
message from A including a fresh MSN-receipt from B, which is required to establish a 
verified symmetric link.  
Situation 3: Colluding nodes C1 and C2 forward traffic between A and B through a 
high speed link in a wormhole attack. If C1 and C2 retransmit the messages unchanged, 
they may improve network connectivity. Still, they could also act as Blackholes and 
forward routing information, but not payload.  
Signatures are not enough to protect against wormholes. Precise time information or 
location awareness or similar is required in order to mitigate such attacks. Mobility also 
helps. We believe wormhole attacks are hard to mount in ad hoc networks. Their 
importance should not be exaggerated.  
Situation 4: Node A is out of 1-hop neighborhood of node B. A malicious node C is 
placed between node A and node B. The malicious node may replay the HELLO 
messages from A unchanged or forward modified versions. This is the same as a 
wormhole attack, except that node C represents both ends of the “tunnel”. Unless C 
retransmits the messages on orthogonal OLSR interfaces, nodes A and B will hear the 
retransmission by C. The hash values prevent C from inserting additional and 
unscheduled messages on A and B’s behalf. Signed messages erase any false 
information inserted by C. 
Situation 5: A malicious node inserts false messages. The signature and hash 
validations will fail. 
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b) Flooded messages 
Fig. 2. Attack situations (Node A true originator, Node B receiver, and Node C 
attacker). 
Flooded messages:  Some attack situations for flooded messages are shown in 
Fig.2b). 
Situation 1&2: There is a malicious node C within the 1-hop neighborhood of the 
neighbors A and B. This is parallel to situation 1 for local messages. The hash values 
prevent C from successfully inserting additional and unscheduled messages on the 
behalf of A (and B). With no packet losses, B will receive the correct message from A 
at the same time as C, and discard any later modified or unmodified duplicates. In order 
to make B flood false information from A it requires the packet was lost by B, and B is 
an MPR of node A, and C spoofs A’s address. Such a masquerade can be detected, but 
not prevented by A. However, more than one packet must be lost in sequence in order to 
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make B flood false topology information. This is as B expects TC messages to be 
signed upon topology changes.  It also requires A is a MPR (only MPRs generate TC 
messages), and B must be its MPR.  
Situation 3&4: In situation 3, the malicious node C represents a shorter route from 
MPR A to the receiver, and forward the routing message to node B before the message 
is received through an authenticated route. In situation 4 there is a malicious node 
between A and its MPR B. Situation 3 and 4 are basically wormhole attacks where node 
C represents both ends of the “tunnel”. C may succeed in temporarily introducing false 
information. Mobile nodes make it harder for node C to succeed in a persisting attack. It 
requires C to track both A and B and maintain the shorter route in situation 3 or keep A 
and B strict 2-hop neighbors in situation 4. The hash values inhibit C in introducing new 
messages from A before A has released the next value in the hash chain. Signed 
messages erase any false information introduced by C.  
Situation 5: Node C is two or more hops away from the originating MPR A. When C 
receives a new hashed message; C can modify the contents and retransmit the message. 
Still, it requires C to spoof the address of a symmetric neighbor of node B. In addition, 
C must send the modified packet before the true MPR forwards the (correct) message, 
as B will discard later duplicates.  The hash values make it impossible for C to insert a 
false packet on behalf of the MPR before a new value in the chain has been received.   
Concluding remarks: Evaluating the hash values before the computationally more 
expensive signature verification renders the hybrid scheme more robust to node 
exhaustion attacks than schemes solely relying on asymmetric signatures. Knowledge of 
the routing message emission rates and the reception time of the last authenticated MSN 
can be used judge whether the received MSN is reasonable or not. This stops possible 
hash calculation exhaustion attacks.  
Neither signatures nor hash values preclude selfish nodes. It is hard to judge whether 
an MPR failed to forward a packet due to selfishness or for other reasons.   
 
6 Performance 
6.1 General assumptions and analytical approximations 
The network topology information and method for calculation of channel utilization 
are adopted from [19]. The network topology information in [19] was obtained through 
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calculations and simulations with the ns-2 network simulator. The number of MPRs 
selected by each node was set 10-20% higher than the minimum required by the 
standard protocol. Other simulation parameters were: Random Waypoint mobility 
model, maximum speed 20 m/s and pause time 60s, nodes distributed over 
1500mx300m, and transmission range 250m.  
The performance calculations are based on the packet formats of the hybrid scheme 
and standard OLSR shown in Fig.1. HNA and MID messages are assumed to contribute 
little to the overall OLSR traffic, and are therefore not included in the calculations. No 
message aggregation is assumed, and the TC intervals are set to 2,5*HELLO intervals. 
I.e., a HELLO interval of 2 seconds implies 5 seconds between each TC message.  
Whereas processor utilization is important, the analysis in [7] revealed channel 
utilization as a more limiting factor for the applicability of asymmetric signatures for 
protection of ad hoc routing messages. The replacement of some of the asymmetric 
signatures with cheaper hash functions makes processor utilization even less 
constraining. The focus of this paper is therefore on channel utilization, and processor 
utilization is left out of further discussions. 
The performance evaluation assumes asymmetric schemes and hash functions of 
similar security levels, and is based on the parameter sizes proposed by NIST [12], 
shown in A.1 in Appendix A. Corresponding signature sizes are found in table A.2 in 
Appendix A. 
Shamir’s IBS expands the signature size with a factor of two compared to RSA for the 
same modulus. Depending on implementation, the newer IBS schemes from the parings 
such as [4], [8], [14], and [17] can provide shorter signatures. In [12], the proposed hash 
sizes are twice the size of the symmetric keys. This is for collision resistance. The threat 
to the hash chains in the hybrid scheme is inversion of the one-way function (preimage 
resistance) rather than collision resistance. Consequently, the hash sizes can be halved. 
6.2 Channel utilization 
The channel utilization is measured as the average fraction of a second a channel is 
occupied. The calculations assume IEEE 802.11b with CSMA/CS-DSSS for the lower 
layers. OLSR traffic is broadcast traffic with a data rate of 1Mbps. UDP, IP and 802.11 
MAC headers add an overhead of 8+20+34 bytes to each OLSR packet, respectively. In 
addition comes a 802.11b delay of 552us [10] per MAC frame.  A collision and error 
free channel is assumed.  
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The size of the TC messages is calculated under the assumptions that every TC 
message advertises (N-1)*mSxRATE links (N equals the number of nodes within 1-hop 
neighborhood and mSxRATE the MPR selector rate; the average probability that a neighbor 
selects this node as its MPR). The HELLO messages are assumed to include two 
different link codes.  
Fig.3 shows the average channel utilization measured in fraction of a second occupied 
by OLSR traffic for various network sizes, security overheads and signature to hash 
ratios.  Fig. 3a) shows that most of the bandwidth savings is obtained by the first hashed 
messages. Increasing the number of hashed messages to each signed message is most 
beneficial for the largest signatures.   
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Whereas Fig. 3a) assumes the same signature to hash ratio for all message types, 
Fig.3b) includes the effect of differentiation on message types. The notation “2048/112: 
H(1:3),TC(1:0)” means every fourth HELLO messages include a signature of 2048 bits 
and a hash value of 112bits. All TC messages include a signature of 2048 bits, but no 
hash value. Likewise, 1024/0:(1:0) refers to a pure signature scheme with 1024bits 
signatures added to both the HELLO and the TC messages. The figure shows that most 
of the bandwidth gain is obtained through hashed TC messages rather than hashed 
HELLOs. 
 
6.3 Discussions 
As a rule of thumb, OLSR traffic should not exceed 10% of the bandwidth. The 
calculations indicate that significant bandwidth savings can be obtained by introducing 
one or more hashed messages for every signed one. More hashed messages per signed 
message are especially beneficial with the larger signature sizes, more nodes in the 
network and increasing emission frequencies. With increasing network sizes, the 
average number of TC messages grows faster than the average number of HELLO 
messages per channel, and the calculations show that the signed TC messages contribute 
more to the channel utilization than the signed HELLO messages. As can be seen from 
Fig. 3b), this difference is amplified with increasing network sizes. Through 
calculations, we found that the difference is also augmented with shorter routing 
message emission intervals. (Experience has shown that the default HELLO interval of 
2s can be too long with mobile nodes). Hence, hashing the flooded messages is 
desirable. Regarding local messages, under the assumption that only authenticated 
neighbors are accepted as MPRs and MPR selectors, the gain obtained by hashing the 
HELLO messages should be weighed against the potential added delay in the neighbor 
detection and MPR selection processes. 
Whereas TC message signatures should be triggered by topology changes or the 
maximum time since last signature is exceeded, the calculations assume periodical 
(maximum time triggered) signatures. Further simulations are required to confirm the 
average time between topology changes. 
The calculations here only considered average channel occupation. That is, 
(2048/80:(1:3)) would show the same average channel occupation as (1024/80:(1:1)). 
However, the probability of congestion and packet losses may be higher with the larger 
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signature sizes. Generally, shorter signatures are preferred.  Furthermore, the 
calculations assumed an IBS scheme. But the figures are applicable to any signature 
scheme with the chosen signature sizes. If the IBS scheme is replaced by a traditional 
digital signature scheme, the bandwidth consumption of certificate exchanges must be 
taken into consideration. An estimate is found by adding the certificate lengths to the 
signature sizes.  
 
7 Related work 
SOLSR [6], proposed by Hong, Hong, and Fu, uses asymmetric signatures and hash 
chains for the protection of OLSR. However, the SOLSR approach is different from the 
hybrid protection scheme. Similarly to the hybrid protection scheme, the signatures in 
SOLSR cover all non-mutable fields of the routing messages. But SOLSR assumes all 
routing messages include a digital signature. Bandwidth efficiency is not considered. 
The hash chains are used to protect the mutable Time to live (TTL) and HopCount 
fields, and do not serve as a proof of authenticity of unsigned messages as in the hybrid 
protection scheme. Each new SOLSR routing message contains both the seed and the 
anchor of a new hash chain. The hash anchor is included in the signed part of the 
routing message. The seed is updated by intermediate nodes. Hashing the seed received 
a number of times equal to the difference between the TTL and the HopCount should 
return the hash anchor. The hybrid protection scheme leaves the TTL and HopCount 
fields unprotected. 
In our opinion, there are some deficiencies with the SOLSR scheme. According to the 
OLSR RFC [3]; intermediate nodes should decrease the TTL and increase the 
HopCount fields nodes before the routing message is forwarded. However, whereas the 
hop count plays an important role in the calculations of the shortest routes in distance 
vector routing protocols such as AODV [15], there is basically no need to protect the 
TTL and HopCount fields of OLSR. The HopCounts are not used in the route 
calculations. Reducing the TTL value by more than one means the packet will die 
sooner. Still, any node can decide not to forward the packet, which kills it even faster. 
Increasing the TTL will not increase the packet lifetime significantly. Duplicates of 
flooded packets are detected on the basis of sequence numbers, and will be discarded. 
Furthermore, SOLSR detects wormholes on the basis of observed round-trip times. A 
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wormhole is suspected if the round-trip time indicates the distance to its neighbor 
exceeds the maximum transmission range. However, it is not evident how one can judge 
whether an extra delay is caused by lower layers normal media contention or an 
additional travel distance through a wormhole tunnel.  
The reactive SAODV [21] uses hash chains to authenticate the hop count, which is 
used to calculate the shortest routes. In SLSP [13], hash chains are used to prevent 
topology information from being distributed further than a specified number of hops.  
In SEAD [9], a hash chain is used to ensure other nodes cannot retransmit the routing 
message with a higher sequence number than just received or with a shorter distance 
than currently received. Loose time synchronization is required in order to prevent 
successful masquerade attacks with the use of already disclosed hash values. In our 
scheme, hash chains are combined with signatures and message sequence number 
receipts and periodic proactive refreshes of the hash anchor (signed messages). This 
reduces the need for time synchronization. 
Whereas the hybrid protection scheme is based on the MSN-receipt technique in [20], 
Adjih et al. [1] and Hafslund et al. [5] propose time stamps instead of sequence numbers 
for replay protection. In [19] it is shown in that the MSN-receipt technique scales better 
than the time stamp solutions. 
 
8 Conclusions and future work 
Bandwidth efficient security solutions are sought for ad hoc networks. The hybrid 
protection scheme shows how hash values from a hash chain can be combined with 
asymmetric identity-based signatures (IBS) into a bandwidth efficient security solution. 
The calculations showed that significant bandwidth savings can be obtained even by in 
average hashing only every second routing message instead of signing it.  More hashed 
messages increase the savings. 
The hybrid protection scheme mitigates persisting route corruption, exhaustion, 
masquerade, replay and black hole attacks from both externals as well as (to some 
extent) internal legitimate members of the network. Although not all routing messages 
are signed, the broadcast nature of the routing protocol combined with the hash values 
make successful attacks harder. The hash values also eases message sequence number 
(MSN) wrap-around recognition and make replay attacks easier to detect. The hash 
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values prevent attackers from successfully inserting unscheduled routing messages on 
the behalf of other nodes. However, under specific circumstances, as discussed in the 
security analysis, there is a risk that malicious nodes may succeed in temporarily 
introducing false routing information. These attacks are not straight forward to mount, 
and signed routing messages will erase any false information. TC messages are 
expected to be signed if they include a topology change.  It would thus require two or 
more lost packets in sequence in order to insert false topology information. A topology 
change from one hashed message to the next is suspicious. 
Whereas the hybrid protection scheme is proposed for OLSR, we regard the method 
as generic and applicable to other proactive link-state routing protocols as well. 
Furthermore, the IBS scheme could be replaced with a digital signature scheme. 
Certificate distribution must then be taken into consideration. Bandwidth efficient 
protection schemes for other routing protocols are topics for further research.  
The security levels suggested in [12] were used as an estimate for the performance 
evaluation. However, a comprehensive framework for the decision of appropriate key 
lengths in ad hoc networks is a topic for further investigations. So is effective key 
management, including revocation. 
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A Appendix: Security levels, hash lengths and signature 
sizes 
(From NIST [12]) 
Security 
level 
(bits)  
Hash 
size 
IFC & 
TDL n 
FFC 
(SDL) 
 p/q 
ECC 
key 
length 
Safe un-
til year 
80 160 1024 1024/160 160-223 2010 
112 224 2048 2048/224 224-255 2030 
Table A.1 
Comparable security levels 
 
Security level 80 112 
Hash size  80 112 
Cert. based RSA 1024 2048 IFC & 
DL IBS Shamir 2048 4092 
SDL Cert. based DSA 160 224 
 ECDSA 320 448 Cert. 
based BLS[2]  168  
ECC  
IBS 
Pairing 
based 
SOK[17], 
Cha& Cheon[2], 
Paterson [14], 
Hess [8]  
(340- 
2048)*
(682-
4092)*  
Table A.2 
Hash lengths and signature sizes 
 
 
 
*) Depends on the embedding degree k of the torsion group (1≤k≤6). 
 
IFC= integer factorization cryptography 
TDL= Traditional discrete log  
SDL= subgroup discrete log  
ECC= elliptic curve cryptography 
n= bits in modulus 
p= bits in prime modulus 
q= subgroup size in bits 
IBS= Identity-based signatures 
Cert.= Certificate 
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Corrections:  
• In the OLSR section Topology change – should have been topology control.  
• In the paragraph describing SEAD in the Related Work section, it is claimed 
that loose time synchronization is required in order to prevent successful 
masquerade attacks with the aid of already disclosed hash values. This refers 
to the hash values of the TESLA authentication scheme. TESLA is one of 
more options that can be used to authenticate the source of each routing 
update messages. The text may give the impression that the time 
synchronization is required directly in the hash chains used to protect against 
short distance frauds and sequence number deceptions.   
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Abstract—This paper proposes a simple, scalable and robust scheme for the 
distribution of revocation information in mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs); the MRL 
scheme.  A MRL is a revocation list for a specific MANET instantiation. The scheme is 
designed for revocation of keys used to protect the ad hoc network service, and the MRLs 
are distributed with the routing messages. MRLs are established with the aid of trusted 
gateways reporting MANET nodes to a central trusted entity. The trusted gateways must 
be able to detect which nodes are in the MANET. This comes intrinsically with proactive 
ad hoc routing protocols, and may be achieved at some additional cost with reactive 
protocols.  The scheme is intended for ad hoc networks with a planned origin, and where 
a common point of trust exists.  
 
Key words: Key Management, ad hoc networks, revocation, MRL, security 
 
I  Introduction 
Protection of the network layer can be achieved with the aid of unilateral 
authentication of the routing messages. Possible solutions include symmetric message 
157 
   
 
authentication codes and asymmetric (public key) schemes such as digital and identity-
based [22] signatures. Symmetric schemes are efficient both regarding computational 
efficiency and bandwidth consumption. However, changes in group membership imply 
re-keying. This represents a threat to network availability. There is no guarantee that all 
nodes receive the new key in a timely manner. Although still challenging, the exclusion 
of specific nodes is easier with asymmetric schemes. A survey of key management 
schemes for the protection of routing information in ad hoc networks is found in [12]. 
In traditional public key schemes, a trusted entity signs certificates that bind public 
keys to IDs. In identity-based schemes, IDs, e.g., IP-addresses, serve as public keys. The 
corresponding private keys are derived by a trusted entity that knows the secret system 
key. In traditional public key schemes revocation refer to the invalidation of certificates. 
In identity-based schemes IDs are revoked. 
This paper focuses on revocation of certificates and IDs used to protect routing 
information in MANETs intended for operational scenarios such as emergency and 
rescue operations. This means ad hoc networks with a planned origin, and where 
common points of trust exists, and pre-configuration is possible. Our MANET is 
connected with the internet through one or more gateways, a so-called hybrid MANET. 
Only authorized nodes are allowed to join the MANET. Exclusion of captured or 
malfunctioning nodes necessitates distribution of revocation information over the ad hoc 
network.  
A number of methods for certificate revocation have been proposed [24] [25]. 
Unfortunately, these are generally not very well suited for the ad hoc environment. The 
online certificate status protocol (OCSP) [19] and the Certificate Revocation Status 
(CRS) [16] approach require online access to a third party to check the validity of 
certificates. Online access is hard to guarantee at all times in MANETs.  
In the certificate revocation list (CRL) method a Certificate Authority (CA) 
periodically updates a signed and time-stamped list of all revoked certificates. A major 
drawback is that with certificate lifetimes typically measured in years, even a small 
revocation rate may lead to long lists. Furthermore, new lists every time a node is 
revoked lead to large update costs. Therefore, CRLs are typically updated only weekly or 
biweekly [25]. Higher granularity is needed in order to be able to expel nodes from 
MANETs that last hours or days.  
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∆-CRLs are shorter and provide fresher information. These only list certificates that 
have been revoked since last CRL update. But ∆-CRLs are also issued with a frequency, 
e.g., daily, that may be to low. Higher frequencies may lead to a significant update cost. 
Besides, if one or more of the ad hoc nodes missed the last CRL, the CRL may need to 
be distributed in the MANET anyway. Moreover, CRLs and ∆-CRLs normally list 
revocations concerning the entire security domain and not only the subset of nodes that 
takes part in a specific MANET. This represents a waste of bandwidth.  
A revocation scheme for the ad hoc environment is needed. The contribution of this 
paper is the MRL scheme for efficient distribution of revocation information in ad hoc 
networks.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Related work is described in section II. 
Section III lists the requirements for revocation schemes for ad hoc networks. The MRL 
scheme is described in section IV. Section V sketches implementation of the MRL 
scheme with various routing protocols. The scheme is analyzed in section VI. 
Conclusions and suggestions for future work are found in section VII.  
 
II Related Work 
Crépeau and Davis [6] propose an accusation-based revocation scheme for ad hoc 
networks. Certificates are issued by an off-line certificate authority prior to network 
participation. All nodes monitor the behavior of the others. Accusations are posted if 
discrepancies from “good behavior” are detected. A certificate is revoked when a 
threshold number of accusations have been posted against one node.  Any node is only 
allowed to post a single accusation against any other node. 
The scheme offers limited robustness to varying network connectivity. The nodes are 
assumed to maintain both a common view of the number of nodes in the network and the 
behavior of these nodes, which is a strong requirement in ad hoc networks.  Furthermore, 
a new node may lead to network congestion as the other nodes are supposed to send their 
certificates and profile tables (listing their view of earlier accusations and revocations) to 
newcomers.  
In [15], Jungels, Raya and Hubaux suggest a revocation scheme for vehicular ad hoc 
networks (VANETs). VANETs differ from MANETs in the sense that the nodes move 
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along roads. The nodes communicate vehicle-to-vehicle or via base stations and fixed 
infrastructure available along the road. In each vehicle, the private-public key pairs are 
stored in a tamper-proof device. On revocations, the CA residing in the fixed net sends a 
key-erase message to the tamper-proof device. If the device does not confirm the erasure 
of all its keys, the CA warn other neighbors by a revocation list sent through a side 
channel, e.g., a FM channel. The key erasure and warning messages demand 
infrastructure. If the vehicles are out of range of a base station, the nodes warn each other 
through accusations in a way similar to the accusation based method of Crépeau and 
Davis [6]. However, Jungels, Raya and Hubaux’s scheme increase the robustness to 
packet losses as accusations are repeated periodically as long as the neighbors continue 
to receive suspicious messages. The accusations are forwarded to the CA as soon as a 
connection to the CA is detected. An accusation based scheme is also suggested in [7].  
Morogan and Muftic [17] suggest the nodes of mobile ad hoc networks fetch CRLs 
when they are online on the Internet, or receive CRLs from nodes with fresher CRLs 
than their own.  
To summarize, the proposals rely on the ad hoc nodes’ exchange of accusations or 
CRLs and downloads from trusted entities during periods with connection to the fixed 
network. 
   
III Requirements 
Security: The revocation information must be distributed in a manner that enables the 
recipient to verify its integrity, authenticity and freshness. The revocation information 
must reach the nodes in a timely manner.  
Robustness: The distribution of revocation information must be robust both to packet 
losses and nodes exhibiting Byzantine behavior. In operational scenarios such as 
emergency and rescue operations, availability is a number one concern. No false 
revocations should ever occur. 
Simplicity: Simplicity is an intuitive and overall design criterion. Computational 
complexity should be localized to the less constrained nodes. The decision to revoke a 
node may be made by an operator, but the distribution of revocation information should 
not involve human interaction.  
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Scalability: The revocation scheme should scale well enough to handle the expected 
number of nodes, security domains, and revocations. The revocation information must be 
distributed in a bandwidth efficient manner. Redundant and irrelevant revocation 
information should be minimized. 
 
IV The MRL Scheme 
A. Assumptions 
A MRL (MANET revocation list) contains revocation information concerning nodes 
in a specific MANET. The term revocation list (RL) is used instead of certificate 
revocation list (CRL) as the method can be used both for traditional certificate based 
public keys as well as for identity-based schemes.  
A central trusted entity is assumed in each security domain. This entity issues 
certificates or private keys, and is responsible for revocations. The keys are linked to 
long term IDs known by the routing protocol, e.g., OLSR main addresses [4], –either 
through certificates or by using the IDs as public keys. Each node may still use multiple 
and temporary identifiers. That is, only pre-defined nodes will expectedly be authorized 
to join protected ad hoc networks for emergency and rescue operations. The general 
assumption that the IP addresses should be obtained as the node enters the network, may 
not apply. Home addresses of Mobile IP may be utilized. This is described in [11]. 
A full RL is issued on a regular basis. Full RLs are transferred to the nodes prior to 
MANET participation. During MANET operation, MRLs are set up and distributed with 
the aid of trusted MANET gateways. The MRLs will expectedly be short. They are 
assumed to fit into a single routing protocol packet/message. MRLs could also be 
distributed over more packets/messages. However, the keys are used to bootstrap the 
network service. Long MRLs imply loss of network connectivity, which makes MRL 
distribution redundant.  
The gateways are assumed to be more protected and less resource constrained, e.g., 
mobile base stations, than ordinary MANET nodes. Specific keys and IDs enable them 
to act as trusted gateways. The MANET may include nodes from a single security 
domain or from multiple security domains. The central trusted entity is assumed to 
possess computational and communicational resources large enough to handle the 
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expected number of concurrent MANET instantiations. It is also assumed to be 
accessible from the trusted MANET gateways when needed. A revocation may be a 
result of detected malicious behavior, a report of a lost unit or other. 
 
B. Protocol Outline 
1) MRL: central trusted entity – trusted MANET gateway 
The protocol is shown in Fig.1. The notation “A->B: MSG NAME:” means that ID A 
sends a message named MSG NAME to ID B, and {msg}signA means a message msg plus 
A’s signature on msg. In the figure, A refers to the trusted MANET gateway and B to the 
central trusted entity.   
The MANET gateway initiates the setup of a MRL with a MRL initialization request 
(MREQ) message (step 1 in Fig.1). The central trusted entity responds with a MRL-
initialization proceed (MPRO) message. The MPRO contains a fresh sequence number 
from the central trusted entity (SeqB1) and a receipt of the sequence number from the 
gateway (SeqA1). Old messages and messages where the signature check fails are 
discarded.   
The MANET gateway proceeds with a Report & refresh (RR) message that lists the 
IDs detected in the MANET. The central trusted entity registers the reported nodes and 
returns a MRL in step 4. The MRL lists the revoked IDs or revoked certificate serial 
numbers among the reported nodes. It may contain zero or more entries. The version 
number (RL no) is incremented only when new items are added to the list.  
After the MRL has been established, the periodic RR messages serve the dual purpose 
of reporting new nodes discovered (if any) and informing the central trusted entity of the 
continued existence of the MANET. A MRL is returned in response to each RR message. 
Reported IDs need not be repeated.  If a RR message has not been received within a 
given period of time, the central trusted entity considers the MANET terminated. If 
continued service is demanded, and the gateway has not received a MRL in response to a 
given number of RRs, it reverts to step 1. 
 A MANET may have more than one gateway to the external network. The central 
trusted entity maintains a separate MRL for each gateway, no matter whether the 
gateways report the same set of MANET nodes or not. The MANET gateways run one 
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instance of the protocol for each involved security domain, and receive a MRL from each 
involved central trusted entity. (The central trusted entities must exchange information 
about their trusted gateways, and issue cross-certificates or mutually signed system 
parameters.) 
 
MRL initialization messages (initial handshake) 
1. A->B: MRL INIT. REQUEST (MREQ): 
{MREQ, A, SeqA1, B}signA 
2. B->A: MRL INIT. PROCEED (MPRO): 
{MPRO, B, SeqB1, A, SeqA1}signB 
 
MRL maintenance messages (periodical) 
3. A->B: REPORT & REFRESH (RR):          
       {RR,A, SeqA2, B,SeqB1, #IDs, IDs}signA 
4. B->A: MRL (MRL): 
{MRL, B, SeqB2, A, SeqA2, RL no, #revoked, 
revoked IDs}signB 
 
General message format (some fields may be empty): 
Message type, Source ID, Source sequence number, 
Destination ID, Last received sequence number from 
destination, List version number, # IDs on list, List of IDs, 
Source’s signature. 
(“#” = “The number of”) 
 
Fig. 1 The MRL protocol between the trusted MANET Gateway (A) and the central 
trusted entity (B)  
 
 A->MANET nodes:  
{A, Message sequence number, [Ordinary routing message 
body], MRL }signA 
 
Fig.2  MRL distribution in the MANET 
 
2) MRL: trusted MANET gateway – MANET nodes 
The MANET gateways distribute the MRLs as a separate routing message/packet or 
appended to an existing flooded routing message type. The protocol is illustrated in 
Fig.2. The MRL scheme assumes that the routing messages are protected by a 
cryptographic signature covering both the MRL as well as all other non-mutable fields of 
the routing message. The “ordinary routing message body” is only included if the MRL 
is appended to another routing message. Only non-empty MRLs are sent into the 
MANET. The latest non-empty MRL is flooded periodically. If multiple security 
domains are involved, more than one MRL may be included by the gateway.  
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3) Message processing in the MANET nodes 
The revocation information distributed with the routing protocol needs only be 
checke
the
hen no trusted MANET gateway with access to the central trusted entity exists, 
revocat imes monitors the behavior of its 1-hop 
ne
V The MRL Scheme with various routing protocols 
OLSR: In the optimized link state routing protocol (OLSR) [2] [4], all nodes maintain 
uding 
ga
2] adopts the generalized MANET packet and message formats 
spe
HNA). The HELLO 
me
d when the first MRL is received and when the RL number indicates a change in 
 list. Routing messages from revoked nodes are discarded. 
 
4) Autonomous ad hoc networks 
W
ion is precluded. That is, each node at all t
ighbors. Nodes acting suspiciously are not accepted as symmetric neighbors. 
Suspicious behavior include actions such as forwarding modified messages, and 
announcing that it will forward traffic on other nodes’ behalf without doing so.  
 
 
a view of the topology of the entire ad hoc network. Topology information, incl
teway announcements, is distributed periodically with the aid of Multipoint Relay 
(MPR) nodes. Each node selects MPRs from its 1-hop neighbors in such a way that all 2-
hop neighbors are covered by at least one MPR. Only nodes that are chosen as MPRs 
forward routing information. Each node is uniquely identified by its main address that is 
included in all messages. 
OLSRv1 [4] proposes that extensions to the protocol are implemented as new 
message types. OLSRv2 [
cified in [3], and suggests extensions are implemented as new message types or type-
length-value fields (TLVs) added to existing message types. For bandwidth efficiency, it 
is beneficial to include the MRL in existing routing messages. Additional packet 
transmissions and extra message signature validations are avoided.  
OLSRv1 [4] specifies four message types: HELLO, Topology Control (TC), Multiple 
Interface Declaration (MID) and Host and Network Association (
ssages are used for local link sensing, neighbor detection and MPR selection, and are 
not forwarded by the MPRs. The other message types are. TC messages convey topology 
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information, and are only sent by MPR nodes. The gateway may not be chosen as MPR. 
Nodes with multiple OLSR addresses send MID messages to map these interface 
addresses to the main address. The gateway may not have multiple OLSR interfaces. As 
the revocation information is distributed through gateways, HNA messages announcing 
non-OLSR interfaces are a natural candidate for the inclusion of MRLs. OLSRv2 only 
specifies HELLO and TC messages. Gateway announcements are included as TLVs in 
TC messages. Hence, gateways emit TC messages, and MRLs can be added as TLVs to 
these. 
The inclusion of MRLs as TLVs in OLSRv1 HNA messages is sketched in Fig.3. The 
MRL scheme assumes that the routing messages are protected end-to-end by a message 
au
in the TC messages. Nodes that do not choose any MPRs 
co
col to ad hoc networks. Opposing OLSR, OSPF 
MA
thentication TLV, e.g., using the scheme in [10].  Backward compatibility would 
require a new message type for MRLs. However, the inclusion of signature TLVs is also 
not backward compatible. According to the specifications in [4] signatures should also be 
distributed in separate messages. But, in [23] it is shown that end-to-end signatures in 
separate messages scale badly. And backward compatibility may not be important in 
operational scenarios such as emergency and rescue operations where only pre-defined 
nodes are allowed to join.   
A potential problem is that only MPR selectors (nodes that have chosen this node as 
their MPR) are announced 
uld be accepted as symmetric neighbors, without having their existence exposed 
outside the scope of HELLO messages. However, in accordance with the OLSR 
specifications [4], the nodes can be set up to report all links. This will inhibit “hidden 
members”. Alternatively, the MPRs can report links to nodes that appears not to be 
included in any other TC messages. 
OSPF MANET: OSPF MANET refers to the adaptation of the Open shortest path 
first (OSPF) [5] [18] routing proto
NET provides reliable flooding. The proposed OSPF MANET solutions; OSPF 
overlapping relays (OSPF-OR) [1] and OSPF MANET designated router (OSPF-MDR) 
[20], differ in the way they optimize the flooding of routing information. OSPF-OR 
nodes choose overlapping relays (ORs) parallel to the MPRs in OLSR. Non-OR nodes 
act as backup ORs that retransmit the routing messages if the ordinary OR fails to do so. 
OSPF-MDR use MANET designated routers (MDRs) to flood routing information. The 
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decision to become a MDR or a backup designated router (BMDR) is made by the nodes 
themselves. All routing messages are acknowledged. 
The nodes are uniquely identified by their router ID included in each routing packet. 
All routers within an OSPF area have a consistent link-state database. The link-state 
database contains a collection of LSAs (link-state advertisements) that describes the 
OSPF routing domain. The topology information is disseminated through link state 
update (LSU) packets containing link-state advertisements (LSAs). Gateways to other 
areas (border area router) run different instance of the routing protocol for each area. 
Only summary information from one area is distributed into another.  
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Fig.3 OLSRv1 packet and message formats 
We assume the MA uters announce their 
ga
R and OSPF-MDR extensions to the OSPFv3 packet format is shown in 
Fig
NET is one OSPF area. The area border ro
teway capabilities through LSU packets containing inter-area-prefix LSAs and inter-
area-router LSAs. We assume that the MRLs are included in LSU from trusted MANET 
area border routers. The other OSPF packet types; HELLO, database description (DD), 
link-state request, and link-state acknowledgement are not forwarded outside the 1-hop 
neighborhood.  
The OSPF-O
.4. MANET specific information is carried in a link local signaling (LLS) data block 
attached to HELLO and DD packets. OSPF-OR in addition specifies a new LSA type – 
link LSA that is used to distribute information about 2-hop neighbors. Each LLS data 
block may contain several TLVs. LLS-incapable routers will not consider extra data that 
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follows after the packet. Thus, the attached LLS data block renders the extended packet 
format compatible with standard OSPF [26]. However, if each MANET is a separate 
OSPF-area, and only predefined nodes are allowed to join, compatibility with OSPFv3 
may not be a strict requirement.  
We suggest MRLs distributed in TLVs in a LLS data block attached to the LSU 
pa
tication as an integral part of the routing 
pro
ckets. The scope of the LLS thus becomes MANET-local rather than link-local. OSPF-
OR [1] assumes LLS data blocks are appended to HELLO or DD packets used in the 
synchronization of the link-state databases of adjacent nodes. But LLS data blocks could 
also be attached to other packet types. We assume end-to-end protection of the routing 
information is implemented with signatures in TLVs in the LLS data block. It requires 
LSU packets are flooded as is. (OSPF assumes LSAs are flooded. The LSU encapsulating 
the LSAs could be modified hop by hop.)   
Whereas OSPFv2 [18] specifies authen
tocol, OSPFv3 [5] relies on IPsec. OSPF-OR suggests the ability to connect to the 
MANET is controlled by layer 2 security mechanisms such as IEEE802.11i. The MRL 
scheme can be used no matter which layer protects the routing messages. That is, at least 
as long as an asymmetric scheme is used and the revoked keys can be linked to IDs 
known to the routing protocol. IPsec and IEEE802.11i by default use symmetric keys. 
Unilateral authentication of ad hoc routing messages may imply a modification to the 
existing standards. 
YLLS Data
OSPFv3 Data
X
OSPFv3 Header
Length = X
HLIPv6 Header
Length= HL + X + Y
 
Fig.4 OSPF MANET packet extension 
AODV: In the ad hoc [21] routing protocol, 
rou
 on demand distance vector (AODV) 
tes are discovered on demand by flooding a route request (RREQ) into the network. 
The RREQ carries the IP addresses of the originator as well as the destination. The 
destination (or intermediate nodes with a valid route to the destination) unicasts a route 
reply (RREP) along the path that the RREQ was received. The AODV specification [21] 
allows extensions in the form of type-length-value (TLVs) appended to RREQs and 
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RREPs. We assume that all routing messages are integrity protected and authenticated by 
digital or identity-based signatures. 
The gateways will normally not have a complete map of all nodes in the MANET. 
Th
Qs sent by the gateway to a predefined revocation 
inf
VI Analysis 
 
A ] is assumed, i.e. the adversary may eavesdrop on any 
me
ey can listen to the routing messages that are flooded in the network, and report to the 
central trusted entity as IDs are discovered. However, the destination will return a RREP 
along the path it received the RREQ. If the destination lies between the source and the 
gateway, the gateway may not receive any of the messages. The AODV expanding ring 
search, i.e., the flooding scope of RREQs is gradually increased until a route reply is 
received, makes it even less likely. Besides, intermediate nodes in a path will not be 
announced. Inclusion of the MRL scheme demands a modification of the protocol: all 
nodes on an active path must periodically send a RREQ searching a gateway. The “D 
flag” must be set to avoid intermediate nodes with a valid route answers the request. The 
gateway checks the signature of the RREQ before the node is reported. If a node on an 
active path does not hear such RREQs originated from one of the precursors within a 
given period of time, the precursor is reported in a TLV appended to its next gateway 
RREQ or blacklisted (excluded).  
The MRLs are added to RRE
ormation address. All nodes processes and forwards the RREQ, but do not return any 
RREPs.  
 
A. Security evaluation 
 Dolev-Yao threat model [9
ssage, modify and replay messages, and forge source and destination addresses. But 
the adversary cannot produce a valid signature on other nodes’ behalf or decrypt a 
message that has been encrypted with a key she does not possess. That is, for the ad hoc 
network the Dolev-Yao threat model must be modified to encounter that one or a few 
nodes may be compromised. This is as ad hoc nodes are expected to be out in the field. 
The probability of compromised nodes will expectedly be higher than in a fixed network.  
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1) Security of the protocol between the MANET gateway and 
the central trusted entity: 
The first three steps of the protocol in Fig.1 are parallel to the three-pass mutual 
authentication mechanism specified in ISO 9798-3[13]. That is, the random numbers in 
the ISO standard are replaced by sequence numbers in the MRL protocol. Mutual 
authentication is in both cases obtained after the first three steps have completed. 
However, in order to continue to evaluate the freshness of the next messages, the MRL 
protocol requires that each message is linked to the preceding one. Differently from the 
random numbers of the ISO standard, the incrementing sequence numbers links the next 
message to the previous one beyond the first three steps. The sequence numbers are not 
reused during the lifetime of the signature keys. Each message is thus uniquely 
identifiable.  
The signature on the initial MREQ message proves the integrity and authenticity of 
origin, but not the freshness of the request. The central trusted entity can judge from the 
sequence number whether it has responded to this request earlier or not. But if not, at this 
point it cannot decide whether the request is fresh or not. The MANET gateway’s 
sequence number (SeqA1) returned in the MPRO message enables the MANET gateway 
to decide which MREQ this MPRO is a response to. Similarly, the central trusted entity 
is able to evaluate the freshness when it receives the receipt of its sequence number in 
the RR message in step 3. The sequence numbers prevents that MRLs are set up on the 
basis of replays. The sequence number receipt in the MRL serves to acknowledge the list 
of nodes reported in the previous RR. It also enables the MANET gateway to detect 
MRL replays.  
The MANET gateway can scale the timeliness of MRLs to the desired level by 
adjusting the frequency of RR messages.  
 
2) The security of the protocol between the MANET gateways 
and the MANET nodes: 
In Fig.1 the signature of the MANET gateway ensures the message integrity and 
authenticity of origin of the routing message that encapsulates the MRL. The central 
trusted entity’s signature ensures the integrity and authenticity of the MRL. The 
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inclusion of the ID of the gateway in the signed part of the MRL prevents others from 
posing as a trusted gateway by including an old list issued to another gateway.  
The sequence numbers and the RL no included in the MRL signed by the central 
trusted entity indicate the freshness of the information. Higher numbers imply fresher 
information. However, these numbers do not uniquely link the MRL to this specific 
MANET instantiation. In theory, the trusted gateway could replay MRLs from an earlier 
MANET instantiation. A way to reduce this problem would be to include the version 
number of the latest full revocation list in the MRL. This would reduce the window of 
opportunity for successful replays of MRLs. A lower version number in the MRL than 
the version number of the latest revocation list held by the nodes would imply a replay. 
However, under the assumption that certificates or IDs are never revalidated after their 
revocation (at least not during the lifetime of the public key/system parameters of the 
central trusted entity), the replay of old MRLs does no other harm than wasting 
bandwidth. 
The nodes must trust the MANET gateway to correctly report all nodes in the 
MANET to the central trusted entity. With the protocols in Fig.1 and Fig.2 the gateway 
could undetectably just report a subset of the nodes. The inclusion of the list of reported 
nodes in the MRL message would mitigate this. However, it would also increase the 
bandwidth cost. Besides, the gateway could still refuse to forward the MRL. We suggest 
redundant gateways as a more practical and robust solution. As long as at least one 
gateway behaves properly, the relevant revocation information will be distributed into 
the MANET.  
A malicious insider may not want to forward revocation information about itself. But 
other nodes that behave according to the protocol will. In OSPF MANET the backup 
MDRs or non-OR nodes will forward the message if the ordinary MDR/OR fails to do 
so. In OLSR, if one MPR does not forward the MRL, the node will still receive it from 
other symmetric neighbors that retransmit the message. Though, the network may 
contain sparsely connected areas. If a node represents the only connection from the 
gateway to the rest of network, this node could hold back revocation information from 
propagating into the part of the network that it “controls” -at least temporarily. Node 
mobility, changing topology and the periodic (re)transmissions of MRLs reduce the 
problem. 
 
170 
   
 
B. Robustness and simplicity 
The scheme is simple and robust in the sense that there is no need to synchronize the 
revocation lists, even if not all ad hoc nodes have the latest full RL. If a revoked node is 
included in the network, it will appear in the next MRL, and be excluded. There is no 
need for the gateways to synchronize their lists of nodes, and the central trusted entity 
needs not harmonize the various MRLs. The scheme is robust to gateway failures in the 
sense that MRLs are deleted automatically if the central trusted entity has not receive any 
RRs within a given timeout period. The scheme is robust to packet losses. Non-empty 
MRLs are repeated in the periodical routing messages from the gateways. Bandwidth 
consumption is optimized as the MRLs only include information concerning the nodes in 
the specific MANET. Also, most of the MRL administration is off-loaded to gateways 
and central trusted entities that are expected to be less energy-constrained than the 
battery powered ad hoc nodes. 
No revocation information will be distributed unless a trusted gateway with access to 
the fixed net exists. A remedy could be to empower more protected and trusted ad hoc 
nodes to deny access, possibly implemented by a threshold scheme [8] (a threshold 
number of trusted nodes must co-operate to exclude a node). But it also adds complexity 
and increases bandwidth cost. 
 
C. Scalability/Performance 
The MRL scheme is here compared with CRLs and ∆-CRLs distributed through the 
gateways rather than the state-of-the-art accusation-based and CRL-exchange methods 
surveyed in section II. This is as we consider CRLs and ∆-CRLs to be more likely 
alternatives for our operational scenario. Accusation based schemes may lead to false 
revocations.  
1) The number of revocations 
Key changes represent a large administrative cost. Changes of keys used to bootstrap 
the network service also represent a threat to network availability. Hence, in practical 
scenarios keys can be expected to last for more than one MANET instantiation. With 
increasing lifetimes for the keys, the anticipated number of revocations will also 
increase. The number of revocations in a specific MANET will depend on the size of the 
MANET and the lifetime of the network. The probability of a revocation during a 
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MANET operation prevMANET can be estimated from the revocation probability prev of the 
involved security domains and the lifetime of the MANET tMANET to the lifetime of the 
key/certificate tkeylife: 
prevMANET = prev*  tMANET/tkeylife     ( 2) 
With Ntot representing the total size of the security domains, the total number of 
revocations in the involved security domains during a MANET instantiation, Nrev, 
equals  
Nrev=Ntot*prevMANET    ( 3) 
However, with NMANET nodes in the MANET, only NMANET/Ntot of these will 
expectedly concern nodes in this MANET.  The number of revocations in a specific 
MANET during its lifetime NrevMANET  is thus:  
NrevMANET = NMANET * prevMANET    ( 4) 
To exemplify this: assume a uniform distribution of revocations with prev=10%, 
Ntot=100000, NMANET=100, tMANET=1day, tkeylife= 365 days.The expected average number 
of revocations within a specific MANET will then be NrevMANET <1. The expected total 
number of revocations within the involved security domains during the same period 
equals Nrev≈28. With the assumed values, a ∆-CRL issued one week after the latest full 
RL would contain around 200 entries. A full RL also comprises previously revoked 
nodes.  
2) Overhead 
Overhead between the trusted gateways and the central trusted entity depend on the 
RR frequency, which can be scaled by the gateways. The sizes of the messages are 
confined by the number of nodes in the MANET and the signatures and message header 
information inserted by the gateway and the central trusted entity. The signatures will 
expectedly contribute most. Redundant revocation information is reduced as origination 
of MRL messages is limited to trusted MANET gateways, and only non-empty MRLs 
are sent into the network.   
The scalability of the MRL scheme is illustrated in Fig.5. The figure shows an estimate 
for the expected average channel utilization under the assumption that the revocation 
information is included in OLSRv1 HNA messages. Channel utilization refers to the 
fraction of a second that the channel is occupied with OLSR traffic. The figure shows the 
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cost of including a MRL, CRL or ∆-CRL in protected OLSR messages. Standard OLSR 
is included for reference. Topology information and calculation methods are adopted 
from [23], and were obtained through calculations and simulations with the ns-2 network 
simulator. The calculations assume IEEE 802.11b with CSMA/CS-DSSS for the lower 
layers, and OLSR traffic broadcast data rate of 1Mbps. UDP, IP and 802.11 MAC 
headers add 8+20+34 bytes to each OLSR packet, respectively.  
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Fig. 5  Performance: Average channel utilization for OLSR with and without various 
revocation methods  
A collision and error free channel is assumed. Additional 802.11b delay is 552us [14] 
per MAC frame. The calculations are based on the formats in Fig.3. 
Protected OLSR refers to the inclusion of a 512 bit signature in all routing messages. 
The calculations assume one gateway that emits one MRL, CRL or ∆-CRL appended to 
its protected OLSR HNA messages.  A CRL of 2000 entries, a ∆-CRL with 200 entries, 
and a MRL with 1 entry is assumed. Each entry is a 32 bit ID. The MRL, ∆-CRL and 
CRL also include a 2048 bit signature from the central trusted entity.  
The figure indicates a significant bandwidth cost for the distribution of CRLs. MRLs 
or ∆-CRL contributes considerably less to the channel utilization. With multiple security 
domains and a CRL or ∆-CRL from each domain, the bandwidth savings obtained with 
the MRL scheme compared to CRL and ∆-CRL will be even greater. The same holds 
true if more gateways insert revocation information.  
 
D. Computational cost 
Keys of central trusted entities are normally longer than those of ordinary nodes. The 
signature verification cost increases accordingly. This is optimized in that the MANET 
nodes only have to verify the MRL signature when a new MRL is flooded into the 
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network. The number of changes will usually be much lower than the number of nodes in 
the network. 
 
VII Conclusions and Future Work 
In the MRL scheme, only revocation information that explicitly concerns the nodes in 
a specific MANET is disseminated into the ad hoc network. The overhead depends on 
the number of nodes in the ad hoc network rather than the total number of nodes in the 
involved security domain(s). This makes the MRL scheme scale well.  
The scheme requires trusted MANET gateways can detect which nodes are in the 
network. This comes intrinsically with proactive routing protocols. We also described the 
implementation of the MRL scheme with reactive routing protocols. The impact on the 
routing protocol performance is a topic for further analysis. Further work is also needed 
to provide a formal security analysis of the protocol between the trusted MANET 
gateway and the MANET nodes. The formal security analysis requires a method that 
takes the nature of the ad hoc environment and the characteristics of the specific routing 
protocol into consideration.  
The MRL scheme has been designed for the revocation of certificates or IDs used to 
protect the network layer routing information. The technique could also be utilized for 
application data. This is another topic for further research. Whereas keys used to protect 
the ad hoc routing information have a MANET internal scope, keys for application data 
may have a global scope.  
References 
[1] M. Chandra, “Extensions to OSPF to Support Mobile Ad Hoc Networking,” IETF 
Internet-draft, April, 2005 
[2] T. Clausen, C. Dearlove, and P. Jacquet, “The Optimized Link-State Routing 
Protocol version 2,” IETF Internet-Draft, June, 2006. 
[3] T. Clausen, C. Dearlove, J. Dean, and C. Adjih, “Generalized MANET 
Packet/Message Format,” IETF Internet-Draft, July, 2006. 
[4] T. Clausen, and P. Jacquet, (eds.), “Optimized link state routing protocol (olsr),” 
IETF RFC 3626, 2003. 
174 
   
 
[5] R. Coltun, D. Ferguson, and J. Moy, “OSPF for IPv6,” IETF RFC2740, 1999. 
[6] C. Crépeau, and C.R. Davis, “A Certificate Revocation Scheme for Wireless Ad 
Hoc Networks, Workshop on Security of ad hoc and Sensor Networks, 2003. 
[7] C.R. Davis, “A localized trust management scheme for ad hoc networks,” 
International Conference on Networking (ICN’04), 2004. 
[8] Y. G. Desmedt, “Threshold Cryptography,” European Transactions on 
Telecommunications, vol. 5, no. 4, July 1994, pp. 449-457. 
[9] D. Dolev, and A. Yao, “On the security of public key protocols,” IEEE 
Transactions on Information Theory, Vol. 29, no 2, 1983, pp. 198-208. 
[10] A.M. Hegland, P. Spilling,  L. Nilsen, and Ø. Kure, ”Hybrid Protection of 
OLSR,” Workshop on Cryptography for Ad hoc Networks (WCAN’06) 
[11] A.M. Hegland, E. Winjum, P. Spilling, C. Rong, and Ø. Kure, “Analysis of IBS 
for MANET Security in Emergency and Rescue Operations,”  PCAC’06. 
[12] A.M. Hegland, E. Winjum, S.F. Mjølsnes, C. Rong, Ø. Kure, and P. Spilling, “A 
Survey of Key Management in Ad Hoc Networks,” To appear in IEEE 
Communications Surveys & Tutorials. 
[13] ISO 9798-3, “Information technology. Security techniques. Entity authentication 
mechanisms. Part 3: Mechanisms using digital signature techniques,” 
International Standardization Organization, 1992. 
[14] J. Jun, P. Peddabachagari, and M. Sichitiu, “Theoretical Maximum Throughput of 
IEEE 802.11 and its Applications,” IEEE International Symposium on Network 
Computing and Applicatons, 2003. 
[15] D. Jungels, M. Raya, I. Aad, and J.P. Hubaux, “Certificate Revocation in 
Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks,” SASN’05, 2005. 
[16] S. Micali, “NOVOMODO, Scalable Certificate Validation And Simplified PKI 
Management,” Annual PKI Research Workshop, 2002. 
[17] M. C. Morogan, and S. Muftic, “Certificate Management in Ad Hoc Networks,” 
SAINT’03, 2003. 
[18] J. Moy, “OSPF Version 2”, IETF RFC2328, April, 1998. 
[19] M. Myers, R. Ankney, A. Malpani, S. Galperin, and C. Adams, “X.509 Internet 
Public Key Infrastructure, Online Certificate Status Protocol – OCSP,” IETF 
RFC2560, June, 1999. 
[20] R. Ogier, and P. Spagnolo, “MANET Extension of OSPF using CDS Flooding,” 
IETF Internet-draft, March, 2006. 
175 
   
 
[21] C. Perkins, E. Belding-Royer, and S. Das, “Ad hoc On-Demand Distance Vector 
(AODV) Routing,” IETF RFC 3561, July, 2003.  
[22] A. Shamir, “Identity-based cryptosystems and signature schemes,” CRYPTO '84, 
Springer, 1984. 
[23] E.Winjum, A.M. Hegland, P. Spilling, and Ø. Kure, “A Performance Evaluation 
of Security Schemes proposed for the OLSR Protocol,” MILCOM, 2005 
[24] P. Wohlmacher, “Digital Certificates: A Survey of Revocation Methods,” ACM 
workshops on Multimedia, 2000, pp.111-114. 
[25] P. Zheng, “Tradeoffs in Certificate Revocation Schemes,”ACM SIGCOMM 
Computer Communications Review, vol. 33, no.2, 2003, pp. 103-112. 
[26] A. Zinin, B. Friedman, A. Roy, L. Nguyen, and D. Yeung, “OSPF Link-local 
Signaling,” IETF Internet-Draft, June, 2006. 
 
176 
